Hello, do you have enough time to help with 2000-2500 words? Need that + 3 or 4 new references. Just trying to finish up my understanding of this topic. If you don't have time, or this is too technical, let me know...
"Describe the different verification methods used by the IAEA to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material at the different nuclear facilities within the nuclear fuel cycle."
I need a few sentences or paragraphs on these items (2000-2500 words total). You don't have to help me with all of them, if you focus on a few that's fine, but its basically an outline of what I need to wrap up this topic (hopefully):
1) Item Counting
2) Non Destructive Analyses
3) Neutron multiplicity counting
4) Active Well Coincidence Counter
5) Passive Neutron Coincidence Counter
6) Gamma spectroscopy
7) Gamma spectroscopy for U
8) Gamma spectroscopy for Pu
10) Weighing and calibration
11) Destructive Analyses
12) Destructive Assay
14) Isotopic (IDMS,...)
15) Particle (α-spectr,...)
17) Containment seals
18) Surveillance cameras
If this is too scientific a topic, let me know. I really just need info on how IAEA uses these methods for accountancy and verification in about 2000-2500 words and 3-4 new references.© BrainMass Inc. brainmass.com March 22, 2019, 3:36 am ad1c9bdddf
the IAEA to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material at the different nuclear facilities within the nuclear fuel cycle."
1) Item Counting
In reference to item counting, this is an effective tool that is utilized by the IAEA to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material but new technology is mandated to adapt to the issues associated with 21st century technology. One of the new technologies that is being examined is the Under-Sodium Viewing, which is placated upon ultrasonic viewing technology that originally was created for a different era of nuclear monitoring during the 1960s but still can provide the necessary resolution for 21st century confirmations in regard to confirming the serial numbers for fuel assembles while using liquid sodium to conduct the confirmation. The reason that this particular item counting technology has been advocated by the IAEA is because it provides the ability to view serial numbers of both the storage and canning stations in regard to fuel assemblies that have been stored in ex-vessels with COK between storage, which is capable to provide a better verification system that can identify the correct association between fuel assembly serial numbers and canning station figures. This is important for improving item accountancy.
This has important ramifications as spent fuel that is elicited from sodium reactors is placed in sodium reactors in sealed cans before it is implemented into the spent fuel pond, and currently there is a lack of verification system to ascertain the accurate balance that exists between the fresh fuel storage and spent nuclear fuel. The IAEA has proposed alternatives for this problem, which are placated upon utilizing a camera that will enable the recording of assembly serial numbers while the canning process occurs to enable the agency the autonomy to prevent any fraudulent behavior.
If CoK has been lost, the agency may use measurements that are conducted with modified fork detectors for verification purposes in regard to any spent fuels. The ability to accomplish this is predicated upon the ability to effectively study and assess how sensitive the measurement is to a process that is categorized as pin diversion as the more sensitive the measurement, the least reliable the assessment will be. There is yet another reverification option that is available, and this is considered to be cutting edge technology as it utilizes tomographic imaging technology to verify spent fuel rods and allow the IAEA the ability to confirm or fail to confirm the records reported by the non-nuclear state.
The current research that has been conducted in Sweeden has yielded promising results for ...
Accountancy and verification measurements are examined. The different verification methods used by the IAEA to confirm the absence of undeclared nuclear activities and material at the different nuclear facilities within the nuclear fuel cycle are determined.