I have just been assigned to a multinational headquarters operating under an international security assistance force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. I need to prepare a discussion paper for the for the Regional Commander, answering the two questions with recommendation and justification (4 pages). Include references
1. After 2014, will NATO continue in AFG or is it more likely to shift to a 'Coalition of the willing' and why?
2. What multinational C2 relationship would best suit your chosen scenario and why?
ISAF was created in accordance with the Bonn Conference in December 2001. Afghan opposition leaders attending the conference began the process of reconstructing their country by setting up a new government structure, namely the Afghan Transitional Authority. The concept of an UN-mandated international force to assist the newly established Afghan Transitional Authority was also launched at this occasion to create a secure environment in and around Kabul and support the reconstruction of Afghanistan.
These agreements paved the way for the creation of a three-way partnership between the Af-ghan Transitional Authority, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA), and ISAF.
On 11 August 2003, NATO assumed leadership of the ISAF operation, ending the six-month national rotations. The Alliance became responsible for the command, coordination and planning of the force, including the provision of a force commander and headquarters on the ground in Afghanistan.
In October 2003, the United Nations extended ISAF's mandate to cover the whole of Af-ghanistan (UNSCR 1510), paving the way for an expansion of the mission across the country.
Check it out. I summarized many of the main issues here. Let me know if anything can be clarified.
NATO or "Coalition of the Willing?"
Nature of Multinational C2 Relationship
The mission of NATO, Afghanistan and 2014:
The main issue here is whether or not the US, the NATO alliance a) has the resources to continue this mission, b) whether the mission ever fell into NATO's parameters of competence, c) whether NATO has a role in the world at all, and d) if the intervention in Afghanistan should either end, or radically shift its composition and direction.
Few took the elections of 2010 seriously. Few believe that Karazi and his group are even remotely representative of the Afghan population. Further, probably no one believes that secular liberalism would ever be the natural choice for Afghans in general. It has been imposed by force. Concerning the military perspective, this mission has been damaging to US interests and has gone far beyond NATOs original mandate, a mandate that has long been obsolete.
Making matters worse, even fewer hold that there has been any measurable success in training an Afghan security force. Unpopular and viewed as agents of a foreign and hostile power, Afghan police and soldiers trained by the infidels are targets for attack. Yet, on June 13 of this year, the collective NATO defense ministers held that by 2014, the Afghan security units will be ready to take over, and the commitments from foreign powers will be much smaller than today.
Vanda Felbab-Brown's testimony to the Armed Services Committee in August of last year refuted many of the inflated claims of NATO and Defense concerning Afghanistan. His statements included:
Despite the substantial improvements of Afghan security forces, few Afghans believe that a better future is on the horizon after 2014. Although NATO and U.S. officials remain optimistic about the success of the counterinsurgency and stabilization campaign, many fear there will be a renewed outbreak of civil war after 2014 when the NATO presence is much reduced. . . During that period of the initial post-Taliban hope and promise, governance in Afghanistan became defined by weakly functioning state institutions unable and unwilling to uniformly enforce laws and policies.
In addition, her testimony stated:
Local government officials have had only a limited capacity and motivation to redress the broader governance deficiencies. The level of inter-elite infighting, much of it along ethnic and regional lines, is at a peak. The result is pervasive hedging on the part of key powerbrokers, including their resurrection of semi-clandestine or officially-sanctioned militias. . . A disturbing big unknown is whether the ANA will be able to withstand the ethnic and patronage factionalization that is already to some extent fracturing the institution. . . The ANP has of course been notorious both for such intense ethnic factionalization, as well as for corruption. . . .Worse yet, the ANP remains notorious for being the perpetrator of many crimes. Among the most controversial aspects of the transition strategy in Afghanistan are various efforts to stand up self-defense forces around the country (Felab-Brown, 2012).
These pessimistic views are now mainstream. They seem to prove the following facts: 1. the military approach in Afghanistan has not succeeded, despite billions of dollars the US does not have; 2. That Afghan units trained by the US have little intention to maintain the US mandate when western forces leave; 3. It was naïve to think that liberalism democracy, western capitalism and corporate penetration will be welcome, and 4. it appears that US forces are viewed as little more than mercenaries of American capital; 5. The Taliban, while distasteful to westerners, were required to impose strict Islamic rule on a country scarred by decades of war, factional strife, a collapsing (or non-existent-economy) and several ...
International security assistance for multinational headquarters are examined. The multinational C2 relationship which is best suited for chosen scenarios are given.