Hello I need help coming up with a perspective of the 2005 London Terror Attack, a perspective that covers learning points that could help Emergency Managers to prevent or respond better to terrorist attacks. I have to explain the recurring features that might be found in terrorist groups dynamics, and examine the factors that increase the complexity of developing effective counterterrorism response.© BrainMass Inc. brainmass.com September 19, 2018, 1:01 am ad1c9bdddf - https://brainmass.com/political-science/political-theory/perspective-london-terror-attack-2005-493814
You already know that I can only point you in the right direction. I will lay out a few sources and issues that can help clarify your own points. I will also give you some citations and articles - attaching a few ideas for each.
I don't want to dwell on the 05 attacks, since that just seems to be a starting point for your perspective. Through the way you have it structured, it looks like you're more interested in anti-terror strategies.
All the bombers in 2005 were of Pakistani descent. There was one from Jamaica.
Massive media coverage (copy cats?) Bombers might be popular at home, especially in Pakistan.
These men were overwhelmingly British citizens - that is a problem.
Quote from this link: "Investigators draw concentric circles of contacts emanating from key suspects but as these get wider and wider, they include more and more individuals. In these circumstances, it's hard to know the nature of any relationship and whether their presence in the wider web is just chance or the sign of a broader network."
This is the problem. It is one thing to have some limited intelligence on these guys, but there are so many "indirect" participants that it becomes difficult to take action. There are also diplomatic sensitivities to take cognizance of.
The big issues:
1. There was a great degree of planning and deliberation before hand.
2. Apparently, there was a functional bomb-factory in Leeds.
3. Al-Qaeda deputy leader Ayman al-Zawahri claimed responsibility. Yet, the police do not accept this at face value.
4. There was definitely weak intelligence. There seems to be no real plan to deal with "cells," especially within the Arabic community in England. The heavy police presence after the attacks was meant to produce a sense of calm.
http://www.terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/122/html (issues from this very good article)
1. Terrorists are fluid. They do not necessarily keep the same tactics from year to year; place to place.
2. There are no concessions policy at the heart of US anti-terror thinking.
3. "Rational terror" that is, political groups with clear political aims (like the IRA) existed here. This is different from the loose cellular structure of ...
The perspective of London Terror Attack in 2005 is examined.