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A game in strategic form

An employee faces a review every year. He prefers to spend time preparing if he will be reviewed; otherwise he would prefer to use time elsewhere. The reveiwer prefers to review when the employee is unprepared. If the players match their actions (employee prepares and the reviewer reviews, or the employe doesn't prepare and the reviewer does not review), the employee wins with a payoff of 35 and the review loses with a payoff of -35. If the actions don't match, the reviewer wins with a payoff of 35 and the employee loses with a payoff of -35. Diagram this game and comment on the equilibrium.

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An employee faces a review every year. He prefers to spend time preparing if he will be reviewed; otherwise he would prefer to use time elsewhere. The reviewer prefers to review when the employee is unprepared. If the players match their actions (employee prepares and the reviewer reviews, or the employee doesn't prepare and the reviewer does not review), the employee wins with a payoff of 35 and the review loses with a payoff of -35. If the actions don't match, the reviewer wins with a payoff of 35 and the employee loses with a payoff of -35. Diagram this game and comment on the equilibrium.

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Solution Summary

Diagram this game and comment on the equilibrium.

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