# Airbus, Boeing, Game, introducing a new model

The market for commercial aircraft is dominated by two firms, Airbus (player A) and Boeing (player B). A crucial decision for each firm is that of introducing a new aircraft model. Let N (for "new") denote the strategy of introducing new models and let O (for "old") be that of staying with the current model line. The profits of each firm are described in the payoff matrix below. In answering the question, you must focus on the payoff numbers as they are given and develop your argument based on these numbers.

Firm B

N O

Firm A N 40, 40 75, 20

O 20, 75 50, 50

a. Explain the incentives of each firm for introducing new models in this market. Be

sure to point out any outcomes with a "collusive" structure.

b. Which outcomes constitute a Nash Equilibrium? In what sense are these stable outcomes?

e same is true for Firm B:

c. Now suppose that Firms A and B compete with each other period after period on an ongoing basis. After each period, each firm can observe whether the other has introduced a new model or not. Consider the two factors of i) repeated play and ii) observable choices and explain how each factor influences the ability of the firms to support a collusive outcome.

You may, if you wish, frame your answer in terms of a "proposal" or "strategy recommendation" to the firms, and then describe how i) and ii) above relate to your proposal.

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#### Solution Summary

The market for commercial aircraft is dominated by two firms, Airbus (player A) and Boeing (player B). A crucial decision for each firm is that of introducing a new aircraft model. Let N (for "new") denote the strategy of introducing new models and let O (for "old") be that of staying with the current model line. The profits of each firm are described in the payoff matrix below. In answering the question, you must focus on the payoff numbers as they are given and develop your argument based on these numbers.

Firm B

N O

Firm A N 40, 40 75, 20

O 20, 75 50, 50

a. Explain the incentives of each firm for introducing new models in this market. Be

sure to point out any outcomes with a "collusive" structure.

b. Which outcomes constitute a Nash Equilibrium? In what sense are these stable outcomes?

e same is true for Firm B:

c. Now suppose that Firms A and B compete with each other period after period on an ongoing basis. After each period, each firm can observe whether the other has introduced a new model or not. Consider the two factors of i) repeated play and ii) observable choices and explain how each factor influences the ability of the firms to support a collusive outcome.

You may, if you wish, frame your answer in terms of a "proposal" or "strategy recommendation" to the firms, and then describe how i) and ii) above relate to your proposal.