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How to keep an employee from shirking

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Suppose you plan to quit your job in 6 weeks because you have saved enough money to move to California where you can indulge your interest in rock climbing. How can your supervisor keep you from shirking your duties during your last weeks at work?

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Solution Summary

It discusses how a manager might stop an employee from shirking on the job if they have alredy quit and are just waiting for the agreed time before they leave. This is a game theory related question.

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This is a very interesting question because it rests on the assumption that collaborative behaviour only happens if there is a long relationship that might lead to punishment if either side shirks. This isn't necessarily the case in real life. However, assuming it does, as the question seems to do, there ...

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