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Game Theory, Extensive form, bank run

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No idea how to start this game tree?
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Bank run game...here's the info:

2 players: each deposits $100
The bank invests this $200
2 dates at which investors can withdraw:
Date 1: investment does not reach maturity
Date 2: investment does mature
At each date, both investors simualtaneously decide whether or not to withdraw their funds. If both investors make withdrawals at date 1, then each investor receives $75 and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 1, that that investor receives $100, the other receives $50 and the game ends. Finally, if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 1, then the project matures and the investors make (simultaneous) withdrawal decisions at date 2. If both investors make withdrawals at date 2, then each receives $150 and the game ends. If only one investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then that investor receives $200, the other receives $100, and the game ends. Finally if neither investor makes a withdrawal at date 2 then the bank returns $150 to each investor and the game ends

(1) Draw the extensive-form game tree that represents this game.

(2) Give the strategy set for each player.

(3) What are the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game?

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Solution Summary

What are the subgame-perfect equilibria of this game?

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