Kodak & Fuji produce photographic film. Suppose that there are no other significant producers, so that Kodak and Fuji constitute a duopoly (oligopoly). Suppose that the firms can produce 500 or 750 rolls of film for a given market in a given quarter. Assume (1) that firms face the same cost structure; (2) that if both produce 500, then each will profit $16 per day; (3) that if Fuji produces 500 and Kodak 750, then Fuji earns $14 and Kodak earns $21; (4) that if both produce 750 rolls then each will profit $15. The remaining combination is implicit.

(c) Suppose that Fuji & Kodak decide to collude. What level of output would be chosen? Why?

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Please refer to the attachment.
<br>
<br>(a) Construct a game matrix for this scenario.
<br>
<br>This is a typical "Prisoner's Dilemma" game.
<br>Production Fuji
<br>Game Matrix 500 750
<br>Kodak 500 16, 16 14, 21
<br> 750 21, 14 15, 15
<br>
<br>(b) Is there a Nash Equilibrium for this game? Why or why not.
<br>
<br>Nash equilibrium is the combination iff while keeping the strategies of the other agents fixed, no single agent Ai could unilaterally increase the utility (or, in cases involving mixed strategies, ...

Driver 2
Left Right
Driver 1 Left 0,0 -1000 -1000
Right -1000, -1000 0,0
-Does either player have a dominant strategy?
-Is there a Nashequilibrium in this game? Explain
-Why is this game called a coope

11. In a one-shot game, if you advertise and your rival advertises, you will each earn $5 million in profits. If neither of you advertise, your rival will make $4 million and you will make $2 million. If you advertise and your rival does not, you will make $10 million and your rival will make $3 million. If your rival advertises

Below is a payoff matrix for Intel and AMD. In each cell, the first number refers to AMD's profit, while the second is Intel's. Is there a NashEquilibrium? Is this an example of the Prisoner's Dilemma?
Please see attached excel matrix.

Please answer all questions
1. Time Magazine and Newsweek are two competing news magazines. Suppose that each company charges the same $5.00 price for their magazines. Each wants to maximize its sales given the $5.00 price. Each week, there are two potential cover stories. One is in politics. The other is on the economy. Sa

You have been offered the chance to participate in a Treasure Hunt game whose rules are as follows. THere are three coloured boxes: red, green and yellow. The game show host must hide a $100 bill in a box of his choice. You have the option of opening one and only one box/ If the money was hidden in that box, you win it. Otherwis

In a one-shot game, if you advertise and your rival advertises, you will earn $7 million and your rival will earn $2 million in profits. If neither of you advertise, your rival will make $4 million and you will make $2 million. If you advertise and your rival does not, you will make $8 million and your rival will make $3 million

Below is a payoff matrix for Intel and AMD. In each cell, the first number refers to AMD's profit, while the second is Intel's.
a. Is there a NashEquilibrium(s)? Why or why not?
b. Is this an example of the Prisoner's Dilemma? Why or why not?
Intel
AMD Lower Price Same Price Higher Price
Lower Price

Please help with the following problem.
Both firms have 2 strategies available: continue the advertising war (W) or reduce their advertising budget (R). The payoffs for each strategy combination are given in the following payoff matrix.
Pepsi
Coke
W

Please refer attachment for table.
Bernie and Manny both sell DVD players. Now suppose they must independently decide whether to charge high or low prices. To illustrate the problems encountered, consider the following profit payoff matrix faced by Bernie and Manny in a one- shot, simultaneous-move game. The first number in e

1. In a Nashequilibrium,
each player has a dominant strategy.
no players have a dominant strategy.
at least one player has a dominant strategy
players may or may not have dominant strategies.
the player with the dominant strategy will win.
2. Nash equilibria are stable because,