



Instructional Narrative JP07



Introduction

Integrating multi-national, interagency and civil partners during military operations poses significant obstacles to unified action. Properly understood, the effects of these obstacles can be minimized to ensure that operational and tactical actions, though potentially less efficient, still achieve strategic success. This lesson allows a closer examination of the concepts to further explore the considerations for planning and executing multinational, interagency, and civil-military operations.

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Lesson Objectives

- Comprehend how US forces are organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for multinational operations.
- Comprehend the complexities associated with integrating multinational forces into a joint campaign.
- Comprehend how US forces are organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for interagency operations as well as operations in cooperation with intergovernmental and nongovernmental organizations.
- Comprehend how Joint Force Commanders confronted challenges in past operations in multinational and interagency environments.



Multinational Operations

Multinational, interagency and civil-partner organizations are often driven by altruistic aims and offer a variety of capabilities that may be critical to the success of joint operations. These organizations can, however, present significant challenges to mission success. Only by anticipating their involvement, and understanding the capabilities and limitations that these organizations bring to the theater can joint planners build required levels of flexibility into their plans while retaining the unity of effort that is critical to operational success.

The reality of the international geo-political context is such that it is very unlikely that the US will go to war without some international military coalition or alliance. Therefore, combatant commanders will have to redouble their efforts to achieve unity of action while balancing multiple countries' interests. The focus of this section is to provide you with an understanding of the complexities associated with operations involving multinational forces.



The Multinational Military Police Company (MNMP COY) of the Kabul Multinational Brigade, conducted Vehicle Check Point (VCP) training in all Police Districts (Nov 2006).

Multinational actors often have different military capabilities, military/political goals, cultures, and world outlooks that the campaign planner must consider when developing the campaign plan. These operations are often challenged in obtaining “partner” coordination in intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, and command, control, and communications. An understanding of these challenges and what brings them about will allow the planner to mitigate their effects.

The 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS) states on page 19:

The United States is waging a global campaign against al-Qa’ida and its terrorist affiliates. To disrupt, dismantle and defeat al-Qa’ida and its affiliates, we are pursuing a strategy that protects our homeland, secures the world’s most dangerous weapons and material, denies al-Qa’ida safe haven, and builds positive partnerships with Muslim communities around the world. Success requires a broad, sustained, and integrated campaign that judiciously applies every tool of American power—both military and civilian—as well as the concerted efforts of like-minded states and multilateral institutions.

The 2010 NSS discusses success based upon a "Whole of Government Approach" to "update, balance, and integrate all of the tools of American power and work with our allies and partners to do the same." The required lesson materials highlight multinational operational considerations, doctrine, and potential planning and operational pitfalls.

Required Lesson Materials



Lt Gen (ret) Short video clip (0:37:04) -- Watch entire clip.

[FlashDownload Video](#) (101 MB) [Download Slides](#) (60 kB) [Text Only](#) [Integrated](#)

This is a part of Lt Gen Short’s lecture to an ACSC in-residence class on coalition operations. Lt Gen Short’s gave this lecture just one year after serving as the JFACC for

Operation DELIBERATE FORCE. As you will no doubt discern, Gen Short was impassioned and very candid in his views. It is worth reminding you that this presentation, like all of our presentations in this program, falls under the ACSC non-attribution policy.

 [NATO, AJP-01, Allied Joint Doctrine \(2010\)](#) -- Skim Chapter 2.

This reading provides a perspective beyond that of the US and is a valuable resource for helping you to understand the complexities of multinational operations.


 [Forster, Col L. M., "Coalition Leadership Imperatives" \(2000\)](#) -- Read entire article.

Col Forster discusses critical leadership aspects of multinational operations.

 [JP 3-16, Joint Doctrine for Multinational Operations \(2007\)](#) -- Read Chapters I and II.

This reading identifies fundamentals for joint forces in multinational operations.

To Learn More

 [Interagency Coordination, DOCNET](#) -- Review the DOCNET Operations course labeled "Interagency Coordination."

Estimated review time is 90 minutes. NOTE: DOCNET courses are available to users from a .mil or .gov domain.



Interagency Coordination

Today's complex environment coupled with a decline in resources is forcing US governmental agencies to interact with one another as never before. The result is a kind of mutual dependency that presents both challenges and opportunities. As an example, the DoD supports and is supported by a number of interagency players that rely on the DoD resources to accomplish their assigned objectives and protect US vital security interests, while in turn contributing important capabilities to military operations. Interagency coordination is critical to the current War on Terrorism and requires understanding by joint planners in order to coordinate efforts and enhance capabilities of the players involved.

As a potential joint planner or commander, you must comprehend the principles of interagency coordination in order to achieve national-level objectives. You must also understand that joint forces assist other interagency partners to achieve national objectives. Understanding the capabilities and limitations of all of the military and civilian organizations engaged is absolutely critical to integrating those agencies' actions effectively to achieve US political and military objectives.

Required Lesson Materials



Harkins, H., Interagency Video Lecture (2007) (1:09:43) -- Watch entire video.

[FlashDownload Video](#) (190 MB) [Download Slides](#) (852 kB) Text Only [Integrated](#)

In this lecture, Mr. Harkins discusses a myriad of issues that military members may face when conducting interagency operations.



Mansager, T. B., “Interagency Lessons Learned in Afghanistan” (2006) -- Read entire article.

Mansager’s article highlights the challenges that the Combined Joint Force-Afghanistan (CFC-A) Commander faced in organizing his joint headquarters and transitioning from conflict to support and stability operations.



JP 3-08, Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (2011) -- Read Chapter 1 and skim the appendices.

Chapter 1 is a primer which serves as the foundation for understanding joint military doctrinal concepts related to interorganizational coordination, planning, and functions. The appendices describe key US Government departments and agencies, IGOs, NGOs – their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States. It is a handy desk-reference for planners.

To Learn More



[Interagency Coordination DOCNET Course](#) -- Entire module.

This DOCNET module provides greater insight into interagency operations.



Civil-Military Operations

One of the greatest obstacles to unified action is integrating and coordinating with non-military agencies in planning and executing joint campaigns. This section examines the complexities of civil-military operations (CMO) coordination during joint operations and the requirement for synchronizing the actions of military and nonmilitary organizations in time, space, and purpose. Whether rebuilding the civilian infrastructure, ensuring the conditions exist to establish a lasting peace, or conducting combat operations where CMO actors are operating freely, the joint force commander must ensure coordination with all actors from the onset of planning through the final phase of the campaign in order to ensure the campaign objectives are achieved.



For all our experience and compassion, we in the relief and development business do not have the capacity to deal with such large-scale catastrophes without help. Help from the military is not something we should begin to take for granted or rely upon in all cases. But there are extraordinary circumstances that call for responses – manpower, equipment, expertise, transport and communication capacity – that only the military can deploy.
 Philip Johnston, President and Chief Executive Officer, CARE

CARE is one of the world's largest private international relief and development organizations.

CIVIL MILITARY MISSIONS IN SUPPORT OF MAJOR REGIONAL CONFLICTS AND OTHER COMBAT OPERATIONS					
PHASES	PRE-CRISIS	PREPARATION	DEPLOYMENT	HOSTILITIES	POST CONFLICT
Civil Military Functions	<p>Conduct civil affairs area assessment, to include identifying potential civil sector affecting military operations and relevant civilian organizations</p> <p>Recommend nonmilitary Flexible Deterrent Options</p>	<p>Coordinate with civilian organizations</p>	<p>Build up civil resources to support hostilities and post conflict operations</p>	<p>Minimize civilian interference with military operations</p> <p>Limit collateral damage on civilian population, infrastructure, and institutions</p>	<p>Support reestablishment of effective civil control by designated civilian organizations</p> <p>Perform civil administration until civil authorities are reestablished</p>

Civil-Military Missions in Support of Major Regional Conflicts and Other Combat Operations



Civil Affairs in CMA

It is important to understand the role that Civil Affairs (CA) plays in CMO. CA activities are inherently civil-military in nature. While they may be integral parts of both military civic action and CMO, they are not synonymous with either. CA activities refer to activities performed or supported by CA that (1) embrace the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve the application of CA functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance CMO.

CA activities are distinguishable from CMO insofar as the former are characterized by applications of functional specialties in areas normally the responsibility of indigenous government or civil authority. CA activities may extend to assumption of governmental functions required in an occupied territory during or immediately subsequent to hostilities. The bottom line is that CA is an enabler for CMO.



Interaction

There are numerous agencies interacting in CMO. Some of the bigger groups include Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), International Organizations (Red Cross), Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), refugees, contractors, local government and social organizations, etc. NGOs typically have certain organizational biases and needs that shape their view of the military, their view of the US, and even their view of the world. Yet despite any biases they hold against the US or its armed forces, it is important to remember that many of these NGOs provide services that are indispensable to an operation's success. Military leaders have an obligation to understand the organizational culture of the NGOs operating within their theater, in order to gain and maintain unity of effort and achieve military and national objectives.

In addition to the traditional NGOs, there has also been a growth in contractor-based support in current operations. The presence of these civilian vendors on or near the battlespace – many of them armed – tends to blur the lines between who is and who is not a combatant. Yet the joint force commander needs to both understand and integrate these players, as they typically provide goods and services within the AOR that are indispensable to successful operations.

There are several types of support to civil operations where CMO may be involved. These include, but are not limited to:


- Support to Civil Administration
- Populace and Resources Control
- Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
- Nation Assistance
- Civil Information Management

As you read the required lesson material, ask yourself the following questions:

- What are the fundamental differences between civilians and military personnel?
- What are the “shared interests” Gourlay speaks of in her article?
- What are the ideological, cultural, and political perceptions that hinder civil-agency cooperation with military institutions?
- What are some differences between the structures of military and civilian institutions?
- What does Gourlay mean in arguing that the relationship between civilian and military actors is either “competitive” or “complementary”?

- What is one of the key tasks for the military in support of humanitarian relief efforts and how is this effort affected by the politicization of military action?
- In what ways are CMOs generally task-organized at the operational level?

Required Lesson Material

 [JP 3-57, Civil-Military Operations \(8 Jul 2008\)](#) - Read Chapter II, pages II-21 to II-36.

 [Gourlay, C., "Managing Civil-Military Co-operation in Humanitarian Interventions" \(2005\)](#) -- Read entire article.

The Gourlay article provides insight into the challenges faced in CMO placed in the context of humanitarian relief actions.

 [Eisenhour, J. H. and Marks, E., "Herding Cats: Overcoming Obstacles in Civil Military Operations" \(1999\)](#) -- Read entire article.

This article discusses several difficulties associated with coordinating efforts of the myriad of organizations associated with CMO.


 [Haseman, J., and Lachica, E., "Getting Indonesia Right" \(2009\)](#) -- Read entire article.

This article explains the planning challenges encountered with coalition partners who are not official allies of the United States.

To Learn More

 [Civil Military Operations DOCNET Module](#) -- Entire module.

This interactive CMO presentation amplifies the joint publications by discussing the capabilities and complexities of CMO, including potential command and control arrangements.

 [Wilkins, Maj J. L., "The Civil Military Operations Center \(CMOC\) in Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY \(Haiti\)" \(1997\)](#) -- Entire article.

This article gives an account of the CMOC in Haiti and how it succeeded despite poor interagency planning.

 [Morris, T., "Civil Military Relations in Afghanistan" \(2002\)](#) -- Entire article.

There is a considerable degree of confusion both among the humanitarian community and the Afghan population over the various military forces present in Afghanistan, particularly

with regard to their respective mandates and humanitarian support/liaison operations.

 [Pugh, M., "The Challenge of Civil-military Relations in International Peace Operations" \(2001\)](#) -- Entire article.

Military initiatives to institutionalize the relationship between military and civilian humanitarian organizations, since the interventions in Somalia and the Balkans, entail a dilution of humanitarian independence as was manifested in practice in Kosovo.

 [Civil Military Operations, Ethical Dilemmas for Special Forces Workshop \(2003\)](#) -- Pages 36-39.

This article discusses the types of issues that hinder CMO.



What's Next?

To conclude this lesson, we will again review the campaign planning process. In the next lesson, you will get an opportunity to actively participate in this process as part of a joint planning exercise. A review of the campaign planning primer looked at in Lesson 2 will provide you with the necessary background to successfully accomplish the exercise objectives.

Required Lesson Material

 [Army War College, Campaign Planning Primer \(2011\)](#) -- Skim entire document.

This reading provides a useful summary of the campaign planning process.



Discussion Question

This Learning Module item should open in a new window. If not, then click the link below.

Click to Launch



Click the link above for this week's discussion questions.



Conclusion

Integrating multi-national, interagency and civil partners during military operations poses significant obstacles to unified action. Properly understood, the effects of these obstacles can be minimized to ensure that operational and tactical actions, though potentially less efficient, still achieve strategic success.

Civil-military operations are an inherent responsibility of command in order to facilitate accomplishment of the commander's mission. These operations encompass the activities that JFCs take to establish and maintain relations between their forces and the civil authorities and general population, resources, and institutions in friendly, neutral, or hostile areas. JFCs plan and conduct civil-military operations to facilitate military operations and help achieve politico-military objectives derived from US national security interests.



Lesson 7 Bibliography

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Army War College, *Campaign Planning Primer*, 2011.



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