# NIKE, INC.: COST OF CAPITAL 

On July 5, 2001, Kimi Ford, a portfolio manager at NorthPoint Grous, a mutual fund management firm, pored over analyst write-ups of Nike, Inc., the athletie shoo manufacturer. Nike's share price had declined significantly from the start of the year Kimi was donsidering buying some shares for the fund she managed, the NorthPoint Large-Cap Fund, which invested mostly in Fortune 500 companies with an emphasis on value investyn. łts top holdings included ExxonMobil, General Motors, McDonald's, 3M and other large-cap, generally old-economy stocks. While the stock market declined over the last 18 months, NoxthPoint Large-Cap had performed extremely well. In 2000 , the fund earned a return f 207 perkent even as the $S \& P$ 500 fell 10.1 percent. The fund's year-to-date retyrns at the end of June, 2001 stood at 6.4 percent versus the S\&P 500's minus 7.3 percent.

Only a week ago, on June 28, 2001, Nike held an analysts, meeting to disclose its fiscal year 2001 results ${ }^{1}$. However, the meeting had another purpose: Nike management wanted to communicate a strategy for revitalzing the company. Since 1997, Nike's revenues had plateaued at around $\$ 9$ billion, white net income had fallen from almost $\$ 800$ million to $\$ 580$ million (see Exhibit 1). Nike' $\$$ market share in U.S. athletic shoes had fallen from 48 percent in 1997 to 42 percent in $2000{ }^{2}$ In addition, recentsupply-chain issues and the adverse effect of a strong dollar had negative y affectedrevenue.

At the meeting, magenent revealed plans to address both top-line growth and operating performance. Te boost heventre, the company would develop more athletic shoe products in the mid-priced segment ${ }^{3} \rightarrow$ a segment that it had overlooked in recent years. Nike also planned to push its appare line, which, under the recent leadership of industry veteran Mindy Gfossman had performed extremely well. On the cost side, Nike would exert more

${ }^{2}$ Rgbson. Doughas, "Just Do...Something: Nike's insularity and foot-dragging have it running in place", Business Keê, July 2, 2001
${ }^{3}$ Skeakers in this segment sold for \$70-\$90 a pair.
${ }^{4}$ Min\&y Grossman joined Nike in September 2000. She was the former president and chief executive of Jones Apparel Grokp's Polo Jeans division.

This case was prepared from publicly available information by Jessica Chan under the supervision of Professor Robert F. Bruner. The financial support of the Batten Institute is gratefully acknowledged. This case was written as a basis for class discussion rather than to illustrate effective or ineffective handling of an administrative situation. Copyright © 2001 by the University of Virginia Darden School Foundation, Charlottesville, VA. All rights reserved. To order copies, send an e-mail to sales@dardenpublishing.com. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, used in a spreadsheet, or transmitted in any form or by any meanselectronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise-without the permission of the Darden School Foundation. Rev. 10/02. $\diamond$
effort on expense control. Finally, company executives reiterated their long-term revenue growth targets of 8-10 percent, and earnings growth targets of above 15 percent.

Analyst reactions were mixed. Some thought the financial targets to be too aggressive; others saw significant growth opportunities in apparel and in Nike's international businesses.

Kimi Ford read all the analyst reports that she could find about the June 28 meeting, but the reports gave her no clear guidance: a Lehman Brothers report recommendeda ' $\$$ trong Buy' while UBS Warburg and CSFB analysts expressed misgivings about the company and recommended a 'Hold'. Kimi decided instead to develop her own discounted-cash-flonyforecast to come to a clearer conclusion.

Her forecast showed that at a discount rate of 12 percent, Niks was overvalued at its current share price of $\$ 42.09$ (see Exhibit 2). However, she had dqne a quick sensitivity analysis that revealed Nike was undervalued at discøunt rates beldw 11.2 percent. Since she was about to go into a meeting, she requested her new assistant, Joanmz Cohen, to estimate Nike's cost of capital.

Joanna immediately gathered all the data she thought she might need (Exhibits 1 through 4) and set out to work on her analysis. At the endef the day, she submitted her cost of capital estimate and a memo (Exhibit 5) explaining her assumptions to Ms. Ford.

## Exhibit 1

NIKE, INC.: COST OF CAPITAL
Consolidated Income Statements

Year Ended May 31
(In millions except per share data)
Revenues
Cost of goods sold
Gross profit
Selling and administrative
Operating income
Interest expense
Other expense, net
Restructuring charge, net
Income before income taxes
Income taxes
Net income

Diluted earnings per common share
Average shares outstanding (diluted)
Growth (\%)
Revenue
Operating income
Net income
Margins (\%)

*The U.S. statutery tox ryte nas $35 \%$. The state tax varied yearly from $2.5 \%$ to $3.5 \%$.
Source: Company's $\mathcal{L}-\mathrm{K}$ SEC filing, UBS Warburg

## Exhibit 2

NIKE, INC.: COST OF CAPITAL
Discounted Cash Flow Analysis


## Exhibit 3

NIKE, INC.: COST OF CAPITAL

## Consolidated Balance Sheets



Source: Company 10-K SEC filing.

## Exhibit 4

NIKE, INC.: COST OF CAPITAL

## Capital Market and Financial Information

On or Around July 5, 2001

| Current yields on U.S. Treasuries |  |
| :--- | ---: |
|  |  |
| 3-month | $3.59 \%$ |
| 6-month | $3.59 \%$ |
| 1-year | $3.59 \%$ |
| 5-year | $4.88 \%$ |
| 10-year | $5.39 \%$ |
| 20-year | $5.74 \%$ |

Historical Equity Risk Premiums (1926-1999)

| Geometric mean | $5.90 \%$ |
| :--- | :---: |
| Arithmetic mean | $7.50 \%$ |

Current Yield on Publicly Traded Nike Debt*

| Coupon |
| :--- |
| Issued |
| Maturity |
| Current Price |
|  |
| Nike Historic Betas |
| 1996 |
| 1997 |
| 1998 |
| 1999 |
| 2000 |

YTD $06 / 30 / 00$
Average


Value Line Forecast of Dividend Growth from '98-00 to '04-'06: 6.75\% paid semi-annually

Issued
Maturity 07/15/96 07/15/21
$\begin{array}{ll} \\ \$ & 95.60\end{array}$

## Exhibit 5

NIKE, INC.: COST OF CAPITAL

Joanna’s Analysis

TO: Kimi Ford
FROM: Joanna Cohen
DATE: July 6, 2001
SUBJECT: Nike's Cost of Capital
Based on the following assumptions, my estimate o
I. Single or Multiple Costs of Capital?


The first question I considered was whether to use single ox multiple costs of capital given that Nike has multiple business segnents. Aside from footwear, which makes up 62 percent of revenue, Nike also sells apparel ( 30 percent ofrevenue) that complement its footwear products. In addition, Nike sells sport balls, tinepieces, eydyrear, skates, bats, and other equipment designed for sports activikjes. Equipment products account for 3.6 percent of revenue. Finally, Nike also sells some non-Nike branded products such as Cole-Haan dress and casual footwear, and ice skates, skate blades, hecky ticks, hockey jerseys and other products under the Bauer trademark. Non-Nike brand account for 4.5 percent of revenue.

I asked myself-whether Nikes business segments had different enough risks from each other to warrant diffegent dosts of capital Were their profiles really different? I concluded that it was only the cole-Aaan jine that was somewhat different; the rest were all sports-related businesses. However, since Cole Haan makes up only a tiny fraction of revenues, I did not think it necessary to compute a separate cost of capital. As for the apparel and footwear lines, they are sold throygh the same marketing and distribution channels and are often marketed in "collections" of similar desion. believe they face the same risk factors, as such, I decided to compute only one cost of caxital for the whole company.

## Methodology for Calculating the Cost of Capital: WACC

Since Nike is funded with both debt and equity, I used the Weighted Average Cost of Capital (WACC) method. Based on the latest available balance sheet, debt as a proportion of total capital makes up 27.0 percent and equity accounts for 73.0 percent:

Exhibit 5 (continued)

## Capital sources

Book Values
Debt

| Current portion of |
| :---: |
| long-term debt |$\$ \quad \$ .4$

Notes payable 855.3
Long-term debt $\quad 435.9$
\$ 1,296.6
Equity
\$3,494.5
$73.0 \%$ of total capital

Cost of Debt
My estimate of Nike's cost of debt is 4.3 percent. Vaxnved at ikis estimate by taking total interest expense for the year 2001 and dividing it by the company average debt balance. ${ }^{1}$ The rate is lower than Treasury yields but that is yecause Nike raised a portion of its funding needs through Japanese yen notes, which carry rates between 2.0 pereent to 4.3 percent.

After adjusting for tax, the cost of debtemes out to 2.7 percent. I used a tax rate of 38 percent, which I obtained by adding state taxes of 3 pexcent to the U.S. statutory tax rate. Historically, Nike's state taxes have ranged from 2.5 percent to 3.5 percent.

Cost of Equity


I estimated the cost of equit using the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Other methods such as the Dividend Discount wodel (DDM) and the Earnings Capitalization Ratio can be used to estimate the-cost of equity. However, in my opinion, CAPM is the superior method.

My estimate of Nike's cost of equity is 10.5 percent. I used the current yield on 20 -year Treasury bonds as my risk-free rate, and the compound average premium of the market over Treastry bonds ( 5.9 pereent) as my risk premium. For beta I took the average of Nike's beta from 1996 to the present.
Putting it All Together
Inputting all my assumptions into the WACC formula, my estimate of Nike's cost of capital is 8.4 percent.

$$
\begin{array}{rl}
\mathrm{WACC}=\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{d}}(1-\mathrm{t}) * \mathrm{D} /(\mathrm{D}+\mathrm{E})+\mathrm{K}_{\mathrm{e}} & * \mathrm{E} /(\mathrm{D}+\mathrm{E}) \\
& =2.7 \% \quad * \quad 27.0 \%+10.5 \% * 73.0 \% \\
& =8.4 \%
\end{array}
$$

[^0]
[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ Debt balances as of May 31, 2000 and 2001 were $\$ 1,444.6$ and $\$ 1,296.6$ respectively.

