ledgeable critic. He cut to the chase quickly, biting intense attention to detail and pricing, dering through store aisles firing a barrage of estions at store managers about sales volumes stock levels of particular items, critiquing chandising displays or the position of certain ducts in the stores, commenting on any aspect core operations that caught his eye, and asking agers to do further research and get back to with more information whenever he found answers to his questions less than satisfying. It readily apparent that Sinegal had tremendous chandising savvy, that he demanded much of managers and employees, and that his views discount retailing set the tone for how the pany operated. Knowledgeable observers anded Jim Sinegal's merchandising expertise being on a par with that of the legendary Sam on, the founder of Walmart.

arehouse Operations

bought the majority of its merchandise manufacturers, routing it either eatly to its warehouse stores or to one of nine docking depots that served as distribution for nearby stores. Depots received containershipments from manufacturers cated these goods for combined shipment andividual warehouses, generally in less than hours. This maximized freight volume and adling efficiencies. When merchandise arrived at rehouse, it was moved directly onto the sales very little was stored in locations off the sales thereby lowering receiving costs by eliminating of the costs associated with multiple-step andling of merchandise, such as purchasing from aributors as opposed to manufacturers, use of receiving, operating regional distribution erers for inventory storage and distribution of erchandise to nearby stores, and having storage at retail sites where merchandise could be in reserve off the sales floor.

Costco had direct buying relationships with producers of national name-brand merandise (e.g., Canon, Casio, Coca-Cola, Cola-Palmolive, Dell, Fuji, Hewlett-Packard, of New York, Kimberly-Clark, Kodak, Echen Aid, Levi Strauss, Michelin, Nestlé, Pansonic, Procter & Gamble, Samsung, and Sony) with manufacturers that supplied its Kirk-

land Signature private-label products. No single manufacturer supplied a significant percentage of the merchandise that Costco stocked. Costco had not experienced any difficulty in obtaining sufficient quantities of merchandise, and management believed that if one or more of its current sources of supply became unavailable, the company could switch its purchases to alternative manufacturers without experiencing a substantial disruption of its business.

Costco warehouses accepted cash, checks, most debit cards, American Express, and a private-label Costco credit card. Costco accepted merchandise returns when members were dissatisfied with their purchases. Losses associated with dishonored checks were minimal because members who bounced checks were prevented from paying by check or cashing checks at the point of sale until restitution was made. The membership format facilitated strictly controlling the entrances and exits of warehouses, resulting in inventory losses of less than two-tenths of 1 percent of net sales—well below those of other retail discounters.

Warehouse Managers Costco's warehouse managers were delegated considerable authority over store operations and, in effect, functioned as entrepreneurs running their own retail operation. They were responsible for effectively merchandising the ever-changing lineup of treasure-hunt products, orchestrating in-store product locations and displays to maximize sales and quick turnover, and coming up with new ideas about what items would sell in their stores. In experimenting with what items to stock and what in-store merchandising techniques to employ, warehouse managers drew on their knowledge of the clientele that patronized their locations-for instance, big-ticket diamonds sold well at some warehouses but not at others. Costco's best managers kept their fingers on the pulse of the members who shopped their warehouse location to stay in sync with what would sell well, and they had a flair for creating a certain element of excitement, hum, and buzz in their warehouses that spurred above-average sales volumes (sales at Costco's top-volume warehouses often exceeded \$5 million a week, with sales topping \$1 million on many days). Successful managers also thrived on the rat race of running a high-traffic store and solving the inevitable crises of the moment.