



# Coping with targets: performance measurement in The Netherlands police

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## Abstract

**Purpose** – The article aims to understand why performance management schemes or targeting were introduced in the Dutch police organisation after 2002. This question is relevant for two reasons. First, Dutch political culture is traditionally not overly concerned with performance of public organisations, and second, police work seems especially averse to targeting.

**Design/methodology/approach** – The article explores changes in Dutch politics, and especially the rise and agenda of Pim Fortuyn, a flamboyant politician who disrupted the traditional political relations in the Dutch polity, and who put government performance on top of the political agenda. Analysis of secondary sources is used to track the response of police management, and field work is used to investigate the reactions of street level police officers.

**Findings** – The introduction of targeting is directly attributable to changes in the polity. As such, they represent a pendulum swing that will move back, especially when the limitations of targeting will become clear, and when the political discourse has moved on to topics other than public accountability.

**Practical implications** – Managers of public organisations could learn from this case that political pressure can have far-reaching consequences, which cannot always be ignored, and can lead to far-reaching effects in the organisation, that may be counterproductive.

**Originality/value** – This article asks simple questions: Why are Dutch police forces using performance contracts involving targets negotiated between the department of home affairs, the mayor and the police chief? Why were they introduced from 2002 on? And will they be a lasting practice in the Dutch police?

**Keywords** Police, Crimes, The Netherlands, Public policy, Performance measures

**Paper type** Case study

## Introduction

This article asks simple questions: why are Dutch police forces using performance contracts involving targets negotiated between the department of home affairs, the mayor and the police chief? Why were they introduced from 2002 on? And, will they be a lasting practice in the Dutch police?

The introduction of performance contracts in the Dutch police is remarkable, and merits attention. Performance and accountability have never been big issues in any branch of government in The Netherlands because, as will be described in more detail, the Dutch political system has typically placed a premium on consensus rather than on responsibility. Rather than aiming for the best measure, the Dutch political system aimed for the most acceptable measure. In addition, police work seems especially averse to targets since police do not only act on crimes they see, but also prevent an



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unknown number of crimes by simply being somewhere, and that number is impossible to gauge.

Since there are no figures on crimes that do not occur because uniformed officers are patrolling the streets, crime statistics tell us what the criminals, not the police, are doing (Reuss-Lanni, 1983, p. 93).

Furthermore, the main approach to policing in The Netherlands used to be community policing – in which the police do not limit themselves to law enforcement but also address social conditions and situations, and in which policemen are professionals who make their own decisions on how to handle certain cases, within considerable margins of freedom. So why then have targets been established in the Dutch police if this was a radical departure from normal operation and goal-effectiveness was not the first priority of the political system? To answer this question we will first take a look at the political environment, and then at the range of actors involved. To see if they are a lasting practice the nature of police work will be discussed.

### **Accountability in the Dutch political system**

#### *Pillars and pacification*

Accountability, in the form of reporting on policy goals and their execution or lack thereof is not traditionally a salient feature of Dutch political culture or bureaucratic operation. The pinnacle of the Dutch parliamentary cycle for example is traditionally the day in September on which the government lets the queen read its policy proposals with much pomp and fanfare and on which the finance minister presents the budget. A budget, however, is ultimately nothing more than a plan – and a compromise at that, because Dutch governments have always been coalition governments. A similar day in May on which plans are linked to actual performance, and results are gauged, has only been instituted recently, and does not receive the same attention as the announcing of plans[1]. In similar vein, the Dutch parliament has wide powers to conduct investigations, including hearing witnesses under oath, but these investigative rights are not often used.

The traditional focus on debating of, and deciding on, plans is rooted in Dutch political culture, and especially in the way in which political conflict between the constituent socio-political groups was resolved from the late nineteenth century until the 1970s. Four main groups formed the polity: Roman Catholics, living mainly in the south of The Netherlands; Protestants, (conservative) liberals; and from the early twentieth century on, socialists. Until the late 1990s this was also the essential make-up of the party system: two large mainstream protestant parties and some fundamentalist fragments, a large Roman Catholic party, a conservative liberal party, and a large labour party. The mainstream Protestants and Catholics merged into one large “confessional” party in the late 1970s to redress the electoral decline of the constituent parties. By combining their powers and by overcoming their traditional differences they hoped to keep “Christian politics” a major force in the Dutch polity, a strategy that has worked reasonably well for there has only been one prolonged period in which the confessional party was not in government[2].

There was very little that orthodox Protestants, Catholics, liberals, and socialists had in common, especially in the first decades of the twentieth century, and to prevent the polity from degenerating into a constantly deadlocked battleground the pillars

“developed a keen eye for workable compromise after a prolonged public stand on principles” (Van der Wussten and Roessingh, 1997, p. 35, see also: Lijphart, 1975). Negotiating settlements between pillars in the form of reaching agreements between parties forming coalition governments, took up most of the resources of the polity. As Table I shows, until 1999 proposed measures were the divisive issues in Dutch politics.

*The effects on administration*

Political division thus kept the focus of the polity on ensuring compromise and reaching pacification between traditionally divided groups. The main goal of the Dutch political system from the late nineteenth century to about the 1970s was not to perform effectively and efficiently but resolve conflicts between the “pillars”, and Table I shows that serious discord leading to a cabinet crisis caused by implementation of policy or the activities of agencies has happened only once in Dutch parliamentary history. Good government was less important than equal participation.

*Changes and shocks*

In recent years, there has been change, however. The day in May on which the plans of the government are scrutinised *was* instituted, in 2000. There are more parliamentary investigations using the maximum investigative powers[3], and the performance of government, rather than the policy proposals are becoming the focus of attention. There has been, since 2000, a remarkable upsurge in the times the phrase “performance

Year	Area	Contested issue	Type
1951	Colonial politics	Transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea to Indonesia	Policy proposal
1955	Housing policy	Increase of controlled rent	Policy proposal
1958	Fiscal policy	Extension of temporary tax increase	Policy proposal
1960	Housing policy	Construction of extra controlled rent dwellings	Policy proposal
1965	Broadcasting policy	Broadcasting system and television advertising	Policy proposal
1966	General policy	Fiscal policy	Policy proposal
1972	Public finance	Profit principle	Policy proposal
1977	Spatial policy	Measures to counter ground speculation	Policy proposal
1981	Labour policy	Work schemes for unemployed	Policy proposal
1982	Public finance	Budget cuts	Policy proposal
1989	Fiscal policy	Commuter tax deductions	Policy proposal
1999	Constitutional law	Introduction of corrective referendum	Policy proposal
2002	Peace operations	Failure to prevent Srebrenica massacre by Dutch army	Actions of government and agencies
2002	Internal conflict	Internal divisions within the populist party in the coalition	Political/personal conflict

**Notes:** The “area” column gives an indication of the broad policy area, the “contested issue” column of the problem over which opinions split, and the “type” column characterises the nature of the contested issue. A cabinet crisis is a serious conflict between the parties constituting a coalition government. It halts the active working of the coalition until the conflict is either resolved or a new government is installed after a general election

**Source:** Overview of cabinet crisis on [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com)

**Table I.**  
Cabinet crises in The Netherlands after the second world war


measurement” has been used in parliament, reflecting an increase in political attention for performance measurement, although the actual numbers (a maximum of 30 mentions in 2001) are not impressive in absolute terms (see Figure 1).

These are signs that there is a beginning of a shift from a traditional focus on plans or *ex ante* control to a focus on accountability or *ex post* control, although it is too early to say that this is a trend with staying power. This shift occurred, not coincidentally, at the same time the polity underwent some shocking changes.

### Shocks

The rise in attention of the performance of government is of course not a recent phenomenon in The Netherlands. The problematic delivery of public services, which seems to be a hallmark of western democracies, rose to prominence in academic debate in the late 1970s and became a political priority of the new right in the 1980s, and has remained a core problem for scholars in public administration, public policy, public management. However, although individual cases of public mismanagement and underperformance frequently rose to prominence for a short time, there were often no repercussions for the responsible political leaders who frequently shifted the blame onto civil servants, made up some excuse for not knowing what exactly was happening, and were not held accountable by parliament or other representative bodies.

The politician who made a central issue of the performance of government was Pim Fortuyn, a flamboyant right-wing politician who started a “movement” out of dissatisfaction with established political parties. Although an ideologically incoherent movement, it brought under scrutiny some important issues, one of them being the serious underperformance of government services; this was popular among his followers, who agreed with him that there should be more nurses, policemen, and teachers, and that they should carry out their core tasks rather than do administrative work. Although part of Fortuyn’s solution was to simply deny the complexity of modern welfare states and propose simple, hardly workable solutions, by making it a core plank of his political movement, and by presenting it as a serious charge of a new political movement against the establishment that did not care for the people, but only for protecting their interests and remaining in the seats of power[4], the issue of public



**Figure 1.** Number of times “performance measurement” (“prestatiemeting”) is mentioned in the Dutch parliamentary record, 1995-2003. The record contains transcripts of plenary and committee sessions of both houses of parliament, members’ questions and accompanying written records

performance became a hot political topic. In the speech in which he accepted the leadership of his movement he said of the Dutch government that:

It should learn from business. The time of Henry Ford, in which the client could get any colour of car as long as he wanted black is long gone, but in the collective sector, where politicians are the leaders, this message hasn't been heard yet. The current collective sector is like a big, old Ford factory, but it should change, and the nurse, the teacher, and the policeman should be in charge again[5].

This slightly rambling comparison aims at expressing the idea that the government does not perform well because it delivers the wrong services, or services that do not meet the criteria of the people, because the people who work in the collective sector have lost control over it. Control was, according to Fortuyn, in the hands of politicians who were ill-equipped to manage a sector in which they do not work themselves. Inspiration for better government was business, where, at least according to Fortuyn, managers were held accountable on the basis of simple targets. Because in addition the issue of performance was now formulated as an "us" (the new politicians, shaking up the cobwebs of the traditional polity) versus "them" (the traditional politicians) situation, government performance became a core ingredient of the political discourse in the run-up to the 2002 election. It was very much an election topic in itself, in a campaign that was one of the most lively election campaigns in Dutch political history because the established political parties did not quite know how to handle Fortuyn, his flamboyance, his unorthodox style, or his ever-growing support in the election polls.

Although Fortuyn, who was murdered during the 2002 election campaign, never had the chance to implement his ideas nationally, he did win a local election in Rotterdam, where his ideas became practice in the short time between the local campaign and his murder. The victory of Fortuyn in Rotterdam resulted in a practical plan to give the mayor and the aldermen quantitative targets, on which they could be held accountable. So for instance, the mayor and aldermen, amongst others, had a concrete target to get 700 drug addicts off the street[6]. Because Rotterdam was paraded as a case of "new" government, and because targets were such an important instrument in Rotterdam, and because the very fact that there were now targets used as instrument was in itself seen as an important improvement in government, targets became an important symbol of new, accountable government. For the moment they are, especially in law enforcement, an important instrument.

#### *Accountability in politics now*

For the moment "accountability" is an important new issue in Dutch politics, and especially in law enforcement the idea has proved popular. Police chiefs now regularly commit themselves to quantitative targets, to be met within a given time period. The momentum for this was undoubtedly created by Pim Fortuyn and his movement, although the root causes are an older dissatisfaction with low levels of public performance and the dissolution of the typical Dutch social organisation based on the "pillars" of society. As long as these pillars were still important modes of social organisation, the political system aimed at reaching consensus; now that the pillars have disappeared, the political system can focus attention on other matters. That performance and targets became a new focus of attention is probably due to Fortuyn, who framed much of his 2002 election campaign around this theme. And because no one wanted to be associated with "old" politics after this campaign, performance

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measurement schemes were also actively endorsed by politicians from the very parties that Fortuyn railed against.

### **Targeting in police work**

That performance measurement schemes were introduced in the Dutch police is a clear consequence of the political pressure to make government accountable. One police chief makes an explicit link with Fortuyn and the introduction of targets when he says that he was not a supporter of Fortuyn, but that he could justify the idea that citizens were neglected by the police.

The targets are quite specific. For instance the “business-plan 2003”[7] of the city of Utrecht mentions specific numbers for specific crimes; for instance, that 150 suspects of public violence should be brought before the public prosecutor, or that there should be 1,050 minors suspected of any crime brought before the public prosecutor[8].

On the face of it, targeting works – police chiefs sign contracts with targets, which are then translated into specific targets for bureaus and precincts, and so on. So, national politics have changed the operation of an important agency of public policy. On the face of it, this is a successful implementation of national politics. Closer inspection of the actors involved reveals a quite different picture however.

#### *Police leadership*

The Dutch police system is organised into regions, usually with one larger city as the centre of the region. The mayor of the largest city in the region is usually responsible for the management of the police. As such the mayors, in their function of police managers are those primarily responsible for the implementation of targeting schemes, since they give the police the means to finish the job. Not all mayors are enthusiastic about targets and contracts. The mayor of Beverwijk, a medium-sized city, says that “these schemes will not make The Netherlands safer” and his colleague from Utrecht, the fourth largest city in The Netherlands, says something even more revealing: “Why do I sign? I would not be able to explain not signing. Public safety is my goal after all. But we get more money, that’s a fact now”[9]. To some mayors performance measurement in the police is apparently more a public relations instrument than a public order measure, leading to a news item in a local newspaper reporting the mayor and police chief hand in hand signing the contract. Of course some mayors are enthusiastic about the schemes in public, but the fact that two mayors have voiced their cynicism openly, and without any repercussion, not even a mild uproar in the local council, shows that cynicism is widespread, because if targeting was an article of faith there would be hostile reaction – or any reaction at all for that matter.

#### *Police chiefs*

One of the first police chiefs to voluntarily agree upon a performance contract was the chief of Flevoland. In this contract a link between the targets of the police and his personal income was established. This is quite a remarkable emulation of a business practice – the police chief who actually stands to lose income if targets are not met, and one on which the dust has not settled (Wijnbelt and Drayer, 2003). It can be assumed that this chief was in favour of performance measurement schemes, although it cannot be ruled out entirely that this is an extreme public relations stunt. In public, police chiefs support the schemes, but they do sometimes express doubts. The chief of

Utrecht for instance argued that the targets were meant more to get some debates on police work started than as real hard targets[10], although an interview with members of the same police force revealed that this same chief gave the impression of taking the targets very serious[11]. The chief of Rotterdam however has no doubts. In an interview he states that targets work, and that his city is an example for others[12]. The chief of Twente is even more positive: “your goals are your pride”[13], he says in an interview. In general, the chiefs range between supportive and enthusiastic, and if there are chiefs who regard the whole scheme as a bad idea then they keep silent.

*Operational policemen[14]*

Fieldwork in police organisations reveals that executing officers feel trapped between the demands of the organisation, to achieve a specific number of fines, and their personal responsibility and assessment as police expert. Generally policemen have no problem with the number of fines they have to write; the target can be easily met, but the fact that their work is more or less routinised from above is a problem for them. Policemen are, in their daily work, confronted with situations, for which they have a whole spectrum of possible responses. The very possibility of making a choice between responses is what makes police work attractive and worthwhile and defines the professionalism of police officers. When organisational pressure diminishes the number of options becomes one, the fine, is favoured for political reasons, the attractiveness of police work as a practical profession decreases. Officers report writing fines in cases where they would not have done so before targeting was introduced, which means that their mode of operation is affected. They cope with the target and make sure that the quantitative target is met as soon as possible. There are smarter and less smart ways to do this, and policemen are now aware of the fact that the leadership does not tolerate large numbers of fines collected for meaningless misdemeanours; not every legal way of meeting the target is organisationally acceptable. Targeting has made the relationship between executing officers and leadership more problematic any way, because the leadership is not always aware of the pressures. In one case encountered during the fieldwork an assistant police chief was not even aware (or at least said so in an interview with a local newspaper) of the fact that there was a minimum number of fines that every officer should write. Executing officers were understandably annoyed.

Lower and middle management officers are more positive. One saw the clear relation with politics: “this is the first time politicians say to us what they want”[15] and saw the whole operation as a positive challenge. But it is interesting why:

If I can translate the targets in a meaningful way I have an instrument to motivate my people; I have something to work toward[16].

So, the targets function as a management tool, and perhaps as a scapegoat to help executive officers commission unpopular jobs. Another quote is even more revealing:

I have selected two tasks that are essential for me[17].

The fact that this “I” can “select” understandably adds to job satisfaction; addressing exactly what the executing officers feel they have lost. In the past, the officer on the street made a selection between two crimes spotted at the same time, based on rules of the thumb and personal experience (Lipskey, 1980). Now his direct boss has made the

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choice for him. Satisfying for the boss, who has more control, but a loss for the executing officer. It does become increasingly clear why the chiefs were so happy about the experiment: the discretion of the street-level cop seems to be disappearing, and the higher hierarchical levels gain more control over the organisation.

### *The public*

Because the discussion about public performance was prominent in a crucial election campaign, the 2002 campaign in which Pim Fortuyn participated, and because the police targets are widely publicised, the public is aware of the targets. Of course the public should be satisfied; after all, they voted for Fortuyn in large numbers, and the ideas of Fortuyn were important in the first cabinet in which his party participated, and in which the target schemes were first implemented. The policemen, who are in daily contact with the public, notice however that public satisfaction with police action is not overwhelming[18]. All policemen interviewed expressed the view that the public, whatever its general support for the basic idea of more public accountability, interprets the individual act of receiving a fine as an indication that the police officer has not yet reached his or her target. That this might lead to less rather than more trust in the police, is the fear of a number of executive officers. Community police officers, whose work depends in part on building relations of trust with the neighbourhood fear that these relations may erode, and that they may miss out on important information on what goes on in the neighbourhood. Trust in the police in The Netherlands is eroding in any case. In November-December 2000 some 69 per cent of the Dutch population expressed trust in the police[19], while in 2004 this had declined to 58 per cent[20].

### **Do targets have a future? The nature of police work**

What is the future of targets? One, already noticed by some policemen, is that the public is expressing greater distrust in the police. The public is not impressed by the strict, fine-writing officer who is – apparently – more concerned with meeting targets than with addressing public safety and security. The system of targets has created a fundamental doubt in the hearts of citizens as to why a fine is issued. Figures show that trust in the police is eroding. Of course this cannot be wholly attributed to this change in the mode of operating, but it is clear that performance contracts have not been able to stop this erosion either. A second effect is that policemen are more dissatisfied with their work. An element of freedom and expertise has been taken from them, and a routine has been imposed instead.

The government has high hopes of its performance measurement scheme. The government's document outlining the public safety program is entitled "Towards a more secure society", and is very clear about its expectations from law enforcers:

The government wants law enforcement and crime-fighting to be executed well. The goal is a large reduction of crime and unacceptable behaviour in the public realm[21].

The document also displays a rather instrumental view on policing, with little autonomy for street-level cops and a premium on rational management in which the behaviour of individual policemen is closely guided and guarded by his superiors, on the basis of specified targets. If policemen have a feeling that their autonomy has been taken away from them, then that feeling is real and intended by policy. The fact that the content and nature of police work is affected by these changes is however

overlooked. The “practical professionals” that Dutch police officers traditionally are, must get used to a more regimented daily practice, in which goals, and behaviour are set, and sanctions are imposed in case of failure (Stol *et al.*, 2004, p. 188). Without changes in recruitment and training for new staff, and without additional training programs for existing staff, the new mode of operation will be carried out with the “old” type policeman, who may dislike the new specifications of the job. Of course numerous artisans, craftsmen and skilled workers have seen their professional autonomy decline over the past decades as industrialisation and modernisation changed their trades and industries, and in all likelihood we are still far from a modern times type police officer whose work is routinised into a few movements, but the further consequences of targeting for labour and job satisfaction do not seem to be contemplated in depth, while this is necessary as the job changes its character.

Another element of the government’s instrumental view is that crime is perceived as a controllable event. Rational management of the kind targeting favours does, after all, presupposes that there is a clear picture of a problem, and that the means and instruments to solve it are fully understood. Targeting does not go together with a perception of crime as a unstructured, complex, and unpredictable phenomenon. So, the government assumes that controllable police officers handle a controllable event. But not even conservative researchers such as Wilson and Herrnstein (1998) maintain that crime is simple. They basically argue that there is an element of choice in crime that is further influenced by the social environment, and while that was a radical departure at the time of publication, it does hardly make crime a simple phenomenon, because in addition to the social environment, public policy should also address human nature, hardly well known territory. Of course the Dutch government cannot ignore the complexity of crime at will, so in the end, as so often in public policy, the pendulum will start to swing back.

### **Conclusion**

The police in The Netherlands are using performance contracts, because politicians want them to do so. A fierce debate on the performance of public institutions, including the police, was central to the 2002 election campaign, in which an unorthodox and new politician, Pim Fortuyn, put the topic on the political agenda of a polity that had previously focused on consensus rather than on accountability. The idea that public organisations and individuals within those organisations should be held accountable derived from a somewhat simplistic idea of how business operates, and an even more simplistic idea of the nature of public performance and its problems in advanced western societies, but was influential nonetheless. Hence, performance contracts were introduced in the Dutch police.

The police are also using police contracts because the managers of the Dutch police, the mayors, are not refusing to cooperate with the schemes. Mayors may be cynical about the effectiveness of performance contracts, but they do cooperate because they have no good reason not to cooperate, as one mayor expressed it. A measure that is intended to improve police effectiveness, and that has such clear beginnings in a political revolution meant to give the public sector back to the people, as Fortuyn formulated it, cannot be disputed openly. A mayor, particularly a mayor that still wants to have a political future (mayors are political appointees, but they often go on to

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elected offices) will go through the public relations ritual of signing the contract, while perhaps expressing fears and cynicism elsewhere.

The police are also using performance contracts because the police chiefs, the uniformed heads of the police, are, at least outwardly, enthusiastic. It is at first hard to understand why this is so, but fieldwork revealed that performance targets mean that executive police officers lose some “discretionary space”. Targets mean less freedom for the cop on the street, but more control for managers – from the lowest management level up.

Police targets, as core instruments of management, are not here to stay. They were introduced because of events in the political arena. A flamboyant politician, a public discourse, a temporary upheaval of the polity and an electorate that wants a – any – change of the established political parties are hardly stable anchors. Targets, and the corresponding view on police work as routine, and on crime as controllable, represent a pendulum swing, energised by upheaval in the polity. The public debate in The Netherlands has moved on since Fortuyn and public performance and accountability and the question “what are they doing with our tax money?” has made room for Islam, terrorism, and integration of minorities, and instead of accountability the public now demands hard measures, whatever the cost. Targets will probably be around for some time, but will become a harmless administrative procedure, a “hassle”, a form to be filled in, but hardly the instrument of control that some wanted it to be. Furthermore, there is ample historical evidence that proves that the circumstances in which targeting work are rather limited, usually restricted to fully understood and predictable circumstances, usually in commercial environments. The police, however, is not a hamburger restaurant. It does not serve a limited set of standard menus but operates in ambiguous circumstances. As economist John Kay noted:

If targets work, then the Soviet Union would have worked[22].

## Notes

1. What actually happened was that the annual overview of government expenses and the reports of the Court of Audit which had traditionally been presented to parliament in September, just before the presentation of the annual plans and budget, was moved forward to May, giving members of parliament more time to scrutinise and debate the findings. Second Chamber, record of meetings 1999-2000, nr. 76, pp. 4967-4971.
2. During the twentieth century there were only coalition governments in The Netherlands.
3. Parliament has the right to convene committees of inquiry. Their main strength derives from the fact that witnesses face criminal prosecution when they do not appear before the commission on request or when they perjure themselves. Although the right of inquiry already existed in the constitution of 1848 (article 95, detailed arrangements in normal law of August 5, 1850) it has been used sparsely. In the nineteenth century eight parliamentary inquiries took place, in the twentieth century seven took place (source: [www.parlement.com](http://www.parlement.com)), while already two inquiries have taken place in 2002 and parliament intends to use the weapon more often (Second Chamber, written record nr. 29547) and extend the possibilities to hear witnesses under oath (Second Chamber, written record nr. 29264.10).
4. His book or election tract in which he outlined his ideas was called *The Disasters of Eight Purple Years* (a “purple” coalition in Dutch political parlance is a coalition made up of Labour and Conservative).

5. "Leefbaar Nederland valt voor Fortuyn", in *Financiële Dagblad*, 26-11-2001.
6. "Van de straat", in *De Volkskrant*, 8-5-2004.
7. "Is men dood? Honderd punten! De politie worstelt met het prestatiecontract", in *NRC Handelsblad*, 1-11-2003.
8. "Is men dood? Honderd punten! De politie worstelt met het prestatiecontract", in *NRC Handelsblad*, 1-11-2003.
9. "Betalen naar prestatie maakt de rattenvanger in de mens los", in *De Volkskrant*, 15-2-2003.
10. "Is men dood? Honderd punten! De politie worstelt met het prestatiecontract", in *NRC Handelsblad*, 1-11-2003.
11. "Is men dood? Honderd punten! De politie worstelt met het prestatiecontract", in *NRC Handelsblad*, 1-11-2003.
12. "In Rotterdam gaan we tot het gaatje", in *NRC Handelsblad*, 30-12-2003.
13. "Meten is beperkt weten", in *De Volkskrant*, 29-12-2003.
14. Based on a case-study in police organisations, by Dirk B. Hoogenboezem. Policemen were interviewed on condition of anonymity and for this article the consolidated report used (Hoogenboezem, 2004). The original field notes will be referred to as "field work, interview [number]".
15. Field work, interview M1.
16. Field work, interview M1
17. Field work, interview M1
18. Based on fieldwork.
19. Standard Eurobarometer 54, April 2001, field work November. December 2000, p. B95.
20. Standard Eurobarometer 61, Spring 2004, p. T19.
21. Veiligheidsprogramma, 2002:5
22. "The trouble with targets", *The Economist*, 26-4-2001.

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