

status factors (i.e., state cadre), which are based on organizational affiliation or level within the hierarchy. In the latter case there is an assumption that organizational affiliation influences behavior.

Victor Falkenheim uses a form of bureaucratic model to examine elites in a single province (Fujian [Fukien]) over a particular period (1949-1966).<sup>33</sup> His choice of province and deliberate decision to eliminate the PLA from consideration detract from his study, but his analytical method is useful. He breaks the state structure into three categories: administrative (policy oriented), business, and enterprises (both implementation oriented). He also types the functions for translating central policy into action: supervision, coordination, and representation. He discusses control processes within the system and shows a special concern for the province-center relationship. He, too, identifies groups within the province by background, but not as rigorously as others.

Michael Y. M. Kau offers a balanced and sophisticated approach using a bureaucratic model.<sup>34</sup> He examines elite background and career patterns, focusing on formal roles and patterns of elite recruitment and mobility to see how close the Chinese attempt at institution building comes to the Weberian ideal type. His is an outstanding mixture of micro- and macro-political analysis.

Chalmers Johnson is another scholar who bases his macro-analysis on a thorough reading of many micro-analytic studies.<sup>35</sup> His focus, similar to those of Vogel and Barnett, was the movement between bureaucratic and Caesarist modes of rule. This approach seems to have especially useful overview perspectives that allow accurate explanation and prediction. The bureaucratic model, though, is what holds the work together.

Robert Scalapino's most recent work begins where his last work finished.<sup>36</sup> He combines micro- and macro-analysis into a middle-level approach. He categorizes elites by background (mostly military, party-administrative, and mass representatives) and then examines how the categories change over time in different categories of province level units (frontier, municipal, ordinary). Scalapino's conclusions include an increasing use of the more complex bureaucratic model, and he reaches conclusions about stability, role of the military, and province-center relations.

Frederick Teiwes, the first to see the importance of province level elites as the critical point of interface between policy makers and policy

<sup>33</sup> Victor Falkenheim, "Provincial Leadership in Fukien 1949-1966," in Scalapino, *Elites*, pp. 199-244.

<sup>34</sup> Michael Y. M. Kau, "The Role of the Military in Transition: The Politics of Mao's Army Building," Paper presented to Fifth Sino-American Conference on Mainland China (Taipei, Taiwan, June 1976).

<sup>35</sup> Chalmers Johnson, "Caesarism in China," *Encounter* (December 1976), pp. 76-83.

<sup>36</sup> Robert A. Scalapino, "The CCP's Provincial Secretaries," *Problems of Communism* 24 (July/August 1976), pp. 18-35.



implementors, also uses a combination of micro- and macro-analysis.<sup>87</sup> He develops an elite profile (age, education, experience, insider, outsider, personal ties) and examines how the various categories move in and out (tenure and turnover) of key positions in the party bureaucracy. He looks at the interchange of assignments within and between the bureaucratic hierarchies (vertical and lateral mobility) as an indicator of bureaucratic control. He notes variations within different provinces and examines the degree of functional differentiation and specialization within the bureaucracy in general. Finally, he attempts to reach conclusions about stability based on patterns of control and elite movement. He develops an index and rates the provinces by relative stability. Teiwes provides an excellent foundation for additional research on province level elites.

At the more complex end of the spectrum of research efforts are the works of Andrew Nathan and Yung Wei.<sup>88</sup> Both suggest movement to a more comprehensive systems approach to analysis. Nathan describes a system of factions that maintains an equilibrium. He suggests that factional politics is a mode of political interplay with fifteen observable characteristics. He recognizes the inherent weaknesses of his model, that it only helps to explain behavior *post hoc* and that it has little predictive value except for the restoration of an equilibrium.

Yung Wei develops seven sets of variables and places them in a systems model. His focus is on elites and his variables include: (1) social, economic, and political environment; (2) personal background; (3) political ideology; (4) path of recruitment; (5) types of elites; (6) types of elite conflicts; and (7) outcomes of elite conflicts. His systems model is similar to Bennett's identification of variables, but he shows more concern for identifying testable hypotheses as opposed to mere description. Unfortunately, his short paper is heuristic only, and he has yet to apply his model in detail.

The two principal models, factional and bureaucratic, have yielded mixed results depending partially on the questions posed. The factional model has proven more useful for short range policy explanation and prediction. The bureaucratic model offers a more comprehensive explanation and more long range predictive capacity.

There are significant variations within each general model. The factional models can be divided into two categories based on the criteria for identifying a faction or group. One category includes the factions defined by the current issue orientation (for philosophical, organiza-

<sup>87</sup> Frederick Teiwes, *Provincial Party Personnel in Mainland China, 1956-1966* (New York: Occasional Papers of the East Asian Institute, Columbia University, 1967). Frederick Teiwes, "Provincial Politics in China: Themes and Variations," in John Lindbeck, ed., *China: Management of a Revolutionary Society* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1971), pp. 116-192.

<sup>88</sup> Andrew Nathan, "A Factionalism Model for CCP Politics," *China Quarterly* 53 (January/March 1973), pp. 34-66. Yung Wei, "Elite Conflict in Chinese Politics: A Comparative Note," *Studies in Comparative Communism*, 1 and 2 (Spring/Summer 1974), pp. 64-73.



tional interest, or selfish motivations) of the members. The second category includes the factions defined by common identity-forming past experience or characteristics. Some studies include combinations of both types. More complex factional models attempt to correlate the factions with issues or events to determine influence relationships. Some of the factional models have been successful at establishing a relationship between elite types and specific political outcomes, but they are still very narrow and fail to see general political change or implications. Further, the relationships are always explained from hindsight and predictions have been generally weak.

The bureaucratic model or some combination of bureaucratic and factional models offer more potential for prediction. It forces the analyst to use more macro-analysis, but based on micro-analysis. It is important then to look at the forest *and* the trees to avoid getting lost in the trees. The systems models may provide a means by which variables can be kept in perspective, but the complexity and lack of explanatory or predictive value suggest that they are of less value than the combination of macro- and micro-analysis described above.

### *Method of Analysis*

The starting point in the search for answers about political change has to be in man, whether acting alone or in groups. Structural and functional analysis of institutions alone cannot provide adequate explanations. When acting alone man's behavior must be examined by biographic psycho-social analysis.<sup>39</sup> While it does not explain everything, an individual's life experience, especially his occupational experience, certainly contributes to his behavioral patterns when he is in a policy-making position.<sup>40</sup> Analysis of those experiences helps to identify factors that determine values and attitudes affecting behavior in policy-making.

But the nature of conflict in Chinese politics is different. It is more collective than individual so it is necessary to examine conflict in the context of group conflict.<sup>41</sup> Since decisions are generally group decisions rather than individual command-type decisions, the most useful approach for understanding Chinese politics must be some combination of analysis of groups or organizations and analysis of individuals who make up the groups. The approach that draws upon both types of analysis is elite studies.

But elite analysis, as was seen in the review of literature above, can be approached in many ways. The most fruitful approach seems to be a

<sup>39</sup> See Richard Solomon, *Mao's Revolution and the Chinese Political Culture* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971).

<sup>40</sup> Kenneth Jowitt, "An Organizational Approach to the Study of Political Culture in Marxist-Leninist Systems," *The American Political Science Review*, 68 (September 1974), pp. 1171-1191.

<sup>41</sup> Parris Chang, *Power and Policy in China*, especially chapter 7.



middle-level approach that combines macro- and micro-analysis. Such analysis should include examination of elite mobility and assignments within key Chinese bureaucracies (the Central Committee, military region and province party, army and government organizations). One approach is to clarify institutional relationships and elite role patterns by focusing on one type of institutional linkage: the interlocking roles of elite members. Once the scope and nature of these interlocking roles are exposed, changes over time can be examined. A determination can then be made as to whether any structural change has taken place and if so to what extent that change is likely to impact on future institution-building or bureaucratic stability.

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