thal reduces the elites to three similar groups—Peking Group, Shanghai Group, and Military Group[17]—which are based primarily on issues.

Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein develop four groups.[18] Members of the groups are identified by the policy position taken on what is assumed to be the key issue—how to deal with the West on modernization. The four categories are: (1) militant fundamentalists who believe in total isolation from the outside world; (2) radical conservatives whose concern is Chinese independence from outside influence; (3) eclectic modernizers who promote self-reliance but allow more contact with the outside world; and (4) westernized Chinese who want maximum contact with technologically advanced nations.

All of the above groups are identified by *current* stands on policy issues, work style, or personal relationships. An increasing number of analysts have attempted to identify groups based upon past identity-forming experiences. The hope has been to correlate elite recruitment or mobility with environmental factors, elite conflict over issues, political styles, or policy outcomes. These approaches require the assembly of detailed biographic data that are generally available for senior elites but become sparse at lower elite levels.

Gordon Bennett searched for commonalities in elite appointments by focusing on five types of elites competing for party secretary posts in the provinces: (1) insiders (localists) versus (2) outsiders, (3) military versus (4) civilian background, and (5) military region or field army affiliations.[19] His conclusions focused on organizational change (militarization of politics) and policy implications (movement toward revolutionary innovation).

George Sung also categorizes elites at the province level in the hope of finding some commonality among those appointed to key positions.[20] He correlates eight factors: (1) date party committee formed; (2) changes in CCP or government leadership; (3) appointments of second secretaries; (4) field army affiliations; (5) insiders versus outsiders; (6) historical power base of field army system; (7) generation differences; and (8) military versus civilian background. His conclusion is that the military region has become a new center of corporate loyalties and that past field army affiliations have decreased in importance. He suggests that the Center has begun to worry about the development of regional power centers.

Paul Godwin categorizes elites by career pattern (military, civilian/military, and civilian) and by examining appointments to key party and

17 Kenneth Lieberthal, "China in 1975: The Internal Political Scene," *Problems of Communism* 24 (May/June 1975), pp. 1–11.

18 Michel Oksenberg and Steven Goldstein, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism* 23 (March/April 1974), pp. 1–13.

19 Gordon Bennett, "Military Regions and Provincial Party Secretaries: One Outcome of China's Cultural Revolution," *China Quarterly* 54 (April/June 1973), pp. 294–307.

20 George Sung, "China's Regional Politics: A Biographical Approach," *Asian Survey* 15 (April 1965), pp. 346–365.

government organizations at the province level over time.[21] He reaches conclusions about the degree of PLA control over the political process. Godwin is also representative of those who focus primarily on elites in a single institution (i.e., the PLA); others with this focus include Ellis Joffe,[22] John Gittings,[23] Jürgen Domes,[24] and William Whitson.[25]

William Whitson has developed relatively sophisticated categories of elites. His well-known field army system and generational categories are used by most scholars. He also notes that within these larger categories there are still other personal cliques or factions based on provincial origin, age, shared unit or battlefield associations, and school ties. He recognizes that in recent years the intensity and focus on field army loyalties has eroded, but that they remain "a significant factor, first in deciding Party as well as military personnel assignments and second in reaching compromises on national policy and regional policy implementation."[26]

Robert Scalapino's comparison of elites in the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees is an example of a detailed and systematic search for factors that might identify common attitudes or political behavior.[27] He carefully types elites by sex, age, place of origin, and several categories of socioeconomic background: petty bourgeois, petty intellectual, intellectual, military, poor peasant, middle peasant, rich peasant, gentry landlord, bourgeois, proletariat, official, and petty official. Noting that most elites have a background made up of combinations of these labels, he searches for similar combinations. He develops further categories based on education, party seniority, functional career patterns (party-administrative cadres, military cadres, and mass representatives), rural-urban experience, record of having suffered setbacks, and level in party or military hierarchy. Finally, he examines current indices of visibility

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21 Paul H. B. Godwin, "The PLA and Political Control in China's Provinces," *Comparative Politics* 9 (October 1976), pp. 1–20.

22 Ellis Joffe, "The PLA in Internal Politics," *Problems of Communism* 24 (November/December 1975), pp. 1–12. Also see Ellis Joffe, *The Chinese Red Army: Growth of Professionalism and Party-Army Relations, 1949–1963* (Cambridge, Mass.: East Asia Research Center, Harvard University, 1965).

23 John Gittings, "The Chinese Army's Role in the Cultural Revolution," *Pacific Affairs* 39 (Fall and Winter 1966–1967), pp. 269–289. Also see John Gittings, *The Role of the Chinese Army* (London: Oxford University Press, 1967).

24 Jürgen Domes, "The Cultural Revolution and the Army," *Asian Survey* 8 (May 1968), pp. 349–363. Also see Jürgen Domes, "Generals and Red Guards," *Asia Quarterly* (January 1971), pp. 3–32 and (February 1971), pp. 123–160.

25 William W. Whitson, "The Field Army in Chinese Communist Military Politics," *China Quarterly* 37 (January/March 1969), pp. 1–30. Also see William W. Whitson, "The Concept of Military Generation: The Chinese Communist Case," *Asian Survey* 8 (November 1968), pp. 921–947. Also see William W. Whitson and Chen-hsia Huang, *The Chinese High Command—A History of Chinese Military Politics, 1927–1971* (New York: Praeger, 1973).

26 Whitson, "The Field Army," p. 21.

27 Robert A. Scalapino, "The Transition in Chinese Party Leadership: A Comparison of the Eighth and Ninth Central Committees," in Scalapino, *Elites*, pp. 67–148.

and degree of cosmopolitanism as defined by foreign training, language, travel, or interaction with foreign visitors. The results of his efforts are excellent profiles of the types of leaders who are considered successful in Chinese Communist terms. While Scalapino avoided the pitfalls of factional politics models in his article, he did not take the next logical step of attempting to tie his elite types to political outcomes.

Parris Chang and Harry Harding begin with issues and attempt to identify key elite groups that support or attack any given issue.[28] Chang ends up in factional politics analysis (radicals versus old cadres), but he also brings in the decisive role of key individual elites. He notes a chain of events in elite conflicts: that critical issues expose broad philosophical differences that eventually reduce to personal factors. His conclusion is that conflict is based not only on a struggle over principles (e.g., pragmatism versus ideological purity) but also on a struggle for power. Harry Harding's analysis leads to slightly different categories of elites. He suggests bureaucratic interest groups are the key. He notes sub-groups within key civilian and military categories. In the civilian bureaucracy he identifies party leaders, heavy industry managers, and economic managers. In the military he identifies the General Political Department, the General Staff, and regional commands as three elements within the military with different positions on issues. He notes that policy is formed through coalitions of these sub-groups. An important observation by both Chang and Harding is that there is no simple party-army dichotomy; that real political life is much more complicated.

Heath Chamberlain goes beyond mere categorization by attempting to correlate types of elites (by degree of identification with the new order and degree of identification with local interests—outside reds, local reds, and local whites) with organizational tasks (generalist, management, control, mobilization) over time.[29] He further breaks elite types down into: (1) sex, (2) age, (3) place of origin, (4) degree of urban exposure, (5) level of formal education, (6) foreign travel, (7) earliest participation in CCP, (8) revolutionary route, and (9) revolutionary task area (military/political/administrative). Chamberlain's sample is especially interesting. He places the elites in three cities (Guangzhou [Canton], Tianjin [Tientsin], and Shanghai) into a single data base, and his conclusions help to explain center-municipal relations.

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28 Parris Chang, "Mao's Last Stand," *Problems of Communism* 4 (July/August 1976), pp. 1–17. Also see Parris Chang, "Mao Tse-tung and His Generals: Some Observations on Military Intervention in Chinese Politics," in Frank Horton, et al., eds., *Comparative Defense Policy* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974), pp. 121–128. Also see Parris Chang, "Provincial Party Leaders' Strategies for Survival During the GPCR," in Scalapino, *Elites*, pp. 501–539. Also see Harry Harding, "The Evolution of Chinese Military Policy," in Horton, *Comparative Defense Policy*, pp. 216–232.

29 Heath B. Chamberlain, "Transition and Consolidation in Urban China: A Study of Leaders and Organizations in Three Cities, 1949–1953," in Scalapino, *Elites*, pp. 245–301.

Lynn White's examination of Shanghai elites focuses on elite response to events.[30] He describes groups not so much by past experience as by how they coalesce under modern crisis conditions. The assumption by all these approaches is that by identifying elite types that pervade, usually by sheer quantity, key policy-making or policy-implementing organizations, explanations and predictions about policy can be made. This group goes beyond background categorization and attempts to correlate the elite nature with other variables: issues, policy outcomes, historical periods, or organizational changes.

Data and conclusions based on these forms of micro-analysis add significant depth to our understanding of the Chinese political system and elite conflict within the system. They have provided a sound foundation for more complex efforts that can begin to tie more of the variables together.

Nearly all of the approaches discussed above reach conclusions that are based upon some form of factional model of politics, although Bennett and Chamberlain touch briefly on elements of a bureaucratic model. They attempt to explain political change *within* the political system, not *of* the political system. It will require more effort along the lines of a bureaucratic model to move in that direction.

A number of scholars have chosen the bureaucratic model of political analysis. William Parish, in an excellent critique of the Whitson Field Army model, suggests the need to develop bureaucratic rather than factional models.[31] Doak Barnett and Ezra Vogel use micro-analysis of the bureaucracy to explain changes in structures, functions, leadership types, and relationships within and between organizations.[32] Both are concerned with the movement from revolutionary to manager or bureaucrat. Both develop categories like those who study elites as factions, but their purpose is to show changes in elite leadership in the bureaucracy and thus changes in the bureaucracy itself.

Vogel's cadres include: Long March veterans, War of Resistance cadres, Liberation cadres, Uprising personnel (defectors), and Retained personnel (based mostly on date of entry into the CCP). Barnett lists 15 categories of cadres: state (paid by the state), local (paid by the commune), administrative, army (officer), army (enlisted men), old cadres, new cadres, Long March cadres, Yenan cadres, Anti-Japanese War cadres, Liberation War cadres, leadership cadres, ordinary cadres, retained cadres, and backbone cadres. The mixture of criteria shows concern for both past experience (i.e., Long March cadre) and current

30 Lynn White, "Leadership in Shanghai, 1955–1969," in Scalapino, *Elites*, pp. 302–377.

31 William Parish, "Factions in Chinese Military Politics," *China Quarterly* 56 (October/December 1973), pp. 667–699.

32 A. Doak Barnett, "Social Stratification and Aspects of Personnel Management in the Chinese Communist Bureaucracy," *China Quarterly* 28 (October/December 1966), pp. 8–39, and Ezra Vogel, "From Revolutionary to Semi-Bureaucrat: The 'Regularization' of Cadres," *China Quarterly* 29 (January/March 1967), pp. 36–60.