Copyright JAI Press Inc. Sep
1992
To provide a model of organizational performance and
change, at least two lines of theoritizing need to be explored--organizational
functioning and organizational change. The authors go beyond desciption and
suggest causal linkages that hypothesize how performance is affected and how
effective change occurs. Change is depicted in terms of both process and
content, with particular emphasis on tranformational as compared with
transactional factors. Tranformational change occurs as a response to the
external environment and directly affects organizational mission and strategy,
the organization's leadership, and culture. In turn, the transactional factors
are affected--structure, systems, management practices, and climate. These
tranformational and transactional factors together affect motivation, which, in
turn, affects performance.
In support of the model's potential validity, theory
and research as well as practice
Organization change is a kind of chaos (Gleick,
1987). The number of variables changing at the same time, the magnitude of
environmental change, and the frequent resistance of human systems create a
whole confluence of processes that are extremely difficult to predict and almost
impossible to control. Nevertheless, there are consistent patterns that
exist--linkages among classes of events that have been demonstrated repeatedly
in the research literature and can be seen in actual organizations. The enormous
and pervasive impact of culture and beliefs--to the point where it causes
organizations to do fundamentally unsound things from a business point of
view--would be such an observed phenomenon.
To build a most likely model describing the causes of
organizational performance and change, we must explore two important lines of
thinking. First, we must understand more thoroughly how organizations function
(i.e., what leads to what). Second, given our model of causation, we must
understand how organizations might be deliberately changed. The purpose of this
article is to explain our understanding so far. More specifically, we present
our framework for standing--a causal model of organizational performance and
change. But, first, a bit of background.
In our organizational consulting work, we try very
hard to link the practice to sound theory and research. The linkage typically is
in the direction of theory and research to practice: that is, to ground our
consultation in what is known, what is theoretically and empirically sound.
Creation of the model to be presented in this article was not quite in that
knowledge-to-practice direction, however. With respect to theory, we strongly
believe in the open system framework, especially represented by Katz and Kahn
(1978). Thus, any organizational model that we might develop would stem from an
input-throughput-output, with a feedback loop, format. The model presented here
is definitely of that genre. In other words, the fundamental framework for the
model evolved from theory. The components of the model and what causes what and
in what order, on the other hand, have evolved from our practice. To risk
stating what is often not politic to admit in academic circles, we admit that
the ultimate development of our causal model evolved from practice, not
extensive theory or research. What we are attempting with this article,
therefore, is a theoretical and empirical justification of what we clearly
believe works. To be candid, we acknowledge that our attempt is not unlike
attribution theory--we are explaining our beliefs and actions ex post facto:
"This seemed to have worked; I wonder if the literature supports our
action."
Our consulting efforts over a period of about 5 years
with British Airways taught us a lot--what changes seemed to have worked and
what activities clearly did not. It was from these experiences that our model
took form. As a case example, we refer to the work at British Airways later in
this article. For a more recent overview of that change effort, see Goodstein
and Burke (1991).
OTHER ORGANIZATIONAL MODELS
From the perspective of both research about
organizations and consultation to organizational clients, we have experienced
some frustration about most if not all current organizational models that do
little more than describe or depict. A case in point is the 7S model developed
by Pascale and Athos (1981) and further honed by Peters and Waterman (1982).
Parenthetically, let us quickly add that by comparing our model with others,
particularly those the reader may be familiar with, if not fond of, we wish to
clarify the nature of our thinking and, ideally, its distinctive contribution,
not cast our comments in a competitive manner.
The strengths of the 7S model are (a) its description
of organizational variables that convey obvious importance--strategy, structure,
systems, style, staff, skills, and shared values (as will be seen, we have
incorporated these dimensions in one form or another in our model)--and (b) its
recognition of the importance of the interrelationships among all of these seven
variables, or dimensions. The 7S model, on the other hand, does not contain any
external environment or performance variables. The model is a description of
these seven important elements and shows that they interact to create
organizational patterns, but there is no explication of how these seven
dimensions are affected by the external environment. Nor do we know how each
dimension affects the other or what specific performance indices may be
involved.
Some organizational models that in our judgment are
largely descriptive do at least stipulate certain "shoulds." Weisbord (1976),
for example, states that the role of the leadership box in his six-box model is
to coordinate the remaining five. The Nadler-Tushman (1977) model is one of
congruence. They argue that for organizational effectiveness the various boxes
composing their model should be congruent with one another (e.g., organizational
arrangements, or structure, should be congruent with organizational
strategy).
Even contingency models of organizations, which imply
that "it all depends" and that there is no one best way to organize or to manage
(e.g., Lawrence & Lorsch, 1969, and Burns & Stalker, 1961, before them)
have certain causal implications. Organizational effectiveness is, in part,
contingent on the degree of match between the organization's external
environment (whether static or dynamic) and the organization's internal
structure (either mechanistic or organic).
To some degree, then, models such as Nadler-Tushman
and the positions taken by Burns and Stalker and by Lawrence and Lorsch suggest
a cause-effect linkage. Nadler and Tushman at least imply that little or no
congruence between, say, strategy and structure produces low organizational
performance, and the contingency models posit that an improper match between the
organization's external environment and its internal structure "causes"
organizational ineffectiveness. The issue in both is that the number of items
that might be congruent (or matched in the case of contingency) is great and the
models provide neither a formula for determining which are central nor an
objective means for knowing when congruence or matching has occurred or what
levels of congruence/matching or incongruence/ nonmatching produce desirable or
undesirable effects. In short, our desire is for a model that will serve as a
guide for both organizational diagnosis and planned, managed organization
change--one that clearly shows cause-and-effect relationships and can be tested
empirically.
With respect to the latter half of this desire, a
model of organization change, we are attempting to provide a causal framework
that encompasses both the what and the how--what organizational dimensions are
key to successful change and how these dimensions should be linked causally to
achieve the change goals. In other words, we are attempting to integrate two
categories of change theory from the world of organization development (OD),
what Porras and Robertson (1987) as well as Woodman (1989) refer to as (a)
implementation theory and (b) change process theory. The former concerns
activities that must be undertaken to affect planned change (e.g., survey
feedback) and the latter refers to specific changes that need to occur as a
consequence of these implementation activities (e.g., embracing a particular
value such as emphasizing service to customers more than adhering rigidly to
procedures regarding how to deal with customers, rather than vice versa). As
these OD researchers have pointed out, theory in OD is typically either one or
the other--implementation or change process. With the model presented in this
article, we are striving for an integration of both theories.
An additional desire, as noted already, is to link
what we understand from our practice to what is known from research and theory.
It is clear that, for example, the 7S model came from consulting practice (see
Peters & Waterman, 1982: 9-12), and we know firsthand that Weisbord's
six-box model evolved from his practice. We believe that these models have valid
components because they are in fact based on practice and do not convey
irrelevant or the so-called ivory tower thinking. Yet these and other models do
not go far enough. For example, such critical dimensions as the external
environment, performance, and organizational culture are not accounted for
sufficiently. Moreover, depicting organizational models as simply as possible
can be beneficial, especially when attempting to explain systemic ideas to
people who are relatively naive about large organizations; however, reality is
much more complex than most, if not all, models depict. And when attempting to
account for organizational functioning and change at the same time, we must
depict a considerable degree of complexity while maintaining coherence--no mean
feat. We know of no organizational models that attempt this degree of
complexity, coherence, and predictability (i.e., causality).
BACKGROUND: CLIMATE AND CULTURE
CLIMATE
The early, original thinking underlying the model
presented here came from George Litwin and others during the 1960s. In 1967, the
Harvard Business School sponsored a conference on organizational climate. The
results of this conference were subsequently published in two books (Litwin
& Stringer, 1968; Tagiuri & Litwin, 1968). The concept of organizational
climate that emerged from this series of studies and articles was that of a
psychological state strongly affected by organizational conditions (e.g.,
systems, structure, manager behavior, etc).
The importance of this early research and theory
development regarding organizational climate was that it clearly linked
psychological and organizational variables in a cause-effect model that was
empirically testable. Using the model, Litwin and Stringer (1968) were able to
predict and control the motivational and performance consequences of various
organizational climates established in their research experiment. They were
working with motivation analysis and arousal techniques developed by McClelland
(1961), Atkinson (1958), and others over a period of more than 20 years.
CULTURE
In recent years, there has been a great deal of
interest in the concept of organizational culture. Drawn from anthropology, the
concept of culture is meant to describe the relatively enduring set of values
and norms that underlie a social system. These underlying values and norms may
not be entirely available to one's consciousness. They are thought to describe a
"meaning system" that allows members of that social system to attribute meanings
and values to the variety of external and internal events that are experienced.
In this article, we attempt to be very explicit about the distinction between
climate and culture. Climate is defined in terms of perceptions that individuals
have of how their local work unit is managed and how effectively they and their
day-to-day colleagues work together on the job. The level of analysis,
therefore, is the group, the work unit. Climate is much more in the foreground
of organizational members' perceptions, whereas culture is more background and
defined by beliefs and values. The level of analysis for culture is the
organization. Climate is, of course, affected by culture, and people's
perceptions define both, but at different levels. We attempt to clarify in more
depth these distinctions later in the article, as has Schneider (1985) before
us. Further, we are attempting to create a model of organizational behavior
within which both climate and culture can be described in terms of their
interactions with other organizational variables. Thus, we are building on
earlier research and theory with regard to predicting motivation and performance
effects.
In addition, we are attempting to distinguish between
the set of variables that influence and are influenced by climate and those
influenced by culture. We postulate two distinct sets of organizational
dynamics, one primarily associated with the transactional level of human
behavior--the everyday interactions and exchanges that more directly create
climate conditions. The second set of dynamics is concerned with processes of
organizational transformation: that is, rather fundamental changes in behavior
(e.g., value shifts). Such transformational processes are required for genuine
change in the culture of an organization. In our effort to distinguish between
transactional and transformational dynamics in organizations, we have been
influenced by the writings of James McGregor Burns (1978) and by our own
experience in modern organizations.
THE MODEL
Figure 1 is a diagram summarizing the model.(Figure 1
omitted) As noted earlier, this model owes its original development to the work
of Litwin and his associates (Litwin & Stringer, 1968; Tagiuri & Litwin,
1968), and has been refined through a series of studies directed by Burke and
his colleagues (Bernstein & Burke, 1989; Michela, Boni, Schecter,
Manderlink, Bernstein, O'Malley, & Burke, 1988). Recent collaboration has
led to the current form of this model that (a) specifies by arrows which
organizational variable (see the boxes) influences more directly which other
variables and (b) distinguishes transformational and transactional dynamics in
organizational behavior and change.
Conforming to accepted ways of thinking about
organizations from general systems theory (Katz & Kahn, 1978), the external
environment box represents the input, and the individual and organizational
performance box the output. The feedback loop goes in both directions: that is,
organizational performance affects the system's external environment via its
products and services, and the organization's performance may be directly
affected by its external environment (e.g., a change in government regulations
or trends on Wall Street). The remaining boxes in the model represent the
throughput aspect of general systems theory.
The total of 12 boxes represent, of course, our
choices of organizational variables we consider to be the most important ones.
These choices were not made in isolation. We have been influenced by others'
thinking. To a large degree, therefore, we have followed precedence. For
example, in one form or another, and perhaps using different labels, we have
incorporated the seven S's of the McKinsey model explained by Peters and
Waterman (1982). The same can be said of Weisbord's (1976) model and the one by
Nadler and Tushman (1977). In addition, we have attempted to account for key
variables at a total system level, with such variables as mission, strategy, and
culture, at a group or local work unit level (e.g., climate) and at an
individual level (e.g., motivation, individual needs and values, and job--person
match).
It is no doubt an understatement to say that the
model is complex. At the same time, however, we recognize the need for the human
mind to simplify the rich complexity of organizational phenomena. And though
complex to depict and describe, our model, exhibited two--dimensionally, is
still an oversimplification. A hologram would be better, but is not
available.
Arrows going in both directions are meant to convey
the open--systems principle. A change in one (or more) "box(es)" will eventually
have an impact on the others. Moreover, if we could diagram the model such that
the arrows would be more circular--the hologram idea--reality could be
represented more accurately. Yet this is a causal model. For example, though
culture and systems affect one another, we believe culture has a stronger
influence on systems than vice versa. Kerr and Slocum (1987), for example, have
provided data that suggest a strong linkage between corporate culture and the
organization's reward system. They show how a company's reward system is a
manifestation of its culture. They also point out that the organization's reward
system can be used to help change the company's culture. Their data lend support
to the linkage notion. We would simply take their evidence and suggest a step
further by arguing that corporate culture (beliefs: and values) determine the
type of reward system an organization has. Yet we would strongly agree that to
change culture the reward system should be used (i.e., to reward the behaviors
that would reflect the new values we might wish to incorporate).
Displaying the model the way we have is meant to make
a statement about organizational change. Organizational change, especially an
overhaul of the company business strategy, stems more from environmental impact
than from any other factor. Moreover, in large scale or total organizational
change, mission, strategy, leadership, and culture have more "weight" than
structure, management practices, and systems: that is, having organizational
leaders communicate the new strategy is not sufficient for effective change.
Culture change must be planned as well and aligned with strategy and leader
behavior. These variables have more weight because when changing them (e.g.,
organizational mission), they affect the total system. Changing structure, on
the other hand, may or may not affect the total system. It depends on where in
the organization a structural change might occur.
We are not necessarily discussing at his stage where
one could start the change, only the relative weighting of change dynamics. When
we think of the model in terms of change, then, the weighted order displayed in
the model is key. This point will be elaborated in the next section.
To summarize briefly so far, the model shown in
Figure 1 attempts to portray the primary variables that need to be considered in
any attempt to predict and explain the total behavior output of an organization,
the most important interactions between these variables, and how they affect
change. Again, in reality, all boxes would have bi-directional arrows with every
other box. We are displaying with our model what we consider the most critical
linkages. Later in this article we define each of the variables and give some
examples of typical interactions.
TRANSFORMATIONAL AND TRANSACTIONAL DYNAMICS
The concept of transformational change in
organizations is suggested in the writings of such people as Bass (1985). Burke
(1986), Burns (1978), McClelland (1975), and Tichy and Devanna (1986). Figure 2
contains a display of the transformational variables--the upper half of the
model. (Figure 2 omitted) By transformational we mean areas in which alteration
is likely caused by interaction with environmental forces (both within and
without) and will require entirely new behavior sets from organizational
members.
It is true, of course, that members can influence
their organization's environment so that certain changes are minimized (e.g.,
lobbying activities. forming or being involved in trade associations and
coalitions). Our feedback loop in the model is meant to reflect this kind of
influence. Our point here is that for the most part organization change is
initiated by forces from the organization's external environment (e.g., changes
in the competitive environment, government regulations, technological
breakthroughs). Not everyone would agree with our premise. Torbert (1989), for
example, argues that organizational transformation emanates from
transformational leaders, not from the environment. We would agree that strong
leaders make a difference, especially in the early stages of their tenure. These
leaders are responding, nevertheless, to forces in their organization's
environment, we contend. This leader responsiveness does not mean passivity.
Astute leaders are people who scan their organization's external environment,
choose the forces they wish to deal with, and take action accordingly. This
leadership process is neither passive nor in isolation, as Torbert's contention
might imply.
Figure 3 contains the transactional variables--the
lower half of the model.(Figure 3 omitted) These variables are very similar to
those originally isolated earlier by Litwin and, in part (structural effects on
climate), later by Michela et al. (1988). By transactional we mean that the
primary way of alteration is via relatively short-term reciprocity among people
and groups. In other words, "You do this for me and I'll do that for you."
This transformational--transactional way of thinking
about organizations that we are using for the model, as noted earlier, comes
from theory about leadership. The distinction has been characterized as
differences between a leader and a manager. Burke (1986) combined both the
theorizing of Zaleznik (1977) and Burns (1978)--that is, transformational
(Burns)-leader (Zaleznik) and transactional (Burns)-manager (Zaleznik)--to
clarify further these distinctions and to hypothesize how each type, leader or
manager, could empower others effectively. With respect to the model, and in
keeping with the leader (transformational)--manager (transactional)
distinctions, transformational change is therefore associated with leadership,
whereas transactional change is more within the purview of management.
With this broad distinction of
transformational-transactional in mind, we now proceed with a more specific
explanation of the model. And, at the risk of erring on the side of brevity, the
next section defines each category or box in the model. With each box definition
we have provided at least one reference from the literature that helps to
clarify further what we mean.
External environment is any outside condition or
situation that influences the performance of the organization (e.g.,
marketplaces, world financial conditions, political/governmental circumstances).
For a broad view of the changing nature of our world economy, see Drucker
(1986). For a more specific perspective on how the external environment affects
the organization, see Pfeffer and Salancik (1978).
Mission and strategy is what the organization's (a)
top management believes is and has declared is the organization's mission and
strategy and (b) what employees believe is the central purpose of the
organization. Apparently, the mere fact of having a written mission statement is
important to organizational effectiveness (Pearce & David, 1987). Strategy
is how the organization intends to achieve that purpose over an extended time
scale. We prefer Porter's (1985) more recent of conceptualizing strategy (as
opposed to, say, the Boston Consulting Group's way) because he links it directly
to environment (industry structure), organizational structure, and corporate
culture.
Leadership is executives providing overall
organizational direction and serving as behavioral role models for all
employees. When assessing this category we would include followers' perceptions
of executive practices and values. As our model shows, we make a distinction
between leadership and management. This difference follows the thinking of
Bennis and Nanus (1985), Burke (1986), Burns (1978), and Zaleznik (1977).
Culture is "the way we do things around here." This
clear. simple definition comes from Deal and Kennedy (1982). To be a bit more
comprehensive in our definition, we should add that culture is the collection of
overt and covert rules, values, and principles that are enduring and Guide
organizational behavior. Understanding an organization's history, especially the
values and customs of the founder(s), is key to explaining culture (Schein,
1983). Also, as stated earlier, culture provides a "meaning system" for
organizational members.
Structure is the arrangement of functions and people
into specific areas and levels of responsibility, decision-making authority,
communication, and relationships to assure effective implementation of the
organization's mission and strategy. Perhaps the classic articles on structure
and no doubt some of the ones cited most often are by Duncan (1979) and
Galbraith (1974). For perspectives about organizational structure and the
future, see Jelinek, Litterer, and Miles (1986) and Peters (1988).
Management articles are what managers do in the
normal course of events to use the human and material resources at their
disposal to carry out the organization's strategy. By practices we mean a
particular cluster of specific behaviors. An example of a behavioral management
practice is "encouraging subordinates to initiate innovative approaches to tasks
and projects." As a practice, two managers may "encourage subordinates" to the
same extent, but how specifically each one does it may differ. Thus, we are
following the work of such people as Boyatzis (1982), Burke and Coruzzi (1987),
and Luthans (1988).
Systems are standardized policies and mechanisms that
facilitate work, primarily manifested in the organization's reward systems,
management information systems (MIS), and in such control systems as performance
appraisal, goal and budget development, and human resource allocation. This
category of the model covers a lot of ground. Some references that help to
explain what we mean by the subcategories include Lawler (1981) on reward
systems, Keen (1981) on MIS, Flamholtz (1979) on control systems, and Schuler
and Jackson (1987) with their linkage of human resource management systems and
practices to strategy.
Climate is the collective current impressions,
expectations, and feelings that members of local work units have that, in turn,
affect their relations with their boss, with one another, and with other units.
For further clarification of what we mean by climate, see James and Jones
(1974), Litwin, Humphrey, and Wilson (1978), and Michela et al. (1988).
Task requirements and individual skills/abilities are
the required behavior for task effectiveness, including specific skills and
knowledge required of people accomplish the work for which they have been
assigned and for which they feel directly responsible. Essentially, this box
concerns what is often referred to as job-person match. This domain of the model
represents mainstream industrial/organizational psychology. Almost any good
textbook, such as Maier and Verser (1982), will provide thorough coverage of
this category of the model. On the job side, see Campion and Thayer (1987) for
an up-to-date analysis of job design, and for the person side, at the general
manager level, Herbert and Deresky (1987) provide a useful perspective on
matching a person's talents with business strategy.
Individual needs and values are the specific
psychological factors that provide desire and worth for individual actions or
thoughts. Many behavioral scientists believe that enriched jobs enhance
motivation and there is evidence to support this belief, yet as Hackman and
Oldham (1980) have appropriately noted, not everyone has a desire for his or her
job to be enriched. For some members of the workforce, their idea of enrichment
concerns activities off the job, not on the job. As the American workforce
continues to become even more diverse, the ability to understand differences
among people regarding their needs and values with respect to work and job
satisfaction increases in importance. See, for example, Kravetz (1988) regarding
changes in the workforce and Plummer (1989) on our changing values (i.e., more
emphasis on self-actualization).
Motivation is aroused behavior tendencies to move
toward goals, take needed action, and persist until satisfaction is attained.
This is the net resultant motivation: that is, the resultant net energy
generated by the sum of achievement. power, affection, discovery, and other
important human motives. The article by Evans (1986) is especially relevant
because his model for understanding motivation in the workplace is not only
multifaceted but the facets are very similar to our model.
Individual and organizational performance is the
outcome or result as well as the indicator of effort and achievement (e.g.,
productivity, customer satisfaction, profit, and quality). At the organizational
level the work of Cameron, Whetten, and their colleagues is especially relevant
to this box: see, for example, Cameron (1980), Cameron and Whetten (1982), and
Cameron and Whetton (1981), and at the individual level the article by Latham,
Cummings, and Mitchell (1981).
CLIMATE RESULTS FROM TRANSACTIONS, CULTURE CHANGE
REQUIRES TRANSFORMATION
In attempting to explain this model so far, we have
encountered many questions, but perhaps most have focused on the distinction
between climate and culture. An additional explanation is no doubt
appropriate.
In our causal model, we argue that day-to-day climate
will be a result of transactions around such issues as
1. Sense of direction: effect of mission clarity or
lack thereof.
2. Role and responsibility: effect of structure,
reinforced by manager practice.
3. Standards and commitment: effect of manager
practice, reinforced by culture.
4. Fairness of rewards: effect of systems, reinforced
by manager practice.
5. Focus on customer versus internal pressures,
standards of excellence: effect of culture, reinforced by other variables.
In contrast, the concept of organizational culture
has to do with those underlying values and meaning systems that are difficult to
manage, to alter, to even be aware of totally (Schein, 1985). We do not mean to
use culture to describe another way of understanding the short-term dynamics of
the organization. Rather, it provides us with a theoretical framework for
delving into that which is continuing and more or less permanent. By more or
less permanent, we mean that change can be arranged or may come about through
the application of uncontrolled outside forces, but it will involve substantial
upheaval in all transactional-level systems and will take time.
When we describe culture as the underlying values and
meaning systems of an organization, we describe those forces that create the
dimensions of climate, those underlying ideas and images around which specific
attitudes and behaviors cluster. Thus, when we attempt to alter the
organizational cluster, we change the climate framework (i.e., the gauge by
which organizational members perceive their work climate). You might even think
of such a period as involving a destabilized climate that would have quite
distinctive properties of its own. The new organization culture, as it becomes
accepted, would create a modified, if not an entirely new set of dimensions
around which climate would be perceived, described, and responded to. Take, for
example, customer service. The culture change desired is one of establishing a
value that the customer comes first, to be served as quickly and as pleasantly
as possible with the highest degree of quality, and a norn that behavior in a
given work unit should be externally oriented first (i.e., focused on customers
or those who members of the work unit serve) and internally oriented second
(i.e., how members work together). The impact of this change in the culture--a
significant shift of priority--on work unit climate might be to replace a former
dimension of teamwork with one of interunit (or customer) relations. Or, at a
minimum, this latter focus on unit relations might become an added dimension of
climate.
APPLYING THE MODEL
For major organizational change to occur, the top
transformational boxes represent the primary and significant levers for that
change. Examples from our experience include (a) an acquisition where the
acquired organization's culture, leadership, and business strategy were
dramatically different from the acquiring organization, even though both
organizations were in the same industry, requiring yet a new merged organization
to come about, (b) a federal agency where the mission had been modified, the
structure and leadership changed significantly, yet the culture remained in the
1960s--obviously a culture change effort--and (c) a high-tech firm where
leadership had recently changed and was perceived negatively, the strategy was
unclear, and internal politics had moved from minimal (before) to predominant
(after). The hue and cry in this latter high-tech organization was something
like, "We have no direction from our leaders and no culture to guide our
behavior in the meantime." These examples represent transformational change
(i.e., the need for some fundamental shifts).
For organizations where the problems are more of a
fine tuning, improving process, the second layer of the model serves as the
point of concentration. Examples include some changes in the organization's
structure, modification of the reward system, management development (perhaps in
the form of a program that concentrates on behavioral practices), or conducting
a climate survey to obtain a current measure of such variables as job
satisfaction, job clarity, and degree of teamwork.
We have been involved recently with one organization
where almost all of the model was used to provide a framework for executives and
managers to understand the massive change they were attempting to manage. This
organization, British Airways, became a private corporation in February 1987,
and changing from a government agency to a market-driven, customer-focused
business enterprise required quite a change indeed. All boxes in the model have
been and still are being affected. Data were gathered based on most of the boxes
and summarized in a feedback report for each executive and manager. This
feedback, organized according to the model, helped executives and managers
understand which of the boxes within his or her organizational domain (or
"patch," as the British call it) needed attention.
It is also useful to consider the model in a vertical
manner. For example, in one large manufacturing organization (Bernstein &
Burke, 1989) we examined the causal chain of culture-management
practices-climate. Feedback to executives in this corporation showed how and to
what degree cultural variables influenced management practices and, in turn,
work unit climate (our dependent variable in this case).
SOME PRELIMINARY SUPPORT FOR THE MODEL'S VALIDITY
Within the context of general system theory, all
variables affect one another, and the hologram notion, introduced earlier, is a
useful way to visualize organizational reality. But with respect to organization
change, our contention is that external environment has the greatest impact and,
internally, the transformational variables (mission/strategy, leadership,
culture) have the greatest impact, and next the transactional variables, etc. If
we were able to conduct the statistical procedure of path analysis on all
variables (boxes) of the model, the beta weights for the downwardly directed
arrows would be larger than the beta weights in the opposite direction (e.g.,
the structure-to-climate direction would be larger than the climate-to-structure
one).
What follows are citations of research studies that
provide support for our organization change argument. These citations are
limited to one or two per "arrow" and do not represent an exhaustive
listing.
THE INFLUENCE OF EXTERNAL ENVIRONMENT
Because our model is based on open-systems theory, we
believe in the causal nature of environments. An excellent framework for
understanding this causal relationship is the one provided by Emery and Trist
(1965). More specifically and recently, Prescott (1986) has empirically
demonstrated how environment influences strategy and, in turn, performance.
Miles and Snow (1978) have provided evidence to show that executive perceptions
of their organization's and their consequent decision making is directly and
causally linked. With respect to organizational culture, if we limit our
definition of external environment to industry group, for example, then Gordon
(1985), who studied utility companies and financial institutions, has shown that
corporate culture is directly influenced by the industry category (external
environment) of the firm.
THE TRANSFORMATIONAL VARIABLES
Chandler's (1962) classic study clearly demonstrated
the differential impact of strategy or structure. More recently, Miles, Snow,
Meyer, and Coleman (1978) have shown how strategy affects structure. And, as
noted earlier, company mission apparently influences strategic decisions, which
in turn affect performance (Pearce & David, 1987). When mission statements
include corporate values and philosophy, or at least imply certain values, they
also reflect the organization's culture, as Wilkins (1989) has noted. The
influence of culture on policy and systems, in this case the reward system, has
been shown by Kerr and Slocum (1987) and Bernstein and Burke (1989) have
demonstrated the impact of culture on management practices. It also seems that
culture makes a difference with respect to organizational performance: that is,
some cultures are more efficient than others (Wilkins & Ouchi, 1983).
It should be mentioned at this stage that we are
quite aware of the fact that models may only help us to understand reality; they
do not necessarily depict it. With respect to our three transformational boxes,
they can be thought of more realistically as being in the minds of organization
leaders and as part of their behavior, not in organizational categories. The
thinking of Tregoe and Zimmerman (1980) is helpful here. They define nine
different categories of strategy, or what they call strategic driving: forces:
product or services offered, market needs, technology, production capability
method of sale, method of distribution, natural resources, size and growth, and
profit-return on investment. They contend that any given company has only one,
singular strategic driving force. This idea, incidentally, is similar to
Galbraith's (1983) "center of gravity" notion. The strategic driving force is a
manifestation of the company leader's beliefs about how to succeed in a
particular industry or line of business. Beliefs are part and parcel to
corporate culture, and the leadership category is where they (strategy and
culture) come together--in the minds of organization leaders and as part of
their behavior. When these executives believe differently about which strategy
brings success, the company is in trouble (see Burke, 1991, for a case example).
Incidentally, in this organizational case, there was a clear need for
transformational change; that is, in particular, change in leadership and in
corporate culture. In the end, however. at best, there was only a transactional
change limited rarely to a modification in the organization's structure.
And, finally, for this transformational category do
leaders make a difference organizationally? It is not difficult to find research
to verify the hierarchical effect on behavior (i.e., that bosses affect
subordinates). One of the early studies that showed how supervisors were
directly affected by their bosses' managerial style was Fleishman's (1953). But
even through mediating variables, as our model reflects, do leaders have an
impact on organizational performance? Surprisingly, little research has been
conducted to address this question. And the studies that have are not always
consistent with one another. Salancik and Pfeffer (1977), for example, showed
that turnover of mayors had little effect on the city's performance. Two more
recent studies do provide support, however. Weiner and Mahoney (1981) found that
leadership accounted for more variance in organizational performance than other
variables, and Smith, Carson, and Alexander (1984), in a longitudinal study,
showed empirically that leadership was associated with improved organizational
performance.
THE TRANSACTIONAL VARIABLES
These variables, structure, management practices, and
systems, are more operational and are more incremental with respect to
organization change. Although our main variable to consider as the dependent one
is climate, structure also has a direct impact on task requirements and
individual skills/abilities (job-person match). Systems, especially rewards,
also directly affect individual needs and values.
Joyce and Slocum (1984) have shown that both
management practices and structure influence climate, and an earlier study by
Schneider and Snyder (1975) also demonstrated that climate is affected by the
same two variables and by the reward system (i.e., pay and promotion policies).
Schneider has also shown a direct linkage between management practices and
climate in a series of studies in the service sector (Schneider, 1980; Schneider
& Bowen, 1985).
With respect to the impact of structure on variables
other than climate, the work of Lawrence and Lorsch (1967, 1969), of course, has
shown its influence on management practices. The relationship between structure
and systems has been demonstrated in numerous ways, just one example being
Ouchi's (1977) study of structure and organizational control. And the
relationship between structure and task requirements has also been demonstrated
many times, perhaps the work by Galbraith (1977, 1973) being one of the best
illustrations.
Regarding the impact of systems, perhaps the most
important subsystem of the policy and procedures (systems) box is the
organization's reward system. The belief that "people do what they are rewarded
for doing" is practically a cliche. Demonstrating this relationship of rewards
and behavior in the workplace is not as obvious and straightforward as one might
presume, however. Witness the pay-for-performance controversy for a case in
point. There is evidence, nevertheless.
Research on gainsharing shows linkage among
management practices, climate, and motivation/performance. Gainsharing
positively influences performance (Bullock & Lawler, 1984). As Hammer (1988)
has noted, however, the presence of worker participation is close to being a
necessary condition for success (in particular, Scanlon Plans). In other words,
when management establishes a working climate of participation coupled with pay
for performance, positive results occur. For more direct evidence that a
participatory climate affects productivity, see Rosenberg and Rosenstein
(1980).
And for evidence that reward systems affect
individual needs/values, and vice versa, see Deutsch (1985). For a more specific
example, see the research of Jordan (1986), a field study indicating that Deci's
(1975) contention that extrinsic rewards have a negative effect on intrinsic
motivation is probably correct.
Another subsystem within the policy and procedures
box and one that is intertwined with the reward system is the organization's
performance appraisal system. For evidence that this subsystem affects
management practices and climate and, in turn, motivation and ultimately
performance, see the work of Cummings (1982) and Cummings and Schwab (1973).
Yet another major subsystem within the policy and
procedure box is the organization's management information system. Perhaps the
latest and broadest research in this area-the impact of information technology
on worker behaviors the work of Zuboff (1988). To summarize, these transactional
dimensions are central to the model. They affect and are affected by a greater
variety of variables than most other dimensions.
MOTIVATION AND PERFORMANCE
With respect to the differential impact of individual
needs and values on motivation and job satisfaction, the work of Hackman and
Oldham (1980) shows some of the clearest evidence. Among other findings, their
research indicates that a majority of people probably have a need for growth and
development on the job and therefore would respond to and be more motivated by
job enrichment, but not everyone would be so motivated. Among other findings
that certain psychologically based interventions affect productivity positively,
Guzzo, Sette, and Katzell (1985) more recently have provided evidence that work
redesign (i.e., job enrichment) does as well. Compared with other boxes in the
model, finding evidence to support our contention that congruence between
persons' skills/abilities and job requirements leads to enhanced motivation and,
in turn, higher performance is very easy. For a summary of this area of
research, see M. J. Burke and Pearlman (1988) and for an example of impressive
evidence, see Hunter and Schmidt (1982).
SUMMARY
Table 1 provides a summary of the studies that we
have cited as preliminary support for the model's validity, particularly in
terms of arrows that are in the downward direction. (Table 1 omitted)
A summary word of qualification: The studies we have
chosen to demonstrate support for our ideas about organizational performance and
change are highly selective. There are no doubt numerous other studies that both
support and perhaps question our arguments. The fact that evidence does exist,
however, is the point we wish to make.
The evidence that we have cited comes from disparate
sources and, with respect to the model, is piecemeal. Ideally, a proper test of
the model would be a study that simultaneously examines the impact of all boxes
across a variety of organizations. The closest we have come so far is to examine
organizational members' perceptions and beliefs: how managers' beliefs about
mission and strategy, for example, relate to (if not predict) their perceptions
and their subordinates' perceptions of work unit climate. To cite an actual
example, at British AirWays one of the performance indices used was perceived
team effectiveness. Data were also collected from BA managers regarding their
beliefs and perceptions about (a) team manager practices (e.g., degree of
empowering behavior toward subordinates), (b) the usefulness of BA's structure
toward subordinates, (c) the clarity of BA's strategy, (d) the extent to which
BA's culture supports change, and (e) the team's climate (e.g., goal and role
clarity). These data categorized according to just these five boxes from the
model accounted for 54% of the variance in ratings of team effectiveness for
this organization, British Airways (Bernstein, 1987). We are not implying that
the model always explains this degree of variance. We are illustrating how the
model can be used methodologically for particular client organizations.
Figure 4 shows these relationships diagrammatically
from the model as they were applied to the client organization, in this case,
BA.(Figure 4 omitted) In another more recent, direct attempt to test the
validity of the model in assessing primarily (but not exclusively) the culture
of a hospital, Fox (1990) showed significant support for the causal
relationships of certain dimensions ("boxes"). Using the model as a causal
predictor, her path analysis outcomes demonstrated that leadership, culture, and
management practices predicted significant variance in employees' perceptions of
work unit climate and organizational performance. The two transformational
dimensions, leadership and culture, were clearly the two strongest
predictors.
CONCLUSIONS
By covering the choice of variables (boxes) that we
have selected, we have made an attempt with this article to describe and define
an organizational model that, at least at face value, makes good, common sense.
Yet others have done this kind of modeling work as well. It is our contention,
however, that we have taken an additional step by hypothesizing causality
(arrows), particularly in the weighted direction; that is, top-down, the
transformational then transactional factors. We have searched and have found,
from the literature and from our own work, at least In part, empirical support
for this hypothesized causality. We are as a consequence encouraged, and we
intend to search further and conduct more search. For a recent and further
application of the model in a corporate setting, see Burke and Jackson
(1991).
We do not always obtain evidence that supports
precisely the causal chain depicted in the model, however. We have found from
our experience, for example, that on occasion perceptions regarding strategy or
structure explain more variance in ratings of climate or some index of
performance than do management practices, usually a heavy indicator. These
occasions are when the organization is in the midst of a change in strategy, a
change in structure, or both. It may also be that national differences would
affect the causal chain in ways that are not quite the same as the model
predicts. In the UK, for example, beliefs about "the team" and what constitutes
satisfaction may not be the same as American beliefs. When given the opportunity
to complain or criticize, the British seem to attribute their feelings of
dissatisfaction more toward distant factors--the culture, the structure--than to
factors close to home--one's teammates. Americans, on the other hand, are just
as likely to criticize their teammates as they are to complain about the
inadequate organizational structure.
Finding exceptions to the causal implications of the
model does not detract necessarily from its usefulness. As a guide for what to
look for and as a predictor for what and how to manage large-scale
organizational change, we have found the model invaluable. Like any other model,
however, we must not allow it to determine exclusively what we diagnose or how
we handle organization change. We cannot afford to allow our model to become
ideology, as Moran (1986) has warned, and that our "way of seeing is a way of
not seeing." (Morgan, 1986: 73)
A final note: It is interesting to point out that
executives and managers more typically concern themselves with the left side of
the model--mission and strategy, structure, task requirements and individual
skills/abilities, and performance (i.e., when one wants to change an
organization, these are the critical dimensions). Behavioral scientists, on the
other hand, are more likely to be concerned with the right side and
middle--leadership, culture, systems (especially rewards), management practices,
climate, individual needs and values, motivation, and performance. We are
criticized by the former group as only dealing with the "soft" stuff. We, of
course, should be concerned with both, and with a more effective integration of
purpose and practice.
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