Chapter **One**

Introduction: Stories of Change

Learning objectives

On completion of this chapter you should be able to:

- Understand why change is both a creative and a rational process.
- Identify why there are limits on what the manager of change can achieve.
- Recognize how stories of change can illuminate key issues in managing change.
- Appreciate the "roadmap" for this book and the multiple "images" approach that underlies it.

Changing organizations is as messy as it is exhilarating, as frustrating as it is satisfying, as muddling-through and creative a process as it is a rational one. This book recognizes these tensions for those involved in managing organizational change. Rather than pretend that they do not exist, it confronts them head on, identifying why they are there, how they can be managed, and the limits they create for what the manager of organizational change can achieve. It shows how the image(s) we hold about how change should be managed, and of what we think our role should be as a manager of change, affects the way we approach change and the outcomes that we think are possible.

As a way into these ideas, we commence this chapter by visiting four prominent companies to look at stories of recent changes. The Hewlett Packard story concerns Carly Fiorina's attempts to establish and then manage the merger with Compaq Computer; the IBM story shows how change to this organization has occurred both from the staff within as well as from management at the top; the Kodak story shows how pursuing changes to digitalize the company has provoked reactions from both staff and investors; and the McDonald's story points to the pressures on organizations to change in order to reestablish themselves in the marketplace. The stories contain both similar and different elements about managing organizational change and the broader tensions and choices this entails. In the last part of the chapter, we draw these out, identifying some key lessons that emerge and indicating where they are addressed in the chapters

that follow. We also provide a "road map" that indicates the position taken by this book, that our understanding of the issues addressed in subsequent chapters is affected by our underlying images of managing change.

STORIES OF CHANGE

A Hewlett Packard Change Story: Managing a Merger

Around 7 a.m. on March 19, 2002, Hewlett Packard's CEO Carly Fiorina and CFO Bob Wayman were on the phone to Deutsche Bank trying to make one last ditch effort to convince them to vote yes.[1] The vote, scheduled for later that morning, was an important one. It would determine the future of the proposed Hewlett-Packard (HP) and Compaq Computer Corp. merger and the future of HP as a major player in the technology industry.[2] The months preceding the vote had been tumultuous. After the announcement of the proposed merger had taken place in September 2001, Walter Hewlett, the son of the co-founder of HP, had publicly opposed the proposition, which required shareholder approval.[3] Fiorina and her team faced serious and accumulating opposition to the merger, but there was also growing concern for HP's future if the deal was rejected. A Merrill Lynch portfolio manager said at the time, "If the deal is voted down, I don't know what I'm left with. I don't know if the board will stay, if management will walk out the door, or what the strategy will be. Sometimes the devil you know is better than the devil you don't."[4]

In the lead up to the vote, HP was confident that a yes vote by Deutsche Bank was a sure thing. Representatives of Deutsche Bank, such as George D. Elling, had been public supporters of the merger and had reportedly even given HP a $1 million contract to uncover the voting plans of other institutions.[5] Word of a change in Deutsche Bank's thinking reached Wayman and, despite reassurances from his contacts that the merger would be supported, talk strongly suggested that they had, in fact, reversed their decision. On the morning of the vote, Fiorina and Wayman were given their first and only opportunity to pitch the deal to the investment team at Deutsche Bank. Fiorina, using her innate ability to impress, gave a compelling and persuasive argument questioning the company's future if the merger did not go ahead. The Deutsche Bank team decided that a failure to continue with the merger would be more disastrous than the merger itself.[6] On March 19, 2002, the merger was approved by a shareholder vote[7]—a result that would have been more difficult had Deutsche Bank not supported the merger.[8]

Premerger

Back in 1999 when Fiorina joined HP, the company was in serious need of guidance. The personal computer division faced growing competition, the sales force needed better coordination, and the company was losing market share to rivals such as Dell and Sun Microsystems.[9] Fiorina joined the organization with aspirations, and external pressures, to change how it functioned. In her view, the culture of HP could be changed by "going back to the roots of the place."[10] One of the ways she set out to achieve this was by working with a local ad agency and the head of Human Resources to create a set of "Rules from the Garage" that outlined what she hoped the culture at HP would become. "The customer defines a job well done" and "Invent different ways of working" became signifiers of the company's direction and aspirations.[11]

She decided to restructure the company. Customers such as Ford and Boeing were frustrated by the separate sales teams from HP that were constantly marketing individual products to them. They wanted a complete package that addressed the needs they had in their entirety.[12] In light of these uncommunicative operational units within HP, Fiorina reorganized the company into "quadrants," creating two "front-end" sections that consisted of sales and marketing and two "back-end" functions where manufacturing and research occurred.[13] There was considerable, but subtle, employee resistance to the change. Fiorina's vision of HP creating a new interface with customers may have been sound, but, as a radical change, it was not widely welcomed by many who were part of the HP "system."[14]

Post-Merger

In the aftermath of the merger, and the ensuing lawsuit that opposed the merger and attempted to dissolve it,[15] Fiorina had a huge task ahead of her. The integration of the two corporate cultures was made more difficult by the strained relations Fiorina had with her own staff, many expressing serious concerns regarding the merits of the merger.[16] The transition was made slightly easier by the 65,000 new personnel who became a part of the HP community after the merger. They were more at ease with creating an organization in the way that Fiorina envisioned. According to Fiorina, the necessary cultural adjustment was simplified by this injection of "new DNA."[17]

Following the merger, Fiorina embarked on a series of technological symposiums and "coffee talks" with HP engineers.[18] Although the merger had already been undertaken by HP and Compaq, there were still many employees who were not convinced of the validity of HP's riskiest move, some of whom faced being victims of the job cuts resulting from the merger.[19] To win over the 147,000 employees worldwide, Fiorina used a range of methods of communicating including the "management by walking around" style that Packard and Hewlett had originally advocated within the organization. A company employee commented on her style and interaction with all members of the company by saying that her actions and down-to-earth nature "earned her a lot of points" with transferees from Compaq.[20]

The company faced challenges in the way of significant competition from both Dell in the PC business and IBM as a service provider.[21] Communicating a vision for the future of the company post-merger remained a key issue for Fiorina.[22] In February 2005 Fiorina was removed from her post as CEO of the company.[23]

An IBM Change Story: Transformational Change from Below and Above

Change from Below[24]

Before using the Internet became as commonplace as watching television, David Grossman and John Patrick from IBM took on the mammoth task of convincing their superiors and co-workers that the Internet was even worth looking at. Their subsequent actions helped to revolutionize Big Blue and drastically change its path into the future.[25]

When David Grossman, a computer programmer, stumbled across a rogue Olympic Internet site for the 1994 Winter Games in Lillehammer, Norway, he was troubled.

IBM had the official broadcast rights to the Games, but Sun Microsystems was taking the raw footage and making it available on the Internet under their logo. Although his position as a programmer did not require him to act on his findings, Grossman was deeply concerned about the implications of the branding of the Internet broadcast and the potential effects on IBM. He pursued the issue by contacting the IBM marketing team for the Olympics. The rogue site was eventually shut down, but the lesson had not been learned. IBM had not even begun to comprehend how the Internet could become an integral part of their business dealings.[26]

Grossman's persistence landed him a meeting with the head of marketing, Abby Kohnstamm, and some of her colleagues. It was here that Grossman was able to give a detailed explanation of the benefits of the Internet. He captivated one member of his audience wholeheartedly. John Patrick, a member of the strategy task force, attended the presentation that day and he immediately became Grossman's ally in the Internet Revolution and an important link to the world of senior management.[27]

As a team, Grossman and Patrick complemented each other. Grossman had the more developed technical know-how.[28] Patrick knew how to make the "boundaryless" culture at IBM work to his advantage.[29] Together they created an underground community of Web fans who shared technical information that ultimately helped IBM into the Internet era, albeit working, for the most part, unofficially.[30] The grassroots Web community infiltrated all corners of the company in a way that would have been difficult for an officially sanctioned, top-down created group. It was through the advocacy of the lower-level personnel that the Internet message was spread through IBM's culture.[31]

Of course, the downside of being an unofficial part of an organization is the potential lack of financial backing for a group's projects. However, when it came to finding money for IBM's first ever display at an Internet World trade convention in 1995, Patrick was not phased. By coordinating the funds and the Web technology from various business units and becoming a "relentless campaigner" for the project, he gained support and expertise from multiple parts of the organization.[32] By sharing experienced personnel and resources from many departments, Patrick and Grossman were able to provide departments with more expertise and highly trained personnel when they were "returned" to the area from which they came. This strategy reinforced internal support for the change.[33] Over the years, Patrick and Grossman succeeded in creating a system that revolutionized the way in which IBM does business. Coupled with the leadership of Lou Gerstner, the period from 1993 to 2002 was one of reinvention and change.[34] IBM transformed from a computer manufacturer to a global service provider, focusing on e-business and the Internet. By the late 1990s, IBM's trading in the e-business sector began to reflect in the bottom line, accounting for almost a quarter of its revenue.[35]

Change from Above

In 2002, Samuel Palmisano, a life-time IBMer, took over leadership of the company from Gerstner. Palmisano's focus changed to emphasize teamwork and collaboration. One of his first steps in demonstrating his new management style to investors and employees alike was a readjustment in executive compensation.[36] This involved a cut in the controversial CEO bonus that was redistributed within the top management team. Palmisano claimed that in order to function as a team, the gap between the CEO and his team must be reduced.[37] Insiders claim that the amount pooled was $3 to $5 million,

approximately half Palmisano's personal bonus.[38] This was an effective way of communicating his intentions and commitment to his vision to the entire organization.

In an e-mail interview with *BusinessWeek*,[39] Palmisano wrote that in planning for change, "I kept thinking about an approach that would energize all the good of the past and throw out all the bad: hierarchy and bureaucracy." To this end, he disbanded the executive management committee and created three teams with which he would work directly. These management teams—in the areas of strategy, technology, and operations—were composed of people from all over the company, not exclusively top management.[40] The aim of the restructure is to make IBM a flatter, more creative organization striving to meet consumer needs.[41]

In addition to the restructure, Palmisano saw a lack of skills in IBM around the delivery of global services. In 2002, IBM acquired PwC Consulting as a way of bringing to it highly specific consulting skills and expertise to assist IBM in providing a full range of services to its clients, "from high-end technology consulting to low-end support."[42] It is as a result of these changes from the top that IBM hoped to meet the challenges of the future.

A Kodak Change Story: Provoking Reactions

Could this be the beginning of one of the biggest turnarounds in American corporate history or one of the most public and embarrassing busts? After more than a century of producing traditional film cameras, Kodak announced in September 2003 that it would cut this line of production. In Western countries, this involves a complete move away from traditional products within the film industry by the end of 2004 and a full-scale launch into digital technology.[43] The move is slated "to generate $16 billion in revenue by 2006 and $20 billion by 2010."[44] At an investor conference, CEO David A. Carp said:

> We are at the dawning of a new, more competitive Kodak, one that is growing, profitably, that has a more balanced earnings stream, and that will have a dramatically lower cost structure. . . To compete in digital markets, we must have a business model that lets us move even faster to take full advantage of the profitable growth that digital promises.[45]

Implementing this change would require Kodak to cut their dividend and to raise capital for new technology purchases.[46] Further elaboration of this strategy occurred in January 2004 when it was announced that to reach the proposed savings of between $800 million and $1 billion by 2007, Kodak needed to make two physical changes to the organization.[47] First, there would be a reduction in the square footage of Kodak facilities worldwide by consolidating current operations and divesting unnecessary assets. Second, Kodak intended to reduce employment worldwide with up to 15,000 jobs to be cut by 2007.[48]

Investor Reactions

The announcement in September 2003 took many external experts by surprise.[49] At a series of post-announcement meetings with investor groups, their reactions were not overly supportive,[50] particularly to the news that their dividends would be severely cut.[51] They were conscious of promises to increase the company's revenue which were not realized.[52] It was feared that this would become another "half-hearted transition"[53]—as

with the $1 billion launch into APS cameras in 1996 that ended in failure.[54] They also pointed to the risk in moving in this direction given the competitive market with rivals such as Hewlett-Packard, Canon Inc., and Seiko Epson Corp., which were already ahead in digital technology research and product development.[55] Carp's response was to stand firmly by his decision to pursue digitalization of Kodak.[56]

Staff Reactions

For many of Kodak's employees, the future looked bleak regardless of the success of the company in moving into digital technology. Employees were rightly concerned about losing their jobs in light of the proposed 20 percent worldwide cutback in employment.[57] Downsizing is not new at Kodak. From 1997 to 2003, the company reduced its workforce by 30,000.[58] As argued in *The Wall Street Journal*,[59] this type of change "moves parallel [to] those at many companies whose comfortable business models have been threatened by rapid changes in information technology." As one union representative explained, the stress on workers in one Kodak production plant has been made worse than necessary because "management has not sought to reassure [Kodak employees] that they have got any long term future. When people have families to raise, financial commitments, that's a very difficult environment to work in."[60]

Hence, along with having to convince investors that the path of change is the right one for Kodak, Carp also had to manage the adverse effects of an ongoing program of downsizing and restructuring.

A McDonald's Change Story: Responding to Pressure

Imagine eating nothing but McDonald's for a month. Morgan Spurlock, independent filmmaker, did just that, restricting his diet with the following limitations:

- No food or drink other than McDonald's menu items.
- Meals supersized when given the option.
- Every item on the menu had to be eaten at least once.[61]

Spurlock spent one long month traveling across the United States interviewing various community groups about the implications of eating fast food and using himself as a guinea pig.[62] Before embarking on this journey, Spurlock underwent a full medical examination and was deemed to be a physically healthy man. One month later, the diagnosis was different.[63] After three square McDonald's meals a day for 30 days, Spurlock had gained 25 pounds and his cholesterol level had jumped from 168 to 230.[64] An alcoholic would have envied his liver given the state it was in after his month-long stint.[65]

The result of this personal experience was a documentary called *Super Size Me*, an entrant in the 2004 Sundance Film Festival. The aim? Spurlock claims that the reason for his exploration into the fast food habits of Americans is to uncover the link between foods like McDonald's and obesity,[66] a correlation that the company has long denied.[67] Nevertheless, the film's release coincided with the launch of McDonald's new Happy Meal for adults, comprising a salad, a bottle of water, and a "stepometer." Despite valiant attempts by McDonald's to counteract the claims of the film, *Super Size Me* became one of the five biggest-grossing documentaries in American history.[68]

Highlighting health issues related to fast food has only added to other worldwide pressures on McDonald's operations. Externally these include an epidemic of mad cow

disease, foot-and-mouth disease, the SARS epidemic in the Asia-Pacific region, a fall in economies leading to weaker foreign currencies, and high commodity costs.[69] Internally these problems were compounded by McDonald's aggressive international expansion strategy that made future growth more difficult.[70] As the then CEO, James Cantalupo, admitted, "we took our eyes off our fries and paid a price."[71]

The problems that the company faced went beyond superficial fluctuations in sales and revenue. The year 1996 was a turning point, with McDonald's experiencing four consecutive quarters of declining sales and beginning to lose market share to competitors such as Wendy's and Burger King.[72] Jack Greenberg, the former CEO, implemented the highly unsuccessful "Made for You" kitchens with disastrous results.[73] The result was slower service in contrast to its aim, which was to add a welcome flexibility with new menu items.[74]

Franchisees became frustrated. Take Paul Saber. For 17 years, he was a McDonald's franchisee, but in 2000 he recognized the lack of fit between the product offerings at McDonald's and consumer tastes. "The McDonald's-type fast food isn't relevant to today's consumer,"[75] he commented as he sold his 14 stores back to the company. Others stuck it out with McDonald's. Richard Steinig remembers getting a 15 percent profit from the $80,000 sales at his two stores in the 1970s.[76] This was quite a comfortable income given that the minimum wage was less than $2 an hour. By 2003 he was struggling to make ends meet. Even the $1 menus advertised worldwide resulted in a loss for Steinig: as he said at the time, "we have become our own worse enemy."[77]

Getting Back to Basics

In 2003 Cantalupo was brought in to rectify the declining state of the organization.[78] He previously held the position of vice chairman and headed McDonald's international expansion. His return from retirement was controversial and analysts claimed that he lacked "the vision or stomach to make the necessary changes."[79] Nevertheless, his vision for the organization's future was in a "back to basics"[80] approach with organizational changes to refocus the organization on core values of quality and service.

Cantalupo began by cutting back new store openings. In 2004, 300 new stores were proposed, in comparison to 1995, when 1,100 new restaurants were opened.[81] There was also a complete overhaul of the advertising campaign. By introducing the "I'm lovin' it" slogan and commercials featuring pop singer Justin Timberlake,[82] the hope was to reinvent the company's image and connect with the younger generation.[83]

Another part of the revitalization of the McDonald's business was the introduction of the new salads menu.[84] McDonald's has long expressed little concern at the claims that its products are directly linked to obesity, but some critics see the launch into the "fresh salads" menus as a sign that the unhealthy reputation of fast foods may have been identified as a threat to the organization.[85] This new menu also has helped to draw in female customers who had previously been reluctant to dine at their restaurants[86] and increase the number of customers during the evening.[87] In the past, McDonald's had tried creating low-fat menu options for their patrons with the McShaker salads and McLean Deluxe burger, but their lack of commitment to the then-new menu saw its failure.[88] Now, responding to external pressures, customers are given healthier and tastier menu options.[89]

McDonald's also implemented an online training program for all U.S.-based employees to overcome customer service issues.[90] The aim was to bring the company back on the road to providing the basic, speedy service and quality products that it became famous for so many years ago.

DRAWING OUT THE CHANGE ISSUES AND WHERE THEY ARE FOUND IN THE CHAPTERS THAT FOLLOW

As outlined in Table 1.1, these four stories carry in them a wide variety of lessons and issues relating to managing organizational change. We now highlight the key issues and indicate how they are picked up in the chapters that follow.

TABLE 1.1 Managing Change: Some Lessons from the Four Stories

Hewlett Packard Change Story

- Different interests need to be recognized and addressed during an organizational change
- These interests are likely to provoke different reactions to change
- Organizational politics and lobbying are likely aspects of an organizational change that will need managing
- Negotiation and persuasion are key communication skills
- More successful communication strategies are likely to be those that "touch" the people to whom they are addressed
- Communicating change often entails providing a vision of the future that is compelling
- Pressures to change come from both outside and inside organizations
- Restructuring is a common organizational change when confronted with problems
- Any organizational change usually involves paying attention to organizational culture

IBM Change Story

- Innovative changes often emerge from below in organizations
- Making change stick requires persistence over time and actions that need to be taken on multiple fronts
- Change needs appropriately placed champions to gain support throughout the organization
- The informal network of the organization is an important part of mobilizing and communicating organizational change
- Change requires marshalling of appropriate resources
- Some changes are incremental, others transformational
- Some smaller change actions often convey powerful symbolic messages to help reinforce the sincerity and credibility that senior management attaches to the larger change

Kodak Change Story

- Organizational change involves handling reactions of both internal and external stakeholders
- Communication strategies need to be designed for internal and external groups
- Reactions to change are likely to be influenced by the success of previous changes and the extent to which there has been delivery on past promises
- Change involves risk and uncertainty
- The consequences of change cannot always be predicted
- Managers of change need to address the question for staff of "How will I be affected?"

TABLE 1.1 Managing Change: Some Lessons from the Four Stories—(*concluded*)

McDonald's Change Story	
• Organizational changes occur in a competitive, international business environment • This means that to prepare for the future, change may need to occur even when things still appear to be going well	• Organizations face external pressures to change such as providing socially responsible products and services • Some changes fail to deliver on their intended outcomes • Change in and of itself is not necessarily good for a company; careful assessment is needed of the relevance and likely success of a proposed change

Images of Managing Change . . . Chapter Two

One of the intriguing features of the IBM story is how David Grossman took on the role of manager of change without a formal mandate to do so. Many in his position would not have seen it as their responsibility to drive change through the organization in this way. They would more likely have experienced change as recipients rather than as initiators of change. Carly Fiorina's use of persuasion to get Deutsche Bank representatives to vote for the HP/Compaq merger indicates that she was aware that as CEO she couldn't simply order the merger to occur—she recognized that change involves different interests that need to be identified and managed. Kodak's David Carp, in the face of opposition from investors to digitalizing the company, stood steadfast in his resolve to move the company down this track.

Each person operates with an image or mental model of what they think is achievable. We can characterize David Grossman's image as being one of an *interpreter* of change—identifying for people in IBM what is going to be needed to keep the organization relevant in the future. For Carly Fiorina, an image of *navigator* might describe her change management style, figuring out how to steer HP towards a merger. David Carp's style might be characterized as a *director*, setting out where Kodak was headed and articulating why this redirection of the company was necessary.

Each image indicates a different approach to managing change and what might be achieved. The images with which we operate as individual change managers influence our actions. It is therefore important that we understand what these images are and how they impact our understandings and interpretations of organizational change. We need to appreciate how our images both illuminate certain aspects of change and take us away from paying attention to other aspects. Chapter 2 picks up the idea of images of change. It outlines six dominant images (change manager as *director*, *coach*, *navigator*, *interpreter*, *caretaker*, *nurturer*) and challenges managers of change to identify their own "in-use" images of change and assess their strengths and weaknesses. This is an important theme that acts as an undercurrent throughout the book and is therefore revisited at various points in subsequent chapters.

Why Organizations Change . . . Chapter Three

For McDonald's, fast international expansion coupled with increasing external pressures contribute to why it is now reorienting itself toward a fresh image. External pressures include changes in consumer preferences with more awareness by consumers of health issues related to fast foods; we also saw other external pressures in the form of currency

fluctuations, the emergence of mad cow disease, and greater competition from other fast food chains. Fast-paced technological change acted as an external pressure on Kodak's traditional film cameras and pushed the company toward the digital era. Customer pressures for more streamlined and single-point-of-contact interactions were behind why, in 1999, Fiorina restructured HP "front-end" and "back-end" sections.

Chapter 3 picks up these issues of why organizations change. It elaborates a range of internal and external rationales for change. The premise of the chapter is that change is a risky business as change often fails to achieve its stated aims—witness, for example, Jack Greenberg's attempts to create flexibility at McDonald's through the "Made for You" kitchens. Given that change can be an expensive and traumatic event for any organization, managers of change need to be able to assess the pressures on them to engage in it. For example, the chapter alerts change managers to the way they are sometimes under pressure to change their organizations because of "fashion" pressures to do so—without an adequate assessment of the real need for the change—or without the change being likely to deliver economic or other beneficial returns to the organization.

What Changes in Organizations . . . Chapter Four

In the four stories of change, we witnessed multiple types of changes, often within the one organization and over time. For Carp, moving Kodak in new directions represents a strategic change, transforming the nature of the organization and the products it distributes. Nested inside this strategic redirection are a number of other changes including downsizing staff and decreasing plant size. At HP the merger with Compaq involves trying to establish a common culture—the new DNA—for the emergent enterprise. At IBM, technological changes in the form of new ways of doing business underpinned David Grossman's change efforts; Palmisano's recent creation of three core management teams represents an attempt to restructure the organization and to reduce hierarchical boundaries.

Chapter 4 focuses on these changes, in particular downsizing and restructuring changes, technological changes, and mergers and acquisitions. These are common types of changes that change managers are likely to experience—and Chapter 4 identifies key issues and challenges associated with them. It outlines how, for some organizations, these changes are strategic and proactive, whereas for others they are reactive. It also discusses the concept of scale of change, noting how what may appear to be incremental for some change managers may be experienced as transformational by the people affected by them.

Diagnosis for Change . . . Chapter Five

The question remains whether the changes implemented by Kodak, IBM, HP, and McDonald's represent the *right* changes for each organization. They were under pressure to change—but which particular changes should be made was not always clear-cut, nor agreed to, by different stakeholder groups such as in the cases of Kodak and HP. The need for change may be clear, but exactly what to change—and the impact of these changes on other parts of the organization—is an important question for the manager of change.

Chapter 5 addresses this dilemma by outlining a number of "macro" models and techniques for mapping and assessing where changes are needed in an organization. Common to these techniques are directing attention into areas such as an organization's structure, strategy, management skills and styles, communication patterns, reward

mechanisms, decision-making procedures, and human resource and cultural modes of interaction. Other "micro" tools and techniques are outlined that enable more specific change actions to be identified in any one of these areas. Well-recognized tools include force-field analyses, gap analyses, stakeholder analyses, and news reporter techniques. Training change managers in such techniques provides them with greater appreciation of why they are conducting specific changes and the likely impact of these changes on other parts of their organization's operations.

Resistance to Change . . . Chapter Six

One of the first reactions to any change is likely to be "What's in it for me?" or "How will this affect me?" Certainly the reaction of staff to Kodak's announcement of more downsizing, or of its investors to the decree that dividends would be cut, attests to this, with resistance from both groups. Fiorina faced resistance to change both at a "family" level (Walter Hewlett) and at a staff level in her desire to press ahead with a merger with Compaq Computers.

Change managers need to pay attention to how people will react to change: whether they are likely to embrace it—even run away with it beyond initial expectations—or whether they are likely to display neutral or negative reactions to it. Resistance to announced changes may relate to their experience with previous changes, whether past promises were delivered or whether those announcing and enacting the changes are seen as sincere and credible. Chapter 6 delves in detail into understanding why people may resist change along with techniques that change managers can utilize to counteract such responses.

Implementing Change . . . Chapters Seven and Eight

How change occurs, and how it is managed in and through an organization, will vary. In the HP/Compaq change story, Fiorina employed two change styles: one to get the merger formalized; a second, later style to "sell" it to staff, albeit with varying degrees of success. In IBM, change emerged at different times both from below and above. The change from below occurred through exciting people, creating informal groups and teams and letting the ideas bubble up to the surface of the organization. This style of coaching and encouraging others and building momentum is a different style of producing change to simply announcing it and getting others to carry it out. The urgency, prevailing conditions, and attitudes toward the change are likely to influence how it is managed. What is clear is that a good idea for change may be badly implemented and fail—and the converse may be true.

Managers of organizational change therefore need to carefully assess the approach they will take to implementing change: how much they will involve people in what needs to be changed or how and when things will be changed. Whether the style of change will vary depending on the type and scale of change, the timing of the change and the stage of the change are other important questions to consider. Chapters 7 and 8 guide the manager of change through six central approaches to implementing change: organization development, appreciative inquiry, sensemaking, change management, contingency, and political/processual approaches. Reference is made to how adopting one or other of these change approaches is underpinned by different images of change, as discussed in Chapter 2.

Linking Vision and Change . . . Chapter Nine

The role of vision is embedded in each of the four stories of change. Carp's address to investors was underpinned by a vision of digital markets being the way of the future; Palmisano's vision is about rediscovering what was good about IBM in the past and taking these characteristics into the future; Fiorina had a similar vision for HP when she began in 1999, setting out to create the future culture of HP by molding it around the core roots of the organization. Conversely, bringing Cantalupo back into McDonald's to assist in turning around the company was criticized at the time on the grounds that he lacked vision.

Vision has apparently become core to managing organizational change. Yet vision is often one of those things to which lip service is paid without really addressing why some visions "take" and others do not in an organizational change. The latter situation can emerge because of the context in which the vision is presented (here we go again), because it fails to resonate or connect with the people for whom it is intended (what does it mean?), or because of the process through which it was developed (I don't know anything about this—who thought this one up?). These issues, which relate to the *content* of successful visions and the *process* through which visions are produced, are outlined in Chapter 9. This chapter provides the manager of change with three dilemmas associated with change visions: whether vision drives change or emerges during a change; whether vision helps or hinders change; and whether vision is an attribute of heroic, charismatic leaders or an attribute of heroic organizations. This chapter cautions the manager of change into accepting at face value that it is up to him or her to produce visions for organizational change—and to question whether vision is central to driving organizational change.

Strategies and Skills for Communicating Change . . . Chapters Ten and Eleven

An important part of managing change involves what, how, and to whom it is communicated. Some change communications are symbolic in nature, such as Palmisano's actions in cutting his bonus and redistributing it to his management team as a way of reinforcing the message that they are all in this together. Many communication strategies are directed to those *inside* an organization with the intention of winning the hearts and minds of staff in support of a change. Fiorina's internal communication strategy including "coffee talks," symposiums, and "management by walking around" provides examples of this and ones that appear to have gone down well with the Compaq people who were transferred into the newly merged organization. Other communication actions are directed to those *outside* the organization in an effort to keep them on board during a time of change. Given that changes do fail, it is clearly important to retain the support of external stakeholders during times of change. Carp's addresses to investors about Kodak's changes serves as an example of attempting to do this.

Having a strategy for communicating change is clearly important; having the skills to enact it is just as important. Chapters 10 and 11 address these two issues. Chapter 10 discusses the communication process—whether you can communicate too much and how to link the communication strategy to the type or phase of a change. It gets change managers to reflect on whether the strategy is intended to "get the word out" or to get

"buy-in" about the change and what media will be used to assist them. Chapter 11 delves into the communication skills that change managers are likely to need, paying particular attention to the listening and language skills associated with "change conversations." The assumption adopted in this chapter is that these skills are needed to ensure that new ways of talking are produced (the outcome of change) and that change managers are not sending mixed or ambiguous messages about what they require or where they are trying to take things. This chapter widens this issue by outlining skills involved in managing change conversations with external stakeholders.

Consolidating Change . . . Chapter Twelve

David Grossman faced an issue in how to resource his "change from below" and teamed up with John Patrick, who developed some innovative ways of gathering resources opportunistically, especially at first. There are many other ways of supporting change aside from just the provision of resources. They may include putting in place a new mindset such as Palmisano did in disbanding the long-standing executive management committee at IBM. Other ways of supporting change may be at a human resource level, by realigning compensation systems or by implementing new training programs such as Cantalupo did at McDonald's in order to reemphasize customer service.

Consolidating change is necessary to ensure that sometime after they are implemented, things do not quietly drift back to how they used to be. Consolidating change is about how to make it stick, how to make it a core feature of how work will occur. As discussed earlier, Fiorina's restructuring of HP served as one way of consolidating change, creating a new interface between customers and the organization. Other ways include creating short-term wins so that people can see the benefits of the new approach and ensuring that senior management continue to reaffirm the changes and model them in their own behaviors. Chapter 12 concludes the book by elaborating on issues for resourcing and aligning change. It sets out how change is "powered"; that is, how powerful groups can be brought on side and retained in order to support the change process and how change can be measured—so that a shift can be demonstrated. At the same time, this chapter points out that, in practice, some changes are deliberately abandoned for a variety of reasons and that multiple changes may be introduced that need to be managed simultaneously. These present very specific challenges to managers when staff perceive them as replacing rather than complementing preexisting changes.

BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER: A ROADMAP OF THE BOOK

Figure 1.1 provides us with a "roadmap" for the rest of the book. It outlines the approach we take to introducing you to managing organizational change from a multiple images perspective. As discussed above, and as will be outlined in more detail in the next chapter, the image(s) we have of ourselves as managers of change influence the approaches we take and the views we hold about how we should engage in change. This observation is central to this book. It is a theme that we weave throughout the chapters that follow. The image(s) we hold influence why we think change is needed

FIGURE 1.1 A Road Map of the Book
Image(s) we have of ourselves as managers of change influence how we do it and to what we pay attention



(Chapter 3), what change looks like and how it unfolds (Chapter 4), the techniques we use in going about diagnosing what needs to change (Chapter 5), the things we pay attention to in handling people's reaction to change (Chapter 6), the underlying "theory" we use in implementing organizational change (Chapters 7 and 8), the importance we attach to the role of vision in producing organizational change (Chapter 9), the communication strategies and skills we employ when we engage in change (Chapters 10 and 11), and the issues we need to address to consolidate change and make sure that it "takes" and endures over time (Chapter 12).

An assumption underlying Figure 1.1 is that our images affect our approaches to all of these issues. For that reason, the images are found in the center of the road map and their influence radiates out to all aspects of managing organizational change. Although the book follows an unfolding linear sequence of chapters, it should be appreciated that all issues of managing change are important—and that the sequence in which we address these issues is not necessarily the sequence in which change managers should take them into account when engaged in a change process. For example, although the last chapter, Chapter 12, addresses how to make change "stick," this does not mean that it is the last thing that needs to be addressed in a change process. Indeed, paying attention to the issues addressed in this chapter early on in a change process is likely to be needed in order to plan for how the consolidation of change might occur. Similarly, although issues of communication of change are not addressed until Chapters 10 and 11, the thoughtful change manager will be paying attention to these issues throughout a change process. The same logic applies to the other chapters.

EXERCISE 1.1

Creating Your Own Story of Change

Think back to a change that you have experienced, in either your personal or professional life.

Option One

Try writing it down in one page or less. Now, answer the following questions:

- What made it a "story"?
- Of the change "lessons" outlined in Table 1.1, which of these are present in your story? Which ones are absent? What are the implications of this?
- Are there other "lessons" embedded in your story for future changes in which you might be involved?
- Now, in small groups, compare and contrast your stories. What commonalities and differences emerge?
- What three key conclusions do you draw from these stories about managing change?

Option Two

In small groups (around five to six people), get each person to tell his or her story of change. This should take no more than three or four minutes each. Record key elements of the story on paper. Go around the group until each person has told his or her story. Put the sheets of paper on the wall so that you can observe them, and answer the following questions:

- What are the common issues across each story?
- What are the differences?
- Of the change "lessons" outlined in Table 1.1, which of these are present in these stories? Which ones are absent? What are the implications of this?
- Are there other "lessons" embedded in your story for future changes in which you might be involved?
- What three key conclusions do you draw from these stories about managing change?

A NOTE ON CHAPTER FORMATS

Each chapter adopts a common format. Learning objectives are provided at the start of each chapter and wide use is made of tables to provide vignettes to demonstrate the relevance of the material to the operations of well-known organizations. Each chapter has a section that provides a series of reflective questions for change managers, getting them to think how they will deal with the issues raised in the chapter, or how they have dealt with them in the past and what alternative ways of managing they might adopt for future changes. Further reading is provided to deepen knowledge of specific issues raised in each chapter should readers wish to delve further into particular areas. Each chapter addresses in different ways the implications of change managers' images of managing change, as outlined in Chapter 2, for the issues covered in each chapter. Learning exercises are available in each chapter to assist individuals in pursuing further

the ideas in the chapter or to assist them in using the material in classroom situations. Each chapter has a case study to enable exploration of the material. This material often calls upon the reader to relate their experiences of change or of organizations with which they are familiar to the material covered in each chapter. Where experience of work organizations is minimal, we suggest that they apply this material to other organizations they have encountered, whether it be a sporting, religious, community, or other organization such as the family or other social institutions of which they are a part. In addition, they can call upon their own reading taken from press and business magazines in order to supplement the knowledge available to them. Each chapter also provides information about additional case studies that can be used to illustrate the material discussed.[91]

Conclusion

As proposed at the start of this chapter, engaging with organizational change and producing successful, intentional change outcomes cannot be guaranteed. It may not even be desirable, in retrospect, if the change idea turns out to be costly, marginal, irrelevant, or just plain wrong. This book does not set out to naively offer the manager of change a recipe book of "what to do." Such approaches, we believe, only compound the problem of maintaining an illusion that managers can control all change outcomes if only they utilize carefully planned steps. This is not a position that we accept. Rather, we suggest that most people's lived experiences of organizations are that they are complicated and messy arenas. Acknowledging this may be the first step to taking a more realistic view of what managers of change can expect to achieve. As discussed in the next chapter, *shaping* rather than *controlling* change may open up alternative images of what managing change actually means. Reflective change managers will accept that choices need to be made in order for change actions to proceed but these choices are informed ones, not ones naively adopted on the grounds that there is only "one best way" of approaching organizational change. We hope that you agree with this position!

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Chapter Two

Images of Managing Change[1]

Learning objectives

On completion of this chapter you should be able to:

- Understand the importance of organizational images and mental models.
- Identify different images of managing and of change outcomes.
- Outline six different images of managing change.
- Identify the theoretical underpinnings of these six change management images.
- Understand the practical implications of the six images and how to use them.

Writers and practitioners such as Gareth Morgan, Lee Bolman, Terrence Deal, and Mary Jo Hatch have been telling us for some time that the images we hold of organizations affect our interpretations of what we think is going on, what we think needs to happen, and how we think things should happen.[2] These images, sometimes referred to as metaphors, frames, or perspectives, are held by us often without our being aware either of their existence or of how they affect our thinking, perceptions, and actions. They act as mental models, pointing us in certain directions in order to make sense of things going on around us. For example, if we think of organizations as if they are machines, then we are likely to be more aware of potential "breakdowns," seeing our role as maintaining them or fixing them. However, if we think of organizations as political arenas, we are likely to be constantly seeking out hidden agendas behind decisions and trying to identify who wins and who loses. We are also likely to see our role as building coalitions, gathering support for our causes, or even stimulating conflict in order to produce innovative outcomes. Alternatively, we may see our organizations as mini societies or cultures. In this case, we are likely to be constantly searching for "the way things get done around here" and thinking about how to encourage the organizational values that are best aligned to the type of work that we do. Providing vision and meaning to our staff so that their identity becomes closely associated with the

organization are further activities we are likely to pursue. Each frame orients us to a set of issues and, like a child with a hammer who sees everything around him or her as if it is a nail,[3] if we only draw upon one particular frame, then this will take us away from thinking about what is going on from an alternative perspective.

In this book, we argue that the same situation applies to managers of change. The images, metaphors, or frames that we hold, both of managing and of change, influence our ideas of what we think managing change is all about. In this chapter, we outline six different images of managing change. We describe the underlying assumptions associated with each image and identify organization and change theories that support each image. Finally, we discuss how change managers are able to draw upon and utilize multiple perspectives and images of managing change.

IMAGES OF MANAGING CHANGE: WHERE THEY COME FROM

As outlined in Table 2.1, there are two key images of managing (*management as control* versus *management as shaping*) and three key images of change outcomes (*intended*, *partially intended*, and *unintended*). As we shall see, depending on the combination of these images, this leads to one of six different images of managing organizational change: *director*, *navigator*, *caretaker*, *coach*, *interpreter*, and *nurturer.*

Images of Managing

Table 2.1 identifies two dominant images of management: management as control and management as shaping.

Management as Control

This has been a dominant image historically. It underlies the classic Fayol[4] characterization of management as involving activities such as planning, organizing, commanding, coordinating, and controlling. It is one that has been present in a number of influential management writers[5] and continues to be in use today.[6] It is associated with

TABLE 2.1 Images of Managing Change

		Images of Managing	
		Controlling . . . (activities)	**Shaping . . .** (capabilities)
Images of Change Outcomes	Intended	Image of managing change: • DIRECTOR	Image of managing change: • COACH
	Partially intended	Image of managing change: • NAVIGATOR	Image of managing change: • INTERPRETER
	Unintended	Image of managing change: • CARETAKER	Image of managing change: • NURTURER

a top-down, hierarchical view of managing. Typically, the organization is treated as if it is a machine: It is up to managers to drive the machine in specific directions, people are told what their roles will be, and departments and business units are allocated resources (inputs) so that the machine can perform efficiently and produce the necessary products or services in which it is engaged (outputs).

Management as Shaping

This image, which has more recent origins, is one that sees managing as being about *shaping* an organization and what happens in it. It is an image often associated with a participative style of managing in which people are encouraged to be involved in decisions and to help identify how things can be done better: Being closer to the action, the assumption is that they are likely to have a better knowledge of how things can be improved. Managing people is therefore about shaping their behavior in ways that encourage them to take actions of most benefit to the organization. The image anthropomorphizes the organization, that is, it treats it like a living, breathing organism or person. While it is possible to shape the organism or person in various ways, whether through rewards, through inculcating a particular set of values, by providing certain types of resources or information, or by providing some types of opportunities rather than others, the final behavior of the organism or person can only be shaped, not controlled. It is through such shaping actions that organizational capabilities are enhanced. Capabilities provide the organization with operational requirements to assist in its effective functioning, even in times of high uncertainty or ambiguity. Typical of this approach is the following view:

> Corporate capabilities are embedded in the fabric of the organization—in its practices, processes, systems, structures, culture, values, know-how and technologies. Importantly this is as true for reshaping capabilities as it is for operational ones. While personal capabilities leave the organization when their owner does, corporate capabilities tend to endure, despite the comings and goings of individuals.[7]

In this approach, good management produces strong corporate capabilities that provide the organization with a firm platform from which to both respond to and shape the external changes and challenges it is likely to face.[8]

Images of Change Outcomes

Table 2.1 identifies three dominant images relating to whether intentional change outcomes can be achieved.

Intended Change Outcomes

In this image, the dominant assumption is that intended change outcomes can be achieved. This image of planned or intended outcomes is at the core of much of the change literature and is suggested to have dominated the practice of changing organizations for over 50 years.[9] Change is treated as the realization of prior intent through the action of change managers. One well-cited discussion of the planned, intentional approach is found in the work of Chin and Benne, who identify three broad strategies for producing intentional change.[10]

- *Empirical-rational strategies* assume that people are rational and follow their own self-interest. Effective change occurs when a change can be demonstrated as

desirable and aligned with the interests of the group affected by the change. Once this has been done, then intentional change will be achieved.[11]

- *Normative–re-educative strategies* assume that changes occur when people dispense with their old, normative orientations and gain commitment to new ones.[12] Producing intentional change in this approach involves changes not just in their knowledge and information but in their attitudes and values.
- *Power-coercive strategies* rely upon achieving intentional change by those with greater power gaining compliance in behavior from those with lesser power. Power may be exercised by legitimate authority or through other less legitimate, coercive means.[13]

Common to each of these approaches is the view that intended change outcomes can be achieved, albeit through differing change strategies.

Partially Intended Change Outcomes

In this image, some, but not all, change intentions are achievable. Power, processes, interests, and the different skill levels of managers affect their ability to produce intentional change outcomes. As Mintzberg and Waters[14] note, the link between what is intended and what is the final outcome is not necessarily direct. This is due to the fact that both intended and unintended consequences may emerge from the actions of change managers; intended outcomes may be adapted along the way or externally imposed forces and factors may modify what was originally intended. For such reasons, systemwide change initiatives do not always achieve the many outcomes that were intended.[15]

Unintended Change Outcomes

Compared to the other two images of change outcomes, there is less attention paid to this image within the change literature although it is common to the mainstream organizational theory literature. This image implies that managers often have great difficulty in achieving intentional change outcomes. This is because there are a variety of forces that either lead to change outcomes that are not intended by managers (they are forced on to them) or inhibit the ability of managers to implement the changes that they desire. These forces may be internal or external to an organization.

- *Internally* they may include departmental or interunit politics, the drag of past practices and routines that are difficult to dislodge, or the presence of deep-seated values and perceptions that are at odds with the desired change and difficult to budge.
- *Externally* they may include a variety of factors such as a confrontational industrial relations environment (which brings desired management changes to a standstill), legislation that mandates various requirements if an organization is to continue to function (e.g., meeting taxation requirements or adhering to governance procedures), or even industrywide trends that impact all organizations operating in the same industry (e.g., imposition of trade sanctions, a run on the stock market, etc).

These forces are typically viewed as being much more powerful than the influence wielded by individual change managers: In such circumstances, change managers and

their intentions are swamped by these other forces. Occasionally outcomes and intentions may collide, but this is the result of the serendipity of events rather than the outcome of planned, intentional actions by change managers.

SIX IMAGES OF MANAGING CHANGE

Arising from Table 2.1 are six differing images of managing change, each of which is dependent on the images held of managing and of whether intentional change outcomes can be achieved. In what follows, we outline each image and discuss various theories that underpin and support them.

Image 1: Change Manager as Director

The *director image* is based on an image of management as control and of change outcomes as being achievable. It is therefore up to the change manager to direct the organization in particular ways in order to produce the required change. The assumption is that change is a strategic choice that managers make and the survival and general well-being of the organization depends on them.[16] So, for example, if a change manager decides that it is important to realign the organization to changes in the environment by introducing a new information technology system throughout the organization, then it is assumed that this can be done, that it will work well, and that the outcome will be a better-performing, better-aligned organization.

Theoretical Underpinning of the Image

As we will see in Chapter 8, there are a variety of what are sometimes referred to as "*n*-step" models or theories of change that assume the image of the change manager as *director*. These *n*-step models outline a set of steps that change managers should use to implement whatever is the change. The models vary in the number of steps they propose and the order in which they should be taken. However, what unites them is an optimistic view that intentional change can be achieved—as long as the change manager follows the correct steps that need to be taken.

Even writers such as Kotter who acknowledge that "successful change efforts are messy and full of surprises,"[17] nevertheless remain optimistic and maintain that his eight-step change model will produce "a satisfying result"[18] as long as the change manager follows these steps. Similarly, Ghoshal and Bartlett[19] write that while change is often thought to be difficult and messy, there is nothing mystical about the process of achieving effective change as long as certain steps are followed.[20] As we will see in Chapter 8, *contingency* theories of change, such as found in Stace and Dunphy[21] and Huy[22] share with *n*-step theories the assumption that change can be directed; they part company with *n*-step theories in arguing that the nature of this direction depends (or is contingent upon) a range of organizational factors such as the scale of the change, the urgency of the change, and the receptivity of organizational members to engaging in the change. There will be different "best ways," that is, different types of steps that change managers should take, depending upon the confluence of such factors. However, as long as they align the type of change with the style best suited to it, then intended change outcomes can be produced.

Image 2: Change Manager as Navigator

In the *navigator image*, control is still seen as at the heart of management action, although a variety of factors external to managers mean that while they may achieve some intended change outcomes, others will occur over which they have little control. Outcomes are at least partly emergent rather than completely planned and result from a variety of influences, competing interests, and processes. For example, a change manager may wish to restructure his or her business unit by putting cross-functional teams in place in order to assist product development across the different business functions. While a change manager may be able to formally establish teams (an intentional outcome), his or her ability to get them to work effectively may be minimal where there is a history of distrust, hoarding of information, and boundary protection by functional units. In this situation, functional managers may appoint people to the cross-functional teams who they know will keep the interests of their department uppermost and block any decisions that might decrease their organizational power (an unintended outcome of putting the teams in place). As Pendlebury et al.[23] point out, "Any sort of change is a leap in the dark." For them, this does not mean that managing change is something that is not able to be controlled; rather "it is only *partially* controllable" with change managers navigating the process toward an outcome, not all of which will be intentional.[24]

Theoretical Underpinning of the Image

The *contextualist* or *processual* theories of change, which, Burnes[25] maintains, are associated with the work of writers such as Dawson[26] and Pettigrew and Whipp,[27] rely upon the *navigator* image. These theories share an assumption with contingency theory that change unfolds differently over time and according to the context in which the organization finds itself. However, they differ from contingency theory in assuming "that change should not be and cannot be solidified, or seen as a series of linear events within a given period of time; instead, it is viewed as a continuous process."[28] Change is therefore "a process that unfolds through the interplay of multiple variables (context, political processes and consultation) within an organization."[29] Directing is not an option as "there can be no simple prescription for managing transitions successfully."[30] It is up to change managers to navigate their way through this complexity by identifying the range of options open to them, gathering and monitoring information, and availing themselves of appropriate resources.[31]

Even so, change managers need to accept that there will be unanticipated disruptions so that even these options and resources will need to be reviewed and reevaluated. In so doing, change managers are urged to incorporate bottom-up involvement of staff in their approach to managing change so, for senior managers, "Instead of directing and controlling change, their role becomes one of ensuring the organization's members are receptive to, and have the necessary skills and motivation, to take charge of, the change process."[32] In this approach change managers are assumed to have "some scope for choice and maneuver."[33] In keeping with the metaphor of the change manager as *navigator*, change courses may need to be plotted, and then replotted as new information comes to light and variations are made. There is no guarantee that the final destination will be that which was initially envisaged (if there is, indeed, a final destination) and there is the ever-present likelihood that a variety of other, unanticipated destinations

might eventuate, brought about by the shifting winds and currents underlying the change.

Image 3: Change Manager as Caretaker

In the *caretaker image*, the (ideal) image of management is still one of control, although the ability to exercise control is severely constrained by a variety of forces, both internally and externally driven, that propel change relatively independent of a manager's intentions. For example, despite the change manager's best intentions to implement activities to encourage entrepreneurial and innovative behavior, they may feel like this is a continually failing exercise as the organization grows, becomes more bureaucratic, and enacts strategic planning cycles, rules, regulations, and centralized practices. In this situation, inexorable growth and the issues associated with it are outside the control of any individual manager of change. In this rather pessimistic image, at best managers are *caretakers*, shepherding their organizations along as best they can.

Theoretical Underpinning of the Image

Three organizational theories reinforce this *caretaker* image of managers of change: life-cycle, population ecology, and institutional.

Life-Cycle Theory As in the example above, this theory views organizations as passing through well-defined stages from birth to growth, maturity, and then decline or death. These stages are part of the natural, developmental cycle of organizations. There is an underlying logic or trajectory and the stages through which it passes are sequential.[34] There is little change managers can do to stop this natural development; at best they are caretakers of the organization as it passes through the various stages (see Table 2.2). In all this, managers have a limited role, helping to smooth the various transitions rather than controlling whether or not they occur.

Population Ecology Theory Drawing on biology and neo-Darwinian logic, population ecologists focus on how the environment selects organizations for survival or extinction,[35] with whole populations of organizations changing as a result of ongoing cycles of variation, selection, and retention.

- Organizational *variation* can occur as the result of random chance.
- Organizational *selection* can occur when an environment selects organizations that are of best fit to its conditions.
- Organizational *retention* consists of forces that retain various organizational forms and thereby serve as a counterinfluence to the forces of variation and selection.[36]

Some population ecology theorists suggest that there are at least some limited actions that change managers may take to influence these forces. For example, some writers point to:

- The ability of some organizations, or their key stakeholders, to interact with other organizations to lessen the effect of the environment.
- The ability of an organization to reposition itself in a new market or environment.[37]

In general, however, the implication of population ecology theory is that managers have little sway over change where whole populations of organizations are impacted

TABLE 2.2 Life Cycle Stages and Change Management Issues

Source: Adapted from Harrison and Shirom, 1999:307–314.

Developmental Stage	Caretaker Activities
Entrepreneurial Stage	
Founder initiates an idea	• Making sure resources are available • Establishing market niche • Ensuring management procedures assist innovation and creativity • Ensuring founder generates commitment to vision
Collectivity Stage	
Coordination through informal means as group identity develops	• Ensuring coordination of communication and decision-making processes • Establishing cohesion and morale through guiding goals and culture • Ensuring skill development through appropriate reward systems
Formalization Stage	
Formalization of operations with emphasis on rules and procedures to promote efficiency and stability	• Facilitating shift to professional management • Providing mechanisms to monitor internal operations and scan external environment • Focusing procedures on efficiency and quality • Striking a balance between autonomy, coordination, and control
Elaboration Stage	
Change and renewal as structure becomes more complex and environmental domains change	• Adapting current products and developing new ones • Ensuring structure facilitates coordination among different units • Planning for turnaround, cutbacks, and renewal

upon by outside forces. One might point, for example, to how managers of many promising dot.com companies were unable to withstand the impact of the widespread dot.com crash in April 2000 that affected the whole population of dot.com organizations.

Institutional Theory Institutional theory argues that change managers take similar actions across whole populations of organizations. This similarity in the actions that they take occurs through pressures associated with the interconnectedness of organizations within an industry or environment.[38] DiMaggio and Powell[39] identify three such pressures:

- *Coercive* (including government-mandated changes).
- *Mimetic* (where organizations imitate the structures and practices of other organizations in their field, usually ones that they consider as legitimate or successful).

- *Normative* (where changes occur through the professionalizing of work such that managers in different organizations utilize similar values and modes of operating in their actions and decisions).

While not all organizations succumb to these pressures—there are "deviant peers"[40] — the assumption is that these external forces are inexorable and individual managers have only limited ability to implement change outcomes that are at odds with these forces. At best, change managers are *caretakers* having little influence over the direction of change.

Image 4: Change Manager as Coach

In the *coach image*, the assumption is that change managers (or change consultants) are able to intentionally shape the organization's capabilities in particular ways. Like a sports coach, the change manager shapes the organization or the team's capabilities to ensure that, in a competitive situation, it will be able to succeed. Rather than dictating the exact state of each play as the *director* might attempt to do, the *coach* relies upon building in the right set of values, skills, and "drills" that are deemed to be the best ones that organizational members, as players, will be able to draw on adeptly in order to achieve desired organizational outcomes.

Theoretical Underpinning of the Image

The traditional *organization development* (OD) theory reinforces the change manager as *coach* image. As we will see in more detail in Chapter 7, underlying the traditional OD focus is the implementation of change that stresses the importance of humanism, democracy, and individual development to organizational life.[41] Hence, in the same way that sports coaches have their own views on the best skills needed, so too does the OD approach. The traditional OD change consultant acts as a *coach* by helping to "*structure activities to help the organization members solve their own problems and learn to do that better.*"[42]

As we shall see, as the OD field grew and focused not just on small-scale but on larger-scale change, so was there a corresponding development of new techniques designed to get the whole organizational system into a room at one and the same time.[43] Retaining the value of drawing people into actions of their own making, proponents of these "coaching" techniques are glowing, sometimes almost evangelical, in outlining how they help to achieve their intended outcomes. For example, they are argued to produce results "with greater speed and increased commitment and greatly reduced resistance by the rest of the organization."[44]

Image 5: Change Manager as Interpreter

The *interpreter image* to managing change places the change manager in the position of creating meaning for other organizational members, helping them to make sense of various organizational events and actions. It is these events and actions that, in and of themselves, constitute a changed organization. It is up to change managers to represent to their staff (and others) what these changes actually mean. However, it is likely that there will be competing meanings within the organization of the same events and actions, especially given that there are differing groups in organizations not all of which share the same interests and understandings. This suggests that only some meanings—and therefore change intentions—are likely to be realized; other meanings

are likely to emerge from alternative interpretations and understandings held by other people engaged in, or affected by, the particular change.

In this contested view of organizational change, managers as *interpreters* "need to be able to provide legitimate arguments and reasons for why their actions fit within the situation and should be viewed as legitimate."[45] For example, in an organizational downsizing, there may exist competing meanings about the change: While change managers may endeavor to portray it as way of strengthening the organization and so enable better protection of the jobs of those who remain, other organizational members may tell different stories, interpreting it as inevitable, given the changed environment of the organization; alternatively, they may present the fact of downsizing as evidence of management's incompetence, or as an underhanded way of getting rid of some politically troublesome individuals or even departments but in the name of making the organization more efficient. Better change managers, therefore, are those who see their role as *interpreters* and are able to dominate stories and understandings about the meaning of a specific change. In this sense, they are like strategists who, as argued by Linda Smircich and Charles Stubbart, enact a view of the world by creating "imaginary lines between events, objects and situations so that events, objects and situations become meaningful for the members of an organizational world."[46]

Theoretical Underpinning of the Image

The *interpreter image* is present in Karl Weick's[47] sense-making theory of organizational change. He suggests that a central focus is needed on the structuring processes and flows through which organizational work occurs. Adopting the latter perspective leads one to see organizations as being in an ongoing state of accomplishment and re-accomplishment with organizational routines constantly undergoing adjustments to better fit changing circumstances.[48] In this constant movement are four drivers of organizational change that shape how capabilities are produced:

- *Through animation* (whereby people remain in motion and may experiment, e.g., with job descriptions).
- *By direction* (including being able to implement in novel ways direct strategies).
- *By paying attention and updating* (such as updating knowledge of the environment and reviewing and rewriting organizational requirements).
- *Through respectful, candid interaction* (which occurs when people are encouraged to speak out, particularly when things are not working well).[49]

These sense-making drivers assist individuals in developing their capabilities for managing the ambiguity of organizational change.[50] At the same time, it is up to change managers to interpret how and why these adaptive emergent changes are occurring.[51] By providing meaning, and connecting the dots, the change manager as *interpreter* helps "to make sense of events that don't fit together."[52] From this perspective it is up to managers of change:

> to author interpretations and labels that capture the patterns in those adaptive choices. Within the framework of sensemaking, management sees what the front line says and tells the world what it means. In a newer code, management doesn't create change. It certifies change.[53]

Image 6: Change Manager as Nurturer

The *nurturing image* to managing change assumes that even small changes may have a large impact on organizations[54] and managers are not able to control the outcome of these changes. However, they may nurture their organizations, facilitating organizational qualities that enable positive self-organizing to occur. Like a parent's relationship with a child, future outcomes are nurtured or shaped, but the ability to produce intended outcomes at the end of the day is severely limited because of the impact of much wider, sometime chaotic forces and influences. Specific outcomes and directions of change cannot be intentionally produced but rather emerge and are shaped through the qualities and capabilities of the organization.

Theoretical Underpinning of the Image

Two organizational theories support the *nurturer* image: chaos and Confucian/Taoist.

Chaos Theory This theory assumes that organizational change is nonlinear, is fundamental rather than incremental, and does not necessarily entail growth.[55] Drawing on complexity theory, these theorists look at how "companies continuously regenerate themselves through adaptive learning and interactive structural change. These efforts periodically result in the spontaneous emergence of a whole new dynamic order, through a process called self-organization."[56] Self-organizing recognizes the chaotic nature of organizations that results from having to grapple simultaneously with both change and stability.[57] In this situation, the change manager nurtures the capacity for self-organization but has little ability to influence the direction of the spontaneous new orders that may emerge. This may all sound a little puzzling, but it could be argued that this is precisely the emergent strategy—of nurturing capabilities—that the highly successful Brazilian entrepreneur, Ricardo Semler, adopted in his manufacturing organization, Semco. It provides an explanation for how Semco moved successfully into other business areas, including electronic business (see Tables 2.3 and 2.4).

Confucian/Taoist Theory Marshak[58] points out that fundamentally different assumptions underlie a Confucian/Taoist approach—perhaps better regarded as a philosophy rather than a theory—to change compared to Western views of organizational change. Confucian/Taoist assumptions view change as cyclical (constant ebb and flow), processional (harmonious movement from one state to another), journey oriented (cyclical change, therefore no end state), based on maintaining equilibrium (achieving natural harmony), observed and followed by involved people (who constantly seek harmony with their universe), and normal rather than the exception. In this sense, organizational change outcomes are not intended so much as produced through the nurturing of a harmonious Yin–Yang philosophy in which each new order contains its own negation. Embedded in this philosophy is, therefore, an image of the change manager as nurturer.

USING THE SIX-IMAGES FRAMEWORK

Each of the images of managing change represents a Weberian "ideal type"; that is, they are ideal not in the sense of desirable but in the sense of a pure form that may not exist completely in reality. This situation is due to the fact that the images of managing and the images of change outcomes are not really separate categories but rather form a

TABLE 2.3 Chaos Theory and Change Management Roles

Source: Adapted from Tetenbaum, 1998.

Change Management Actions	Core Elements
Managing transitions	• Destabilize people • Get them involved in decision making and problem solving
Building resilience	• Provide people with the ability to absorb change
Destabilizing the system	• Create a state of tension • Seek disconfirmation of organizational beliefs • Act as a devil's advocate • Seek to nurture the creativity needed to cope with the chaotic environment in which organizations operate
Managing order and disorder, the present and the future	• Provide balance between a need for order and a need for change
Creating and maintaining a learning organization	• Facilitate ways in which continuous learning is available to everyone in the organization

TABLE 2.4 Semco: A Chaotic Business?

Semco is a well-known South American manufacturing business that has a flat hierarchy and emphasizes staff empowerment to engage in decisions about virtually all company issues, from strategy to setting their own salaries. Ricardo Semler, the Brazilian majority owner of Semco, has recently discussed how the company has moved away from being a manufacturing company, making industrial pumps and white goods, and into e-business and other services that now account for 75 percent of its business.[a] Many of the company practices and philosophies arguably illustrate principles of chaos theory at work. For example, Semler maintains that the company successfully "went digital without a strategy." He puts this down to what some might term a chaotic management style whereby, in his words:

> [R]ather than dictate Semco's identity from on high, I've let our employees shape it through their individual efforts, interests, and initiatives.
>
> That rather unusual management philosophy has drawn a good deal of attention over the years . . . The way we work—letting our employees choose what they do, where and when they do it, and even how they get paid—has seemed a little too radical for mainstream companies.
>
> . . . I do suggest that some of the principles that underlie the way we work will become increasingly common and even necessary in the new economy. In particular, I believe we have an organization that is able to transform itself continuously and organically—without formulating complicated mission statements and strategies, announcing a bunch of top-down directives, or bringing in an army of change-management consultants.[b]

[a]Semler, 2000:52.
[b]Semler, 2000:51–52.

continuum: in the case of managing, a continuum from controlling to shaping and, in the case of change outcomes, a continuum from intended to unintended change outcomes. For this reason, it is important to point out that the six images of managing change themselves have blurred boundaries and in practice elements of different images may overlap and intermingle.

These six images are enduring, each having, as we have seen, differing theoretical underpinnings that serve to legitimate them. Nevertheless, and as already noted, it is probably fair to say that the *caretaker* and *nurturer* images are less discussed in the change management literature—although they are quite accepted within the wider organizational theory literature, which has much less of a "practice" orientation than does the change management literature. This situation occurs for obvious reasons: the *director*, *navigator*, *coach*, and *interpreter* change images entail, to varying degrees, much more active, intentional, and directional assumptions about the ability of change managers to proactively produce organizational change (whether through control or shaping actions). In this sense, they are much more positive images than the *caretaker* and *nurturer* images, which entail a more reactive and possibly negative view of the effectiveness of the manager of change—in terms of both why specific changes are occurring and the extent to which these changes are related to the intentions held by change managers. Managers obviously do not like to feel that they are insignificant players in their organizational worlds. Rather, the assumption that they are able to produce positive and intentional change is an important part of Western change management lexicon.

We have seen this situation recently in relation to the six-images framework we have outlined in this chapter. A well-known change consultant based in Washington, DC, reported to us how he intended using the six-images framework in a major international organization to help in getting their staff to understand the impact of the culture of the organization and the multiple competing discourses about "organizational change" that existed within it. The organization agreed to use the framework and even requested and received copywrite reproduction permission to use it. However, at the last minute, some senior members of the organization argued against using it "because it might legitimate managers not assuming responsibility for initiating and managing change; it might give them an out." This was for two reasons: first, the possibility of seeing change as having unintended outcomes; second, the possibility that the change manager may have minimal impact where the organization is dominated by enforced change from the outside. In the end, the six-images framework was not used.

The implication of this example is instructive to us in the following terms. Some writers refer to certain topics as being "sacred" and to others as being "profane"; that is, respectively, some topics are not to be questioned (the sacred) and to do so is not seen as legitimate (the profane). The example just outlined suggests that sacred to the change field is the view that organizational change can be managed in the form of producing intentional outcomes; it is profane to suggest otherwise, that is, that managers of change might be dominated by forces much bigger than themselves. Our position in this book is that it is time to end this divide and recognize that, in the long run, such distinctions do not help managers of change; rather, it hinders them by stopping them from taking a reflective view of their actions—and what is achievable—in any particular change situation. It is to these wider implications to which we turn for the rest of this chapter.

Three Key Uses of the Six-Images Framework

In using the six-images framework, we draw attention to three interrelated issues for reflection by the manager of change: surfacing assumptions about change, assessing dominant images of change, and using multiple images and perspectives of change.

Surfacing Our Assumptions about Change

The six-images framework guides us in reflecting on the images and assumptions we hold about managing change. As we noted at the start of this chapter, we all have mental models and these help us to simplify and make sense of the complex organizational worlds in which we operate. At the same time as they simplify and illuminate, they turn our attention toward some things and away from others. Being aware of the mental models with which we work helps us to think more carefully about their relevance—and the extent to which the assumptions they entail are really ones that are going to be of assistance to us in approaching organizational change.

Being aware of these images enables change managers to assess the assumptions that are being made by *others* with whom they are working or interacting or from whom they are taking advice. Resulting from this assessment may be actions to reorient the images others have of the particular change in which they are involved by providing a new image through which the change can be seen.

For example, a change manager working with a *navigating* image may get others, who may view change through a *director* image, to acknowledge that unanticipated outcomes may occur as a change unfolds. He or she might get them to accept that one possibility of engaging in a change is that their current view of what is desired at the end of the change may shift as the change unfolds and new possibilities emerge. In this sense, awareness of differing change management images can lead to an educative process within a change team. It requires encouragement of conversations around images and assumptions about the anticipated change, testing these within a group and ensuring that all members of the team share common change image(s). This ensures that individual change managers are not talking past one another and making assumptions that are not shared by others.

Assessing Dominant Images of Change

The six-images framework encourages change managers to reflect on whether they are dominated, for all changes, by a particular view of change—and the limitations of such an image. For example, the *director* image turns our attention to the outcomes we want to achieve and the steps needed to get there; at the same time, it turns our attention away from whether the outcomes are really achievable (or even desirable) and whether unintentional outcomes also might occur should we pursue a particular change course.

The six-images framework directs attention to whether the organization in which the change is to occur is dominated by a particular view of what is achievable and how change should unfold. Indeed, Hamel & Prahalad[59] point out that some organizations are dominated by a particular view of how things should get done—almost to the point where the view is part of the "genetic coding" of the organization and is therefore seen as natural and not open for negotiation. In this instance, the change manager whose change image is at odds with a dominant organizational image may experience

frustration and stress as he or she seeks to work with a change image that may be deemed by the wider organization to be less legitimate or relevant than another.

Using Multiple Images and Perspectives of Change

It is possible that a change manager's image-in-use may depend on his or her personal preference or it may be an unconscious decision based on the use of an approach with which the manager is familiar. One of the advantages of exposure to the range of images of managing change and associated techniques is that it reduces the likelihood of a change manager using a single image because of a lack of understanding of the range of options upon which he or she is able to draw. The six-images framework directs attention to the range of available options and how their use may vary.

• *Image-in-use depends on the type of change.* Change managers may assess some types of change as being more amenable to one image of change rather than another. An *interpreter* approach might be seen as possible for one but not another type of change. In this case, the change manager adjusts his or her image of change and the corresponding perception of what is possible depending on the change situation being confronted. For example, Anderson and Anderson[60] adopt a *coaching* image in arguing that developmental and transitional change, but not transformational change, can be managed. They draw on a *navigator* change image in relation to transformational changes, arguing that there are too many intangibles that can inhibit the arrival of predetermined outcomes; what is required is a mindset that accepts that organizations can be led into the unknown without the end point being predictable in advance.

• *Image-in-use depends on the context of the change.* As we will see in Chapter 6, the context of change may vary; in some situations, organizational members may be ready for a change and unhappy with the status quo. In this situation, the image-in-use might be *coach* or *interpreter*, involving people in particular ways in order to identify desired change outcomes. However, an alternative change context may be one where hostility and resistance may face the change manager in attempting to implement specific changes; in this case, the ability to achieve intended change outcomes may be deemed unlikely and a *caretaker* or at best *navigator* change management image might be assessed as the most feasible image with which to work.

• *Image-in-use depends on the phase of change.* Changes pass through different phases—to be explored in more detail in later chapters (e.g., Chapter 11). Change managers may choose to use different images depending upon the change phase—or their perception of the phase of the change. For example, in initiating a change imposed on them from outside—for example, the need to implement an ISO 9000 system in order to continue to be used as a supplier—the change manager may feel that the *caretaker* image is the most appropriate as the change was not intentionally produced from within but mandated from without. However, as the change progresses, they may feel that an *interpreter* role might be appropriate, conveying to staff new meanings associated with the implementation such as greater professionalism and the possibility for expanded business into new areas.

• *Image-in-use depends on simultaneous involvement in multiple changes.* In organizations, there are often multiple changes unfolding at one and the same time, either within various business units or across the organization as a whole. In this situation,

some changes might be imposed from outside the business unit and a *caretaker* image might apply to these; simultaneously, other change initiatives may be underway, initiated from within a business unit so that a *director* image is most applicable, that is, seeking intentional outcomes in a controlled manner. In this situation, multiple change images coexist, corresponding to different but simultaneous changes that are being concurrently managed. This implies that skilled change managers are able to swap images depending upon the change or the change situation—or manage multiple images simultaneously where they are related to different, concurrent changes.

EXERCISE 2.1

Assessing Change Managers' Images

Your task, either individually or in small groups, is to find and interview two people who have managed change in an organization. It is preferable to select people from different organizations and industries to provide a contrast. Compare and contrast the responses you receive and arrive at an assessment of the following issues:

- Which images of change did you come across?
- How did these images affect the actions they took as managers of change?
- Where they drew upon multiple images, to what extent were these different images related to
  - The type of change?
  - The context of the change?
  - The phase of the change?
  - Simultaneous involvement in multiple changes?
  - Were there any other factors that you identified?
  - What broad conclusions do you draw from your analysis about the impact of images and mental models on the way these change managers approached change?

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have explored six images of managing change: *director*, *navigator*, *caretaker*, *coach*, *interpreter*, and *nurturer*. Each of these images is based on differing assumptions about managing (controlling actions versus shaping capabilities) and change outcomes (intended, partly intended, unintended). Each is underpinned by theories drawn from the organizational theory and change literature—although we have kept to a minimum our discussion of these theories. We have identified three key uses of the six-images framework in order to assist the manager of change: surfacing assumptions, assessing dominant images, and using multiple perspectives and images of change.

We close this chapter by pointing out that there are a variety of other uses for this framework that will be noted in later chapters in the book. Two of these we will make mention of at this point. First, even assessing change as successful is often bound up with one rather than another image of change:

- Was it managed well?
- What went right?

- What went wrong?
- Did we get the outcome we were after?

Such questions are predicated on particular images of change and fail to appreciate that even judging the success of particular changes is open to interpretation depending upon who is doing the interpreting and what images they hold of managing change. As Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron note, "Judgments about success are also likely to be conditional on who is doing the assessment and when the judgments are made."[61] The six-images framework points to the need to raise conversations early about measurements of the success of a change (something we will visit in more detail in Chapter 12) and ensure that people within the organization adopt similar images and assumptions in relation to it.

Second, some writers argue that we need to think not of *managing change* but of *leading change*. For example, Kotter[62] differentiates between managing and leading change. Similarly, and as outlined above, Anderson and Anderson[63] suggest that transformational change cannot be managed, but it can be led as long as *leaders* have the right mindset. However, our six-images framework suggests that this distinction might be overstated. Rather, Anderson and Anderson are really referring to the distinction between a *coaching* image of managing change on the one hand (what they call *managing change*) and a *navigating* image of managing change on the other (what they refer to as *leading change*). In reality, both are aspects of managing change; it is the image and assumptions behind them that vary. Hence, we argue that the distinction between leading and managing change is too artificial a distinction to retain. Indeed, this is the position taken by other organizational change writers and practitioners who do not make such firm distinctions between managing and leading change. For example, Kanter, Stein, and Jick move freely between using the two terms, one being used interchangeably with the other, as in their statement: "The world does not stand still while leaders manage a change."[64] This is the position adopted in this book and one that we will visit again in Chapter 8.

TABLE 2.5 Chapter Reflections for the Practicing Change Manager

- To what extent are you more comfortable with one or other of the six images described in this chapter in terms of your own approach to managing change—or your anticipated approach to managing change?
- Why is this the case?
- What are the strengths and limitations of the images that you have identified as most relevant to you?
- What skills do you think are associated with each image in order to use it well?
- Are there areas of personal skill development that are needed in order for you to feel more comfortable in using other change management images?
- Have you been in an organization that was dominated by particular images or approaches to change?
- What barriers would you face in trying to bring consideration of alternative images in these organizations? What strategies could you use to assist you in overcoming these barriers?
- ***As a group exercise:*** In small groups, compare and contrast your responses to the above issues. Where do differences exist? Try and identify why this is the case.

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Case Study Green Mountain Resort (Dis)solves the Turnover Problem

Green Mountain Resort was not expected to be in business for very long, not that anyone was making predictions. It was a small resort with golf, tennis, and, most notably, some skiing—on machine made snow for the most part—set in the Appalachians. It was a fair distance from major population centers and had none of the history of the famous southern spas of an older era, places like the Homestead.

But it didn't have to stand fully on its own: it was built as a draw for buyers of vacation homes at Green Mountain. The resort was the center of sales hospitality and an attractive amenity of home ownership. Being a property owner got you membership in the resort with ski passes, discount golf, and the like. Salespeople pointed to the resort as a symbol of their commitment to community: they were not just selling lots; they were offering a lifestyle.

Of course, the salespeople also knew that when the real estate sold out, the function of the resort as a sales tool would disappear along with the sales staff, and, if this were like other similar developments, the resort would lose its luster and perhaps even go out of business. The resort wasn't there for vacationers but for buyers. Soon, there would be no more buyers. And soon after that, the resort would have to make it on its own, as only a resort.

The top management of Green Mountain at this time came to the operation when the original developers failed. They were sent in by the investment bank that had financed the original operation to put the place in order and get it sold. But the bank's workout team fell in love with the rural beauty and lifestyle and bought it themselves. Actually, it was a very complex plan that structured eventual ownership for the homeowners, with part ownership by the remaining management company that would continue to run the operation. The former bankers were committed to building an actual community, one they wanted to stay in themselves, and to having the resort become a first-class operation on its own. They were explicit about their goal: make sure that Green Mountain, the community and the resort, didn't go to seed when the land sold out.

With the new structure, the resort manager was an owner. He decided to stay on, motivated by his ownership share as well as the opportunity to have his own show, no longer just an adjunct to sales. Gunter had been part of the original management and had expected to eventually leave for another resort job, enacting a pattern typical in the hospitality industry. But now he was an owner, not just an employee, and he had a vision of a first-class mountain resort.

The architecture of the lodge, and of most of the vacation homes, was more up-country than ski-country. In contrast to this uniquely American look was Gunter, in his Tyrolian hat, his accent recalling his native Austria. He didn't wear lederhosen but would have looked natural in them. His wife, Hilde, actually had blond braids, and when they were together, you could only imagine that they were off on a hike to an Alpine meadow. Their house was perfectly Teutonic, immaculate, and welcoming in a way that made you think you shouldn't touch anything. Gunter was nothing if not rational.

That is why Gunter was worried about the turnover of staff. Green Mountain Resort was in a beautiful rural county, but that county was also the poorest in the state. That meant that it was hard to find good employees locally, and those that were good, whether local or imported, didn't stay long. High turnover meant added training, plus the predominance of

novice staff. And it was mainly the best service people who moved on, leaving behind the poorest performers. That, Gunter knew, undermined efforts to build a first-class operation. Turnover had to be reduced.

There weren't a lot of options. In such a small operation, the opportunities for promotion were few, and Gunter was faced with the irony that if he reduced turnover, there would be even fewer openings for advancement. Structural arrangements to keep people from leaving, such as term contracts, benefits that took time to vest, and the like, were seen as coercive and drove people away. Besides, such measures seemed out of character for Gunter and for Green Mountain.

The so-called hospitality industry, in its training and management development literature, saw turnover as a problem needing treatment, as well. One difference in the industry association view, however, was that turnover was defined as chronic, always there, something to be endured. All management could do, went the advice, was to minimize the debilitating effects: streamline training, simplify jobs, don't become dependent on individuals, make HR processes more efficient.

Gunter knew this perspective but didn't want to settle for a chronically sick organization. His efforts, though, had turned out to validate the industry view and even, sometimes, make things worse. Gunter also was beginning to see the paradox of his situation and recognize that he needed not just some new ideas but some new ways of thinking about his situation. So he called in a consultant.

The consultant was already working with the development company that was marketing the land and owned the resort but was not an expert in the hospitality industry. This was deliberate, as Gunter already knew the conventional industry take on turnover. Perhaps an outsider, someone with a fresh look, would see something new.

The consultant listened to Gunter's retelling of all he had done to reduce turnover, how it hadn't worked and had even driven away some of those he wanted to keep. After listening to the litany of failures, the consultant asked just what it was that Gunter really wanted, to which the reply was, reduce turnover, of course. It was said in a way that made the consultant think that Gunter believed he knew what to do and only needed help in the execution, help in finding a better tactic for reducing turnover.

The consultant told Gunter, with some embarrassment, that he couldn't really think of anything else to try. But he also was suspicious that, since nothing worked and some reasonable tactics just made things worse, they ought to try something different. The consultant suggested rephrasing the old aphorism, "If at first you don't succeed, try, try again," to say, "If at last you don't succeed, don't just try again, do something different." The issue now was how to break out of the set of failed solutions, all of which, even with their differences, left the situation essentially intact. What would be *really* different?

Since the so-called solutions continued to fail, perhaps a real difference would come from stopping attempts to solve the turnover problem. If turnover is so resistant to being changed, perhaps there is something functional about it. What if turnover were embraced, rather than scorned? The consultant suggested looking into what actually happened when good people left. Where did they go, and what did they do? In short, Gunter and the consultant went after the answer to a new question: What is good about turnover?

Things looked different from this perspective. The best employees, the ones Gunter most wanted to keep, usually left for better jobs, jobs that required the good training and variety of assignments they had at Green Mountain. And they tended to be high performers in their new jobs, which led to more promotions.

It began to look like turnover, an anathema to Green Mountain as an institution, was a good career development move for those who turned over. More investigation of those careers revealed—no surprise—that the best people, the ones Gunter wanted most to keep, did the best in their new jobs. But what was most interesting, they attributed their success, in large measure, to the training and early responsibility they had been given at Green Mountain. Their employers, usually other resorts, came to regard Green Mountain alumni as prime recruits.

The word got around: If you wanted great training, early responsibility, to get on the fast track, Green Mountain was the place to go. That meant that more smart, ambitious people began to apply for jobs at Green Mountain, expecting to work hard, learn a lot, and move on quickly. Gunter could now imagine the resort mainly staffed with these career builders, working hard and smart in order to learn and develop, and in doing so, providing exemplary levels of service. So what if turnover was high? The staff would always be highly motivated, and other potential top performers would be waiting at the gate.

Now with an explicit strategy for recruiting high-potential people, offering them the promise of rapid career development, turnover might actually increase, but it would mean something different: It would be a sign, given the reformulated strategy, of success rather than an organizational problem. The situation had been reframed, the facts given new meaning.

Was the problem solved? The answer is both yes and no. No, the facts of turnover remained, but, yes, that no longer was troublesome. It might be better to say the problem had been dis-solved, that is, it had been neutralized, and, by being given a new context, now had no effect. What had once been a liability was now transformed into an asset, and so there was no longer a need to engage in problem solving. The reframing of the situation rendered the failed first-order change efforts irrelevant, and so continuing efforts to reduce turnover could stop. Turnover had been a problem partly because of the efforts to get rid of it. (Problems are problems, in part, due to the ongoing efforts to fix them.) No more fix: no more problem.

This is an example of second-order change, one distinguishing feature of which is that change interventions are directed at the "solution." At Green Mountain, continuing efforts to reduce turnover were interrupted by the technique of reversal, that is, finding a plausible interpretation of the facts opposite in meaning to the generally accepted interpretation. (Turnover is bad, versus turnover is good.) With the new meaning, no fix was required, and when you aren't fixing something, there must not be a problem.

Green Mountain continues to fast-track new hires on to other resorts. Gunter has not moved to another resort but has expanded his own role to be a mentor.

Questions:

1. Which of the six change images discussed in this chapter can be identified in the assumptions about managing turnover that were held by
   - Gunter?
   - The hospitality literature?
   - The consultant?
2. How did these assumptions influence prescriptions for dealing with "the turnover problem"?
3. Choose another change image and apply it to "the turnover problem." To what new insights does it lead?
4. What conclusions do you draw from this about the statement at the start of the chapter that "if we only draw upon one particular frame, then this will take us away from thinking about what is going on from an alternative perspective"?

TABLE 2.6 Additional Case Studies

Yahoo!: Business on Internet Time Rivkin, J. W. & Girotto, J. (1999) *Harvard Business School*
Reviving Yahoo!: Strategies That Turned the Leading Internet Portal Gupta, V. (2003) *ICFAI Knowledge Centre, India*
The Rebirth of Air France (A), (B), (C), and (D) Trepo, G., & Autier, F. (2001) *HEC School of Management, France*
Ricardo Semler's Employee Empowerment Strategies at Semco Sumit, K. C., & Bala Kiran, V. (2004) *ICFAI Knowledge Centre, India*

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Notes

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2. Morgan, 1997; Bolman & Deal, 1997, 2003; Hatch, 1997.
3. This idea is taken from Bolman and Deal, 1997:12–13.

4. Fayol, 1949.
5. E.g., see Luthans et al., 1988; Mintzberg, 1975.
6. E.g., see Higgins, 1994:5.
7. Turner & Crawford, 1998:15.
8. See Beer & Nohria, 2000:35–36.
9. Burnes, 1996:170.
10. Chin and Benne, 1976:22.
11. Chin and Benne, 1976:31.
12. Chin and Benne, 1976:23.
13. Chin and Benne, 1976:23–24.
14. Mintzberg & Waters, 1985.
15. Harrison & Shirom, 1999:31.
16. White et al., 1997:1384.
17. Kotter, 1995:67.
18. Kotter, 1995:59.
19. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 2000.
20. Ghoshal and Bartlett, 2000:220.
21. Stace & Dunphy, 2001.
22. Huy, 2001.
23. Pendlebury, Grouard, and Meston, 1998:39.
24. Pendlebury, Grouard, and Meston, 1998:39.
25. Burnes, 1996:187–88.
26. Dawson, 1994.
27. Pettigrew and Whipp, 1993.
28. Burnes, 1996:187.
29. Burnes, 1996:187.
30. Burnes, 1996:187.
31. Burnes, 1996:189–92.
32. Burnes, 1996:189.
33. Collins, 1998:70.
34. Van de Ven & Poole, 1995:512–20.
35. White et al., 1997:1384.
36. Van de Ven & Poole, 1995:512–20.
37. Hall, 1996:192–200.
38. Oliver, 1988:543.
39. DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:67–74.
40. DiMaggio & Powell, 1991:73.
41. Nicoll, 1998b.
42. French and Bell, 1995:4. (Italics in original.)
43. See Fuller, Griffin, and Ludema, 2000; Bunker and Alban, 1992.
44. Axelrod, 1992:507.

45. Barge & Oliver, 2003:138–39.
46. Smircich & Stubbart, 1985:726.
47. Weick, 2000.
48. Weick, 2000:229–32; see also Feldman, 2000.
49. Weick, 2000:235–36.
50. Weick, 2000:234–35.
51. Weick, 2000:236–37.
52. Weick, 2000:232.
53. Weick, 2000:238.
54. Thietart & Forgues, 1995:1.
55. Lichtenstein, 2000:131.
56. Lichtenstein, 2000:131.
57. See Thietart & Forgues, 1995:28.
58. Marshak, 1993.
59. Hamel & Prahalad, 1994.
60. Anderson and Anderson, 2001:9.
61. Pettigrew, Woodman, and Cameron, 2001:701.
62. Kotter, 1996:26.
63. Anderson and Anderson, 2001:9–10.
64. Kanter, Stein, and Jick, 1992:375.