Copyright Center for Advanced Studies in Management Jul
1999
| [Headnote] |
| This paper presents the theoretical rationale for
further development of a model for the assessment and management of
intraorganizational conflict. The purpose of such a model would be to
assist employees, managers, human resources practitioners, and external
service providers in selecting the most appropriate conflict management
strategy for a given conflict. The framework presented builds on the
previous work of Sheppard (1984) and Elangovan (1995, 1998) in suggesting
|
| [Headnote] |
| that a contingency-based model of strategy selection
must include attention to characteristics of the conflict desired outcomes
of the participants, and awareness of available conflict management
strategies. By expanding the range of conflicts and conflict management
strategies typically included within a single model, the framework
presented here forms the basis of a comprehensive model for dealing with
intraorganizational conflict. |
This paper presents the theoretical underpinnings for
a comprehensive model for the assessment and management of intraorganizational
conflict. The purpose of the model is to provide members of non-union
organizations with guidelines for selecting appropriate conflict management
strategies for different forms of conflict. Unlike previous models which have
been largely confined to discussions of grievances (Costantino & Merchant,
1996; Ewing, 1989) or limited to the activities of managers as third parties
(Elangovan, 1995, 1998), this model incorporates a broad definition of conflict
as well as a variety of conflict management strategies and third parties. This
article presents a review of the literature used to develop the initial
framework and describes on-going research efforts to refine this framework and
suggest relationships between its components in order to build a comprehensive
model for the assessment and management of intraorganizational conflict.
Rationale for a New Model
Conflict occurs whenever interdependent parties
perceive incompatible goals. Since organizations have been described as systems
of interdependent units with often competing interests (Cyert & March,
1963), conflict is an inevitable and pervasive part of organizational life.
Intraorganizational conflict has many forms, ranging from informal arguments
over office space to formal lawsuits over employment issues that can cost
organizations thousands of dollars and person hours. While the prevalence of
informal conflict is difficult to estimate due to lack of documentation,
Mintzberg's (1973) classic study of managers indicated that in the course of the
myriad issues that managers attend to on any given day, an inordinate amount of
time and energy is spent managing conflict. The pervasiveness of informal
conflict is supported by additional research investigating managerial activities
which found that the most successful managers exhibited a greater percentage of
behaviors specifically related to conflict management (Luthans, Rosenkrantz,
& Hennessey, 1985). 1985),
On the formal end of the spectrum, disputes over
issues such as productivity, absentee policies, work rules, discrimination,
promotion, and termination account for a 400% increase in employment litigation
over the past two decades (Harness & Mook, 1997). The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission documented a backlog of over 100,000 charges filed by
employees in 1997, up from 46,000 charges in 1991 (Harness & Mook, 1997;
Simon & Sochynsky, 1995). These figures help explain the recent surge of
interest in bringing alternative dispute resolution (ADR) to the workplace. Many
organizations are designing internal dispute systems in an attempt to reduce the
costs of litigation and improve employee relations. The American Arbitration
Association reported in 1997 that ADR programs calling for their services
(mediation and arbitration) have been implemented by nearly 300 large companies.
Since many internal procedures do not include provisions for the use of external
mediators and arbitrators, the actual number of organizations that have
developed or are interested in designing conflict management systems is far
greater than that number suggests.
While concerns about litigation have popularized
dispute system design, researchers have identified several other positive
implications of effective organizational conflict management. Outcomes may
include an atmosphere that supports the discussion of conflict and reduced
stress (Murphy, 1995), reduced conflictrelated health problems (Stokols, 1992),
increased perceptions of fairness and job satisfaction (McCabe, 1988; Shapiro,
1993; Shapiro & Brett, 1993), increased prosocial behaviors (Greenberg &
Barling, 1996), and fewer incidents of aggressive behaviors such as employee
theft and litigation (Greenberg, 1993; Greenberg & Barling, 1996; Shapiro
& Kolb, 1994). The fact that such benefits affect individual members as well
as the attainment of organizational goals makes the pursuit of effective
conflict management systems an important objective of organizational
development.
Definition of Terms
Because this study expands the scope of previous
examinations of intraorganizational conflict, it is important to clarify the
usage of major terms. Conflict will refer to situations that occur when two or
more people working within the same organization perceive differences in
beliefs, values, or goals which impact their ability to work together and/or
affect the work environment. Intraorganizational conflicts may result over
issues such as performance standards, task completion, policy interpretation, or
interpersonal differences.
As indicated above, a distinction is made between
informal and formal conflicts. Informal conflicts may occur among coworkers,
employees and supervisors, within or between groups, and among departments
within an organization. Such conflicts often occur when there are differences in
values, beliefs, or opinions regarding how work gets completed, how resources or
tasks are distributed, or where priorities should he. Formal conflicts, on the
other hand, occur when there is an alleged human rights or policy violation.
Because formal conflicts are more likely to lead to litigation, these are often
handled in accordance with official corporate conflict management procedures.
Due to the nature of informal conflicts, such procedures rarely apply.
The term desired outcomes refers to disputants' and
third parties' conflict management goals. Previous authors have used the term
"criteria" to discuss the goal that is considered most important for a
satisfactory solution (e.g., a sense of fairness or the most efficient use of
resources). While the concept of criteria is appropriate for examining
third-party strategy selection, disputants in a conflict are more likely to
focus on personal goals or desired outcomes when choosing appropriate action.
The term desired outcomes is used here to reflect concerns that are taken into
consideration by disputants as well as by third parties who may become involved
in the conflict.
The phrase conflict management strategies is used to
describe any action taken by a disputant or a third-party to try to manage or
resolve a conflict as defined above. Strategies include specific mechanisms for
managing a conflict, such as negotiation, mediation, or arbitration, as well as
actions such as seeking advice and coalition building. Use of the term
strategies should not be confused with the large body of research on conflict
styles (e.g., Thomas & Kilmann, 1974), which suggests a broader definition
of "strategies" including avoidance, accommodation, compromising, collaboration,
or competition. As with types of conflict, conflict management strategies may
also be formal or informal. This model includes both formal conflict mechanisms,
those governed by official company policies and procedures, as well as informal
processes, those actions taken by disputing parties to manage the conflict
themselves, or by third parties who try to help manage a conflict.
The term thirdparty is used to refer to any
individual who is not a part of the initial conflict, but becomes involved in
order to help manage or resolve it. A variety of third parties are included in
the model: supervisors or managers of the disputants (intervening managers),
other organizational members who may intervene due to their conflict management
skills or expertise (intervening others), and third parties who are not
employees of the organization such as consultants, mediators, and arbitrators
(external thirdparties).
Framework Development: A Review of the Literature
Three major components of a model of conflict
management have been proposed by previous literature: identification of the
characteristics of conflicts that may occur, a list of criteria by which to
evaluate the success of a particular strategy, and a comprehensive set of
conflict management strategies available to the parties (Beres & Schmidt,
1982; Sheppard, 1984). An overview of the research in managerial third-party
intervention, due process procedures, dispute system design, and alternative
dispute resolution (ADR) reveals the aspects of each of these areas that are
most relevant to the assessment and management of intraorganizational conflict.
Conflict Charcteristics
Researchers adopting a contingency approach to
conflict intervention have long recognized the need to develop a conflict
typology-a mechanism for distinguishing one type of conflict from another. In
his framework, Sheppard (1984, pp. 173-174) integrated two decades of
organizational behavior and conflict research to develop a list of
characteristics that were defined as "potentially relevant" to development of
such a taxonomy. The entire list includes 35 variables, broken down into three
categories: conflict characteristics, disputant characteristics, and
characteristics of the conflict setting. The organizational conflict research
that has investigated these areas can be used to truncate this list to three
sets of related dimensions: content dimensions, relational dimensions, and
situational dimensions, which form the basis for the first component of the
present framework.
Content Dimensions. One characteristic of conflict
that is central to the question of how it should be addressed is the nature of
the topic of the conflict, or what the conflict is about. Research suggests
several dimensions that may be useful in assessing the content of a conflict:
task versus relational issues, objective versus subjective issues, and issues of
policy interpretation versus policy change.
One study that specifically addresses the effect of
conflict characteristics on managerial intervention strategies was performed by
Shapiro and Rosen (1994). Using a survey of 74 university managers, the
researchers collected examples of conflicts in which managers considered
intervening, as well as the specific intervention decisions made in each
conflict. In a content analysis of the issues in conflict, they found four
types: personality conflicts, policy/procedure conflicts, conflicts, over
authority/responsibility, and resource scarcity conflicts. The latter two
conflict types were further categorized by Shapiro and Rosen as task conflicts.
The labeling of task conflicts was used to
distinguish conflicts based on issues such as resource allocation from those
resulting from differences in interpersonal or management style. Other authors
have also made this distinction between task and relationship conflicts
(Burnett, 1993; Jehn, 1995, 1997). In her work on group conflict, Jehn (1995)
defined task conflict as existing "when there are disagreements among group
members about the content of tasks being performed, including differences in
viewpoints, ideas, and opinions" (p. 258). Relationship conflict is defined as
"interpersonal incompatibilities among group members, which typically includes
tension, animosity, and annoyance among members within a group" (Jehn, 1995, p.
258). Shapiro and Rosen's (1994) study confirmed that managers selected
different strategies when conflicts were described as task as opposed to
relational.
Other authors have also recognized the utility of a
relational or interpersonal conflict category. In their recent development of a
conflict skills assessment, Olson-Buchanan, Drasgow, Moberg, Mead, Keenan, and
Donovan (1998), classified conflicts using three components: short-term,
long-term, and interpersonal. While the first two categories distinguish between
conflicts that have short-term impacts (i.e., productivity, disruption) and
long-term impacts (potential for recurrence, damage to past and future
relationships), the final category refers to the emotional intensity of the
disputants. Using these three components, the authors suggest a model for
choosing from four managerial actions: none, policy creation, arbitration, or
reactive problem solving. Like other contingency theorists, OlsonBuchanan et al.
(1998), suggest that different types of conflicts require different strategies.
Their typology, along with the work of previous authors, supports the utility of
a task versus relational dimension of intraorganizational conflict.
Deutsch (1973) and Fisher and Keashly (1991) have
suggested that conflicts differ with regard to whether the issue is objective or
subjective. Objective conflicts have been defined as those over tangible
resources or facts, while subjective conflicts are those dealing with
differences in perceptions, interpretations, or values. A conflict may also be
defined as objective when there is one right answer or best solution for
managing it. A subjective conflict, on the other hand, has no single correct
answer or many possible solutions. These categories illustrate the potential
utility of an objective versus subjective dimension of conflict issues.
Also based on Sheppard's (1984) collection of
conflict characteristics, Elangovan (1995) proposed a set of "key conflict
attributes that affect strategy selection" in his prescriptive model of
managerial third party intervention (p. 808). Elangovan's model includes two
categories of conflict characteristics: conflictrelated attributes and
disputant-related attributes.
Elangovan's (1995) conflict-related attributes
include one called the nature of the conflict@ or the conflict content. Within
his nature of the conflict attribute, Elangovan distinguishes between disputes
over privileges (DOP) and disputes over stakes (DOS). The dichotomy is intended
to reflect the difference between conflicts over "what is," or the
interpretation of existing policy, and those over "what should be," or the
development of new policy (p. 811). In a recent empirical test of his strategy
selection tree, Elangovan (1998) found evidence that using the nature of the
dispute distinction to select an appropriate conflict management strategy
increased intervention success. This suggests the need for a dimension that
makes a distinction between conflicts based on policy interpretation as opposed
to those based on either the change of existing policy or implementation of new
policies. This dimension is referred to as policy interpretation-policy change.
Relational Dimensions. A number of previous authors
have noted that the existing relationship between disputants (Yarbrough &
Wilmot, 1995) or between disputants and a third party (Karambayya & Brett,
1994) should be considered when selecting a conflict management strategy. The
most prominent dimensions relevant to these relationships include whether the
parties are interdependent versus independent, whether parties are of equal or
unequal status, whether there is high trust or low trust, the existence of a
high versus low record of previous conflict management success, and whether the
conflict is dyadic as opposed to multiparty.
In addition to investigating the content of the
conflict, Shapiro and Rosen (1994) examined managers' evaluations of the level
of seriousness of the conflict. Conflicts perceived as serious were more likely
to be handled by mediation, and those perceived as less serious were overlooked.
Others have also indicated that seriousness or importance of the conflict is a
likely predictor of whether or how a manager will intervene (Elangovan, 1995;
Karambayya & Brett, 1994; OlsonBuchanan et aL, 1998; Sheppard, 1984). In a
study of managers' conflict behavior as disputants, however, Morrill (1991) was
unable to find support for his prediction that managers would be more likely to
confront opposing parties when they perceived the conflict to be more serious.
Instead, he found that confrontation depended more on organizational norms, such
that when there was greater interdependence between parties, there was more
confrontation and an increased tendency to pursue grievances. This finding
suggests that the level of interdependence may be a more useful predictor of
strategy selection than the more subjective category of seriousness.
The effect of interdependence on strategy selection
was examined indirectly in a study designed to test the impact of three conflict
characteristics identified by Sheppard in 1984 (Lewicki & Sheppard, 1985).
These authors examined the effects of time pressure, future expected relations
between the parties, and range of impact on whether a manager exerted process or
outcome control in an intervention strategy. The study manipulated these three
variables in two different scenarios that were presented to 100 managers in
survey form. Managers read the scenarios and responded to questions regarding
their likeliness to use strategies that were high in either process or outcome
control. As expected, findings indicated that when time pressure was high,
future relations (or interdependence) were low, and there was a broad range of
impact (the conflict had implications for the resolution of future
organizational conflicts), managers were more likely to assume outcome control.
The work of Lewicki and Sheppard and Morrill (1991) supports the inclusion of
interdependent-independent as a relational dimension of conflicts.
More insights into relational dimensions can be
discerned from differences in responses to the two scenarios used in the Lewicki
and Sheppard (1985) study. In the first scenario, the third party was described
as a peer of the disputants, while in the second, the third party had higher
status. Not surprisingly, responses to the first scenario indicated a greater
tendency toward the use of process control, whereas those in the second scenario
were more likely to exert outcome control. There appears to be a clear
relationship between status differences between disputants and the third party
and the latter's choice of intervention. This finding is supported by others who
have either examined this relationship directly or have used similar research
methods (Karambayya & Brett, 1989, 1994; Keashly & Newberry, 1995).
These studies reveal that characteristics of the
third party also play a role in the strategy used, specifically in terms of
their relationship to the disputants. The status differences between disputants
and third parties is another significant relational dimension which can be
referred to as equal-unequaL Importantly, this dimension should also be used to
examine the relationship among disputants, since power differences among
disputants are likely to impact strategy selection decisions.
Elangovan's (1995) model also includes three
disputant-related attributes: the nature of the relations between disputants,
commitment probability, and disputant orientation. Within the first attribute,
nature of disputant relations, Elangovan included the level of interdependence
and status differences, also included in the present model. Commitment
probability refers to the manager's perception of how likely disputants will be
to adhere to a solution imposed by the manager. Underlying this perception are
issues of power differences, prior success, and trust, all variables that refer
to the relationship between the third party and disputants. Disputants'
orientation refers to the manager's perception of the disputants' ability to
arrive at an "organizationally appropriate" solution on their own. Clearly, both
of these attributes would be useful for a third party trying to determine the
best way to intervene from an organizational perspective, and Elangovan (1998)
did find support for the utility of the disputant orientation rule.
Because the model proposed here is intended to
benefit both disputants and a variety of potential third parties, the facets of
these dimensions that are most relevant are those of the level of trust and
previous record of success. Research on managerial style has indicated that when
employees trust their managers to consider their position in making a decision,
they are more likely to approach the manager with a grievance (Gordon &
Fryxell 1993). Furthermore, previous success in conflict management would seem
to be an important factor in one's choice to use a certain strategy or a
particular third party. Therefore, dimensions of trust (high-low) and record of
success (high-low) were added as relational dimensions.
Within the ADR literature one conflict characteristic
used to determine an appropriate ADR mechanism is that of conflict complexity
(Costello, 1996). This variable has been used to refer to the number of parties
involved, as a dyadic conflict is likely to be managed differently than one
involving many parties. While Costello used the term to describe multi-party,
inter-organizational conflicts, it is also possible to conceive of a complex
intraorganizational conflict between departments or coalitions. It was therefore
deemed appropriate to add a relational dimension to represent dyadic versus
multi-party conflict.
Situational Dimensions. Previous work has also
indicated that variables surrounding a specific conflict situation are relevant
to selecting the most appropriate conflict management strategy. Some of the most
relevant variables include whether there is high or low time pressure, whether
the conflict has a broad or narrow range of impact on the organization, whether
the conflict is in a high or low stage of escalation, and whether the disputants
have a broad or a narrow range of conflict management options available.
Lewicki and Sheppard's (1985) research, reviewed
above, demonstrated the impact of time pressure and range of impact on conflict
management strategy selection. Elangovan (1985) also includes these variables in
his managerial strategy selection model. Elangovan's (1998) research supported
that considering time pressure and dispute importance in strategy selection
decisions led to a greater degree of success in managerial conflict
interventions. Due to this empirical support, two situational dimensions were
defined: time pressure (high-low) and range of impact broad-narrow).
The literature on due process systems suggests that
how employees choose to take action on a grievance is influenced by the
accessibility and credibility of grievance procedures (Blancero & Dyer,
1996; McCabe, 1988; Shapiro & Kolb, 1994). If, for example, a company has an
ombudsperson, employees may be more willing to take action than when their
options are limited to approaching a supervisor or going over a supervisor's
head (McCabe, 1988, 1997). Situational characteristics in terms of the conflict
management options available should therefore impact a disputant's choice of
strategy. The options made available will also reflect organizational norms for
handling conflict, and thus enable or constrain a third party's options for
intervention. This literature suggests a need to add a situational dimension
called range of conflict management options available (broad-narrow). This
characteristic was identified by Sheppard (1984), as "presence of procedures or
norms regarding conflict settlement" (p. 174). Including this dimension
acknowledges that cultural constraints will influence the selection of conflict
management strategies.
The literature in dispute system design and ADR has
identified a number of ADR mechanisms and attempted to prescribe situations when
each is appropriate (Costantino & Merchant, 1996; Costello, 1996; Ury,
Brett, & Goldberg, 1988). Many previous strategy prescriptions have relied
upon the stage of the conflict, suggesting that more conciliatory models be used
in the early stages of conflicts, while more third party control should be taken
in stages of higher escalation (Prein, 1984; Thomas, 1990; Ury, Brett, &
Goldberg, 1988; Yarbrough & Wilmot, 1995). This evidence suggests the
addition of a final situational dimension encompassing the stage of the conflict
(low escalation-high escalation). A summary of the three categories of conflict
dimensions appears in Table 1.
Desired Outcomes
In order to determine how to manage a conflict
situation, it is necessary to consider a variety of desired outcomes. For
example, in a conflict with a co-worker over whether a project deadline should
be the 15th or the 30th of the month, a primary objective may be to meet your
needs (i.e., wanting a delay until the 30th), while a secondary concern may be
to preserve the relationship with your coworker. Mandelbaum and Pomerantz (1991)
have referred to these as primary and contingent goals. Because any or all of
these goals may be taken into consideration in a conflict situation, it is
necessary to investigate their role in the strategy selection process. Because
desired outcomes have traditionally been discussed from the vantage-point of the
third party or manager, the goal of this first stage of model development was to
identify the desired outcomes expected to be most relevant to disputants as well
as to third parties involved in intraorganizational conflicts.
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Third-party intervention research has relied heavily
on Sheppard's (1984) list of criteria, divided into four major categories:
fairness, participant satisfaction, effectiveness, and efficiency. Sheppard's
complete list actually revealed 21 criteria, including criteria for both the
process and outcome of a conflict management intervention. Rather than review
the complete list, the following section presents the current research relevant
to these four categories.
Prein's (1987) collection of 69 cases in which a
third party intervened resulted in a list of ten possible third-party goals.
These goals can easily be fit within three of the four major categories
presented above: fairness, satisfaction, and effectiveness. For example, Prein
found that one possible goal was to institute better rules and procedures. Such
an outcome emphasizes a concern for fairness and setting a precedent for future
behavior. A second goal found by Prein was to find a fully acceptable solution.
This outcome displays a desire for participant satisfaction.
The remaining eight third-party goals identified by
Prein (1987) all indicate concerns for the effectiveness of the solution. These
include the following goals: improve the relationship, prevent repetition, teach
parties to manage conflict more effectively in the future, work on a structural
solution by altering work structure, create more clarity, learn from the
conflict without resolving it, try to create a workable solution, and find a
pragmatic solution. The diversity of goals within the category of effectiveness
indicates that one's definition of "effectiveness" depends heavily upon
individual values and preferences. This has important implications for the
strategy a disputant or third party will choose.
An interesting twist on the discussion of third-party
goals is supplied by Putnam's (1994) analysis of managers as third parties. She
suggests that as organizational members, managers have a more political role
than external third parties and are differentially vested in conflict outcomes.
Managers may find that a conflict reflects a need for structural change and may
be in a unique position to select a strategy that focuses on an underlying
issue, rather than settlement of the individual conflict. This political
perspective indicates that generating organizational change is another possible
desired outcome, similar to Prein's (1987) identification of working on a
structural solution by altering work structure.
Thomas (1982) identified four strategic goal
dimensions based upon a content analysis of four contrasting views of normative
models of conflict management. The four dimensions included decision quality
(effectiveness), consumption of organizational resources (efficiency), and
effects upon individuals and effects upon parties' relationships, both of which
demonstrate concerns for satisfaction and long-term effectiveness. Thomas points
out that there are trade-offs involved regarding which goals can be attained. A
desired outcome will be determined by the specific conflict situation, such as a
third party's relationship to one or more disputants or the range of impact the
conflict has on the organization. Elangovan (1998) similarly recognized the need
to identify "potential sets of intervention criteria and [develop] different
models to suit them" (p. 329). This supports the need for greater attention to
the interrelationships between desired outcomes and the conflict dimensions
reviewed in the previous section.
Tyler's (1986) work in procedural justice addresses
some of these interrelationships. Tyler's examination of the connections between
goals and concerns for procedural justice revealed that when individuals have
short-term goals (goals of immediate individual gain), they are less concerned
with fairness and more concemed with individual outcomes. When people have
long-term goals (indicating willingness to defer personal achievement to
attainment of a group goal), they are more concerned with procedural justice.
This distinction may be related to the level of interdependence dimension
described earlier and suggests that procedural justice may be of greater concern
when there is a perception of high interdependence.
Tyler (1986) also connected his study to the
managerial style literature, noting that managers may be either task or
relationally focused. Task-focused managers are likely to be more concerned with
productivity, while relational managers are more likely to focus on social
harmony. Tyler found empirical evidence that only managers who had concerns for
social harmony also emphasized fairness. Tyler's work has two additional
implications for this study. One is to recognize that organizational norms
impact the desired outcomes of third parties as well as disputants. For example,
an organization that emphasizes productivity and short-term goals is less likely
to be concerned with fairness as a desired outcome. Like Morrill's (1991) study,
this indicates that less interdependent employees will manage conflict
differently than those who are more interdependent. Tyler's work also supports
the contention that desired outcomes are connected to managerial styles and
personal preferences, both of which will impact disputant and third-party
preferences in conflict management strategy selection.
In one of the few articles to address the issue of
disputant conflict resolution goals, Sander and Goldberg (1994) identified eight
of the most common disputant objectives. Three of these reveal similarities with
the managerial goals reviewed above-minimizing cost, timeliness, and maintaining
or improving the relationship. It should be noted, however, that this article
was written for attorneys who need to choose an appropriate intervention based
upon their client's goals. Concerns for cost are relevant to disputants in this
context, while they may not be as salient in an informal workplace conflict.
The five additional disputant objectives noted by
Sander and Goldberg (1994) are privacy, vindication, obtaining a neutral
opinion, establishing a precedent, and maximizing or minimizing recovery. While
this list of objectives was derived from the authors' experience rather than
empirical research, they are also deemed important by other dispute system
design practitioners and merit further examination (e.g., Costantino &
Merchant, 1996; Costello, 1996).
In some cases, a disputant or third party prefers to
use a mechanism that maintains confidentiality, including privacy from peers or
supervisors (Sheppard, 1984). On the other hand, a disputant or third party may
desire a more public forum, such as a situation in which the outcome carries
implications for future organizational practice. As an example of how different
parties to a conflict may have different desired outcomes in this public or
private realm, consider the serious example of sexual harassment. In such a
conflict, the alleged harasser may have reasons to desire privacy, such as fear
of embarrassment or loss of reputation, while the grievant may wish a public
forum in order to clarify the behaviors that are considered unacceptable.
Clearly, these goals have implications for what mechanism is used and reveal the
complexity that arises when parties' desired outcomes lead to different strategy
preferences. The desire to use a public forum may also be linked to the desire
to generate structural change (Prein, 1987; Putnam, 1994).
Related to this discussion is the possible objective
of establishing a precedent. This is akin to Lewicki and Sheppard's (1985)
"range of impact" dimension in recognizing that some conflicts are idiosyncratic
while others carry organization-wide implications. The desire to set a precedent
is therefore linked to a broad range of impact and will require a different
conflict management strategy than conflicts where this is not a desired outcome.
It should also be noted that the desire to set a precedent shows a concern with
long-term goals and, therefore, fairness (ryler, 1986).
Sometimes obtaining a neutral opinion is in itself a
desired outcome. When this is the case, it seems unlikely that disputants would
choose a manager as a third party, since the existence of a history as well as a
future relationship with the parties makes it difficult for a manager to appear,
or even act, neutral (Karambayya & Brett, 1989, 1994). This possible desired
outcome has implications for whom disputants choose as a third party. The desire
to be heard by a neutral third party displays a concern for impartiality and
also fits within the category of fairness.
The final two objectives discussed by Sander and
Goldberg (1994) are vindication and maximizing or minimizing recovery.
Vindication, or justifying one's position, may be desired by a disputant and
reveals a concern for their own satisfaction. Recovery issues are also relevant
to participant satisfaction, since a concern for recovery reflects short-term
goals (Tyler, 1986). When either vindication or recovery is the primary outcome
desired by a disputant, it would explain their determination to settle a
conflict using a formal, adjudicative process.
While dispute system design authors have been able to
link some of these desired outcomes to specific conflict mechanisms, it is
recognized that characteristics of the conflict moderate strategy selection
decisions. Table 2 presents a starting point for identifying the desired
outcomes most relevant to third-party and disputant conflict management strategy
preferences.
Conflict Management Strategies
Previous literature has tended to focus on either
third-party managerial intervention or ADR, a focus which has kept discussions
of formal and informal strategies conceptually distinct. Since this model
incorporates a wider range of strategies, the strategies discussed below include
both formal mechanisms (e.g., mediation and arbitration) as well as informal
strategies (e.g., advising) which some authors might refer to as "tactics." The
desire to include both formal and informal conflict management strategies has
been one of the challenges to parsimony in the development and presentation of
this framework.
In order to overcome this difficulty, it was
necessary to devise a typology for identification and classification of the
entire range of available strategies. Ury, Brett, and Goldberg's (1988)
presentation of three orientations to managing conflict-interests, rights, and
power-supplied this typology. In order to include the range of available
strategies, conflict management options are introduced below in relation to
whether they are interests-based (attempting to reconcile disputants' underlying
interests), rights-based (focusing on determining who is right in accordance
with some accepted guidelines for behavior), or power-based (attempting to
resolve conflicts based on who has the most power). Within each category,
strategies are further broken down into a discussion of those that are formal
versus informal and whether their use involves no third party, an intervening
manager, an intervening other, or an external third party.
Interests-Based Strategies
Negotiation, or negotiated ADR (Costantino &
Merchant, 1996), occurs when disputants reach their own settlement without
intervention by a third party. While negotiation is frequently thought of as a
formal process involving representatives for each party, this form of
negotiation is more consistent with a union than a nonunion setting. Because
this framework is intended for use in non-union settings, the only form of
negotiation that is applicable is the informal process where disputants try to
reach agreement on their own.
When disputants are unable to manage a conflict on
their own, one or both disputants may turn to a third party for advice. Kolb's
(1986) ethnographic study of ombudspersons found that third parties often use an
adv/sing strategy where they act as counselors. Advisers in Kolb's study either
spoke to a single party, acted as a go-between, or facilitated discussions
between the parties to help them see each other's point of view. Third parties
in this case may include supervisors, peers, mentors, or human resources
practitioners. Since this strategy is conceptually distinct from those where a
third party actually facilitates communication between disputants, facilitation
is discussed below as a separate interests-based strategy. Note that like
negotiation, advising or seeking advice is an informal conflict management
strategy.
Costantino and Merchant (1996) have grouped a number
of third-party strategies under the heading of facilitated ADR. Their definition
of facilitated ADR includes any strategy where a third party assists disputants
in reaching an agreement. In each of these models of intervention, the third
party is considered "neutral" and their role is to facilitate a settlement
without any control over the final outcome (Costantino & Merchant, 1996).
Researchers have identified several facilitated strategies, ranging from the
least to most directive intervention, including moderation (Thomas, 1990),
conciliation (Deutsch, 1991; Fisher & Keashly, 1991), and consultation
(Fisher & Keashly, 1991; Thomas, 1990).
Facilitated strategies are commonly defined as
problem-solving. Prein's (1987) study of external third parties found support
for a strategy called a "procedural approach," where third parties placed
emphasis on problem identification and problem-solving procedures. Kolb and
Glidden (1986) also found that third parties sometimes take on a problem-solving
role. In their study, they used the term "problem solver" to refer to a
collaborative strategy where third parties encouraged the open sharing of
information to settle conflicts in a way that promoted understanding and
prevented recurrence of the conflict. Ewing's (1989) case studies of due process
procedures indicated that when presented with employee conflicts that were not
eligible for formal procedures, intake staff used informal procedures including
facilitation of problem solving.
Due to the similarities among the previous
strategies, all of the strategies where a third party assists disputants in
problem solving are included in the model under the umbrella term facilitation.
Note that facilitators may include intervening managers (although there is no
empirical support suggesting managers use this form of intervention),
intervening others (particularly ombudspersons or HR practitioners), or external
third parties (such as consultants).
The final interests-based conflict management
strategy is mediation (Costantino & Merchant, 1996; Deutsch, 1991; Fisher
& Keashly, 1991; Karambayya & Brett, 1994; Kauffman & Davis, 1990;
Thomas, 1990; Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988; Yarbrough & Wilmot, 1995).
While this is another example of facilitated ADR, the tactics used may be
different from those used in problem solving and the strategies are therefore
treated individually. While there is no consensus on the exact role of the
mediator, the most basic definition suggests that mediation involves
intervention by a neutral third party who guides the process but allows
disputants control over the outcome (Sheppard, 1984). The mediator may provide
information concerning relevant legal issues, help parties engage in perspective
taking, guide parties toward a realistic settlement, help improve the
relationship between disputants, or engage in some combination of these tactics.
While Sheppard (1984) included mediation in his
typology of third-party strategies, he indicated that managers were not likely
to use it. This finding has been confirmed by subsequent research suggesting
that managers are too accustomed to their decision-making role to act as
mediators (Kolb & Sheppard, 1985; Lewicki & Sheppard, 1985). Conlon,
Carnevale, and Murninghan (1994) have demonstrated that managers' conflict
management behavior may resemble a hybrid strategy they call intravention. In
intravention, third parties begin by mediating, but have the option to impose a
solution if they think mediation is taking too long or believe disputants will
not come to a solution on their own. Empirical support for the use of this
strategy indicates that managers may use a combination of interestsand
power-based strategies in their approach to conflict management.
Shapiro and Rosen's (1994) investigation of
managerial intervention strategies found support for managers' use of mediation.
By including ratings of mediation self-efficacy in their study, they concluded
that managers who perceived higher self-efficacy with mediation were more likely
to use it. This has obvious implications for the role of conflict management
training in increasing the range of conflict management strategies used by a
third party.
Karambayya and Brett (1989) integrated the strategies
suggested by Sheppard (1984) and Kolb (1986) and asked participants to engage in
a series of conflict simulations. A questionnaire then asked participants to
provide disputants' perceptions of third-party roles, outcomes, and the fairness
of procedures. A factor analysis of results found support for mediation,
although their definition of the strategy was markedly different from those
described above. Items included in the mediator factor were described as similar
to the behaviors performed by mediators in the legal setting where questions are
asked, proposals are integrated, and managers shuttle back and forth between
disputants to try to resolve a conflict.
The preceding discussion reveals that there is a
substantial body of research on the use of mediation as a strategy for
intraorganizational conflict management. Research on organizational due process
procedures reveals that companies are beginning to include internal mediation in
their informal processes. Organizations may train ombudspersons, human resources
staff, or peer mediators to manage conflicts that are inappropriate for formal
procedures (Dibble, 1997; Harness & Mook, 1997; Ritzky, 1994; Simon &
Sochynsky, 1995). In some cases, companies even provide for the use of external
mediation as part of a formal process. Unfortunately, the question of when
mediation is used, either as an internal or external option, remains unclear
(Ritzky, 1994). It is generally assumed that mediation is only formal (utilizing
an external service provider) when it is court mandated.
In summary, four main types of interests-based
strategies were identified as relevant to intraorganizational conflict
management: negotiation, advising, facilitation, and mediation. All of these
strategies are informal, with the exception that mediation might also be a
formal strategy when it involves the use of an external provider. With the
exception of negotiation, all interests-based strategies involve a third party.
Intervening managers, intervening others, and external third parties may all
potentially use these interests-based strategies. Previous research has
determined that intervening managers or intervening others are most likely to
use advising, while intervening others or external third parties are most likely
to use facilitation or mediation.
Rights-Based Strategies
Because most dispute systems have been designed to
handle grievances, a number of formal, rights-based strategies may be found in
the organiZational Context. Formal rights-based strategies are usually carried
out by a designated human resources representative or a senior executive officer
of the organization (Ewing, 1989). Companies may also utilize an ombudsperson or
a peer review board in their grievance process. In rare cases an external third
party, such as an arbitrator, may become involved as well. Research has also
revealed informal strategies that adopt a rights-based orientation. Since these
have been less widely discussed, evidence of informal rights-based strategies
will be reviewed first, followed by the formal strategies that comprise many
grievance procedures.
Sheppard's (1984) framework of third-party
intervention included two strategies that place the third party in a judge-like
role. Adversarial intervention is described as a courtroom style procedure
wherein disputants have control over the presentation of their case and the
manager determines an appropriate solution. Inquisitorial intervention is
similar, except that the manager assumes more control over the process by asking
the disputants questions rather than allowing them fun control over case
presentation. In both of these strategies, the conflict is framed as a win-lose
situation and the third party acts as the judge. While the third party does
retain outcome control, the fact that disputants are given an opportunity to
present their case and influence the final decision should result in higher
perceptions of fairness and satisfaction with outcomes (Shapiro, 1993). This is
significantly different from a third-party strategy where an outcome is
determined autocratically, without giving consideration to disputants' arguments
or opinions.
In two studies of managerial intervention strategies
Karambayya and Brett (1989, 1994) have confirmed that managers do perform a
judge-like role. In the 1989 study discussed earlier, Karambayya and Brett found
evidence of a strategy they called inquisitor, supporting Sheppard's (1984)
inquisitorial intervention strategy. The term arbitrator has also been used to
describe managerial intervention activities, illustrating that managers are
likely to emulate more formal rights-based interventions in the process of
informal conflict management (Karambayya & Brett, 1994; Kolb & Glidden,
1986; Olson-Buchanan et al., 1998). While it is possible that an intervening
other could also perform these informal rights-based strategies, disputants are
less likely to accept outcome control from a peer (Keashly & Newberry,
1995). When intervening others use rights-based strategies, it is more likely to
be in conjunction with a formal grievance process.
While the most common in-house conflict management
designs are opendoor policies (Ewing, 1989; Lipsky & Seeber, 1997; McCabe,
1988; McDermott, 1995), the informal nature of these policies combined with
employees' fears of negative repercussions has resulted in the creation of more
formal venues for expressing grievances. One strategy employed by organizational
due process procedures is investigation. An investigator has no power to impose
a solution. The purpose of this strategy is to listen to the employee's problem,
conduct an investigation, and determine the most appropriate course of action.
This strategy is generally referred to as fact-finding in ADR parlance
(Costantino & Merchant, 1996).
Another strategy that may be combined with
investigation or fact-finding is internal adjudication. The adjudicator may be a
senior executive or a peer review board made up of a combination of managers and
lower-level employees (Ewing, 1989; McCabe, 1988; McDermott, 1995). Formal
adjudicative strategies are only available for conflicts involving alleged
violations of company policy, such as wrongful termination claims, safety
hazards, or unwarranted disciplinary action. Adjudicators are only granted the
authority to interpret right or wrong. They do not have the authority to change
policy or offer alternative solutions to the conflict (Ewing, 1989; McCabe,
1988). This is another clear example of a formal, rightsbased third-party
intervention.
There are also non-binding rights-based strategies,
known as advisory ADR (Costantino & Merchant, 1996). Advisory ADR strategies
enlist the services of an external third party and may range from relatively
simple to elaborate procedures. Some of these include private judging,
mini-trials, summary jury trials, early neutral evaluation, and advisory
arbitration (Costantino & Merchant, 1996; Costello, 1996; Singer, 1990).
Each of these methods entails some degree of presentation of arguments and
evidence to a third party who makes a finding which is then used by the parties
to determine how to proceed. For example, if parties who feel confident they
will win in court are advised that their case is not very strong, they may be
more inclined to agree to mediation (of course, the reverse is also true).
Because these strategies tend to be expensive and time-consuming, they are more
likely to be used in complex inter-organizational conflicts (Costello, 1996).
Because advisory ADR has the potential to induce disputants to try mediation, it
may be used in certain types of intraorganizational disputes and is included in
this framework.
Some organizational grievance procedures offer
arbitration as the final level of appeal (Ewing, 1989; McCabe, 1988). While
organizations have traditionally been reluctant to have an outsider interpret
and make binding decisions regarding their internal policies, many have realized
that they need to include an arbitration option to demonstrate to employees that
they are willing to limit their authority (McCabe, 1997; Peterson, 1994). As
with internal adjudicators, arbitrators are limited to making an interpretation
of policy and do not judge the fairness of a policy or suggest creative
solutions (McCabe, 1988).
In review, rights-based strategies may be informal,
such as the use of adversarial and inquisitorial intervention by managers. On
the formal side, rights-based strategies are often found as part of
organizational grievance procedures. Intervening others may use fact-finding or
adjudicative strategies, while external third parties may be called in under
special circumstances (such as human rights violations that have potential for
litigation) to use the strategies of advisory or binding arbitration.
Power-Based Strategies
Because the goal of ADR is to offer less adversarial
approaches to conflict management than are provided in the courts, it is not
surprising that the dispute system design research emphasizes interests- and
rights-based strategies. Due to the significance of the role of power in
organizations, however, it would be an oversight not to include power-based
approaches in a comprehensive model of intraorganizational conflict management.
In the organizational context, power-based approaches
may be used by a variety of organizational members. Intervening managers and
intervening others may act autocratically, either by imposing a solution or
restructuring work assignments to minimize interdependence of the disputants
(Karambayya & Brett, 1994; Kolb, 1986). Managers may also use the strategy
of providing impetus, offering the threat of punishment or promise of a reward,
to coerce disputants to settle conflicts on their own (Karambayya & Brett,
1989; Sheppard, 1984). The strategy of providing impetus was prevalent among the
managers interviewed by Sheppard (1984) and has found considerable support from
other studies as well.
Irving and Meyer (1997) conducted a multidimensional
scaling analysis of managerial styles and found that managers tend to either
approach or avoid conflict. When managers prefer not to get involved,
threatening disputants that they had better manage the problem on their own
provides managers with a quick way out. Morrill's (1991) work also documented
managerial tendencies to confront or avoid conflict. In addition, Prein's (1987)
four categories of third-party intervention strategies included one labeled
"powerless or unsure third party," while Shapiro and Rosen (1994) also reported
a managerial strategy of "overlooking." All of these studies illustrate that
third parties (particularly managers) often prefer to avoid dealing directly
with conflict.
Even when intervening managers or intervening others
start out using an interests-based approach, such as mediation, they may be
likely to use their power to promote or enforce a particular solution. This is
the premise behind intravention, as discussed above (Conlon, Carnevale, &
Murninghan, 1994). Ewing's (1989) case studies also reported that even when
mediation was used as part of a due process procedure, it was really "power
mediation," where disputants were strongly encouraged to accept a mediated
settlement rather than moving on to more formal strategies that might result in
negative repercussions.
Prior research suggests that there are times when
power-based strategies are appropriate, such as when there is high time
pressure, low interdependence, and a broad range of impact (Elangovan, 1998;
Lewicki & Sheppard, 1985). Powerbased strategies may also be expected by the
disputing parties when the third party is seen as an expert or in control over
the issue in conflict (Keashly & Newberry, 1995).
In addition to the power-based strategies reviewed
above, third parties or disputants may recognize that the source of a conflict
is structural and that a rebalancing of power to generate organizational change
is necessary (Rummel, 1976). This is the position taken by Pondy (1992) and
Putnam (1994) when they recommend that managers assume the role of conflict
orchestrator. This strategy would entail renaming conflicts to introduce the
underlying causes rather than dealing with surface issues. The desire to examine
underlying issues may be particularly salient when a conflict is rooted in
cultural differences or diversity (Donnellon & Kolb, 1994). While there is
little empirical data to provide exemplars of the use of this strategy in
organizations, much theoretical work suggests that managers should take on this
proactive role as conflict orchestrator (Burton, 1990; Clegg, 1994; Donnellon
& Kolb, 1994; Pondy, 1992; Putnam, 1994).
Disputants may also use power-based approaches to
conflict management. They may appeal to higher levels of authority, for example,
to overturn a supervisor's decision. When this is done by virtue of
"connections," it is an even more apparent use of referent power (French &
Raven, 1959). Disputants may also use threats to coerce another party to submit
to their will, especially when a disputant has higher status (Morrill, 1992;
Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988). Employees may also build coalitions to
influence group or organizational decisions (Murninghan, 1986) or in an attempt
to coerce an employer to change organizational practices (Clegg, 1994).
Coalitions are also likely in organizations that
utilize voting in their decisionmaking processes (Murninghan, 1986). Voting is
an example of a more formal power-based strategy because the contingency with
the most influence wins (Ury, Brett, & Goldberg, 1988). A final example of a
formal power-based strategy is the use of strikes or lockouts, although these
are most commonly found in the unionized workplace. The point is that all
employees, from the lowest level employees to highest level managers, have the
option to choose power-based methods, and with the exception of Ury, Brett, and
Goldberg (1988), dispute system design research has ignored this area of
organizational conflict management. A model that attempts to include a
comprehensive typology of intraorganizational conflict management strategies
must give attention to power-based alternatives.
As indicated above, power-based strategies are most
likely to be used by intervening managers, higher status intervening others, or
disputants themselves. External third parties are the least likely to use
power-based approaches to conflict management as they usually lack the necessary
power and credibility.
The preceding discussion has illustrated the variety
of strategies that are potentially available to help manage intraorganizational
conflicts. Previous typologies have focused on either managerial intervention,
formal grievance procedures, or ADR. This has left a number of strategies
potentially under-investigated: those used by internal intervening others
(non-managers) and those used by external third parties who are not arbitrators,
such as consultants. More complete knowledge of the strategies used by all types
of third parties would provide organizational members with greater awareness of
their conflict management options and assistance with the selection of the most
appropriate strategy for a given conflict situation.
Using the preceding discussion as a guide, a new
framework which identifies the entire range of potential intraorganizational
conflict management strategies is illustrated in Table 3. This framework
requires conceptualization of a three dimensional grid which includes: the
orientation to conflict management (interests, rights, or power), the formality
of the procedure, (informal or formal), and the location of a third party (if
any) in relation to the organization (none, intervening manager, intervening
other, and external). Used in concert, these three dimensions help clarify the
specific conflict management options that might be available for a given
conflict. The theoretical framework that results from this literature review is
depicted in Figure 1.
Implications for Research
.jpg) |
|
The goal of this paper was to review the literature
that informed the initial framework for a model for the assessment and
management of intraorganizational conflict. In order for this framework to move
from a heuristic device to a practical tool for organizational members,
additional research is needed. Efforts to empirically investigate the utility of
this framework and suggest relationships among its components have been
undertaken in two ways. In the first phase of research, focus groups with
working MBA students were conducted to explore perceptions of conflict and
conflict management in the workplace in order to inductively generate a list of
the relevant conflict characteristics, desired outcomes, and conflict management
strategies. Results from this research were then used to modify the framework
and reduce the number of variables to make the resulting model more
parsimonious. The focus group research also resulted in a set of hypotheses and
research questions for continued investigation of the relationships among the
conflict characteristics, desired outcomes, and conflict management strategies
included in the framework.
In phase two of the research, a survey instrument was
developed to test these hypotheses and investigate the additional research
questions raised by the focus group interviews. The survey was administered to
working graduate students (primarily MBA students) and the employees of two
private organizations. A total of 571 surveys were collected. Initial data
analyses indicate that the framework indeed has utility for the assessment of
intraorganizational conflicts and strategy selection decisions. Due to space
limitations, the specifics of these qualitative and quantitative research
efforts and results must be reserved for future discussion.
Additional research is also needed to transform this
framework into a testable model with application to a variety of organizational
contexts. First, all of the variables included in the components of this
framework must be examined to reveal how different combinations of conflict
characteristics and managerial and nonmanagerial desired outcomes lead to the
selection of different conflict management strategies. Second, results
demonstrating the impact of specific variables such as time pressure, type of
conflict, and relational history on conflict management strategy choices should
be compared with the findings of Elangovan (1998) to continue to build a
comprehensive contingency-based model of organizational conflict management.
Third, while sensitivity to the topic creates considerable challenges to
engaging in fieldwork on organizational conflict, in-depth case studies of
organizations with existing conflict management processes are needed.
Case studies would accomplish a number of goals. They
would make it possible to compare the prescriptions offered by current theories
to actual decisionmaking processes. Case studies would also allow for
measurement of the effectiveness of following versus not following these
prescriptions (much like Elangovan's 1998 work). The opportunity to undertake
detailed case studies would also enable researchers to determine ways in which
the features of unique environments impact conflict and the strategy selection
process, making it possible to suggest strategies for adapting contingency-based
models to a variety of organizational contexts. Finally, case studies would
enable further exploration of the ways in which conflict is productive for
organizations and provide guidelines for the selection of strategies that
maximize conflict's generative potential. Further investigation of the processes
of organizational conflict and conflict management would enhance efforts to
develop a truly comprehensive model that addresses the myriad issues with which
organizations may be faced.
.jpg) |
|
| [Footnote] |
| Note: The author would like to acknowledge Tricia
Jones of the Department of Communication Sciences, Temple University, as
well as two anonymous IJCM reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier
drafts of this paper. |
| [Footnote] |
| Received: June 3, 1998 |
| Accepted after two revisions: July 15, 1999
|
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|
| [Author Affiliation] |
| Jessica Katz Jameson |
| North Carolina State University
|
| [Author Affiliation] |
| Biographical Note |
| [Author Affiliation] |
| Jessica Katz Jameson |
| North Carolina State University Department of
Communication Campus Box 8104 Raleigh, NC 27695-104 Phone/Fax:
919-513-1477/515-9456 Email: [email protected]
|
| [Author Affiliation] |
| Dr. Jameson is an Assistant Professor of Communication
at North Carolina State University where she teaches courses in
organizational communication and conflict management. She received her
Ph.D. from Temple University. Dr. Jameson's current research interests
include third-party intervention, dispute system design, and the role of
emotion in organizational conflict management. |
My Research