Metaphors of Protest: A Classification of Motivations for Collective Action

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This article proposes a classification of motivations for collective action based in three of Tetlock’s (2002) metaphors of social functionalism (i.e., people as intuitive economists, politicians, and theologians). We use these metaphors to map individual- and group-based motivations for collective action from the literature onto the distinction between individuals who are strongly or weakly identified with their social group. We conclude that low identifiers can be best understood as intuitive economists (supported by both early and recent work on collective action), whereas high identifiers can be best thought of as intuitive politicians or theologians (as recent work on social identity has started to explore). Interestingly, our classification reveals a remarkable lack of attention for the intuitive theologian’s motivation for collective action. We therefore develop new hypotheses for future research, and derive recommendations for policy and practice from our analysis.

Many people may remember the World Press Photo 1989: A young Chinese man stands passively in Tiananmen Square to block the path of a Chinese tank. This powerful picture raises many questions, one of which is why people protest. Historically, most theory and research on collective action has been driven by individuals’ pursuit of rational self-interest (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Oberschall, 1973; Olson, 1968). However, this motivation does not appear to offer much help in understanding the Chinese man trying to stop a tank; in fact, it would be a substantial understatement to say that the risk of being overrun

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We thank Hein Lodewijkx and Agneta Fischer for their comments on a previous draft of this article.
by tons of steel constitutes a big cost to the individual. Therefore, additional group-based motivations for collective action have been proposed to better understand and appreciate why individuals protest in terms of their social identity (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Reicher, 1996, 2001; Simon et al., 1998). The main aim of this article is to provide a classification of individual-based and group-based motivations for collective action that identifies theoretical and empirical gaps in the literature, and to develop new hypotheses and recommendations for policy and practice.

We seek to meet this aim by applying three of Tetlock’s (2002) metaphors of social functionalism to the collective action literature. We first identify theory and research on collective action that assumes humans to be intuitive economists (Edwards, 1962) who aim to achieve individual goals through collective action. Then we identify more recent theorizing on collective action that assumes people to be intuitive politicians and theologians (Tetlock, 2002) who aim to achieve group goals through collective action.\(^1\) We will argue that low identifiers with a social group are more likely to resemble intuitive economists whereas high identifiers are more likely to resemble intuitive politicians and theologians.\(^2\) Moreover, we will argue that progress and innovation in theory and research on collective action lies in the group-based metaphors in general, and in the intuitive theologian metaphor in particular. We therefore link recent theorizing on moral conviction (e.g., Skitka, Bauman, & Sargis, 2005; Tetlock, Kirstel, Elson, Green, & Lerner, 2000) to the collective action literature, develop new hypotheses for future research to explore, and apply our analysis to inform recommendations for policy and practice.

**Metaphors of Protest**

Social behavior is difficult to understand without some kind of social functionalist perspective (Tetlock, 2002). Even the most formal theories of social behavior already subscribe to some form of social functionalism the moment they assume that individuals (either implicitly or explicitly, either consciously or nonconsciously) are motivated to achieve particular goals. Indeed, most theories assume that there is at least some reason that people think, feel, and act the way they do. However, there are multiple perspectives on humans as motivated goal achievers. At the individual level, one can view humans as intuitive economists (Edwards, 1962) who seek to maximize subjective utility. People may protest

\(^1\) *Group based* means here that intuitive politicians and theologians’ motivations transcend intra-individual functions. Furthermore, it should be noted that although Tetlock (2002) also identified the metaphor of the intuitive scientist (who is motivated to reduce subjective uncertainty) and the intuitive prosecutor (who is motivated to hold others accountable), both are beyond the scope of this article.

\(^2\) In line with the social identity and collective action literature we use “low” and “high” identifiers to differentiate the relative strength of group identification (i.e., “lower” vs. “higher” identifiers).
only when the individual benefits of taking action (e.g., lower taxes) outweigh its individual costs (e.g., time and effort). This metaphor is thus based in the individual, and assumes an intra-psychic function of social judgment, motivating people to focus on personal costs and benefits to achieve favorable individual change (i.e., changing the individual’s relationship with external reality).

However, Tetlock (2002) also proposed group-based metaphors of social judgment and choice that are embedded in the larger social structure: intuitive politicians and theologians. In the context of collective action, these metaphors can be seen as motivations for social change (i.e., positively changing the group’s relationship with external reality), which derive from the social identities that embed individuals in the larger social structure (i.e., being a woman, American, or gay). Whereas intuitive politicians’ motivation for collective action is based in their accountability to different social groups (e.g., protesters symbolically burning U.S. flags in the face of the White House in front of television cameras), intuitive theologians’ motivation is based in their defense of fundamental values that govern their social life (e.g., protesters against abortion or homosexuality). These two metaphors thus acknowledge the group-based nature of individuals’ different motivations for collective action to achieve social change, and explicitly connect individuals through their social identities with the larger social context (that also includes social and economic conditions that may be associated with group membership).

The distinction between individual- and group-based motivations fits nicely with insights from the social identity approach on the difference between personal and social identities (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Reicher, 1996, 2001; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Social identity theory (SIT) proposes that social identity, defined as “that part of an individual’s self-concept which derives from . . . knowledge of . . . membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63), is key to collective action. Collective action can be defined thus: “a group member engages in collective action strategies anytime that he or she is acting as a representative of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group” (Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990, p. 995). SIT suggests that people identify with a low-status (or disadvantaged) group to mobilize for collective action to achieve social change, and predicts that people will do so more strongly when sociostructural factors like the instability and illegitimacy of the intergroup status differential suggest more hope and scope for social change, and when intergroup boundaries are impermeable (Ellemers, 1993; Tajfel, 1978). In line with these ideas, Bettencourt, Charlton, Dorr, and Hume (2001) showed meta-analytic evidence for the influence of these sociostructural factors, and Van Zomeren, Postmes, and Spears (2008) for the effect of group identification on collective action. Indeed, the extent to which individuals identify with their group explains the
effect of these sociostructural factors on collective action (Mummendey, Kessler, Klink, & Mielke, 1999; Tajfel, 1978).

However, high and low identifiers with a low-status group differ in more than only their strength of identification and their participation in collective action. For example, stronger group identification relates to stronger group-level self-definition and perception (e.g., perceiving the self and the social world in terms of “we” and “they”; Ellemers et al., 1999), and with stronger emotional experience on the basis of group membership (e.g., experiencing group-based anger and action tendencies to confront the outgroup; Van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004; Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2008). Furthermore, high identifiers tend to stick with their group in times of trouble or threat because they are strongly committed to achieve social change (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1997). Low identifiers, on the other hand, only do so when external, instrumental factors suggest that social change also fosters individual change. For example, Doosje, Spears, and Ellemers (2002) observed that low identifiers pragmatically felt more connected to their low-status group when there was hope and scope for the group to achieve higher intergroup status. Similarly, Van Zomeren, Spears, and Leach (2008) found lower identifiers to be more motivated for collective action when their instrumental group efficacy beliefs were stronger.

We therefore propose that low identifiers’ motivations for collective action typically differ from those of high identifiers. More specifically, low identifiers should be motivated to achieve individual change (resembling the intuitive economist), whereas high identifiers should be motivated to achieve social change (resembling the intuitive politician or theologian). Below we map existing theory and research on collective action onto this classification of motivations for collective action.

A Classification of Motivations for Collective Action

As noted in the introduction to this issue, early work on collective action emphasized objective status variables as predictors of social protest (e.g., Davies, 1962; Gurr, 1970; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1968). Such frameworks proposed that structural status differences between groups (as measured by various indicators such as wealth and health) explained low-status group members’ participation in collective action to achieve social equality. In these approaches, less attention was paid to the role of individuals’ subjective perceptions, beliefs, and

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3The use of general metaphors allows for an examination of where collective action researchers have hitherto based their theories on. However, these metaphors can never fully account for the rich and complex ideas about individuals’ motivation for collective action, nor are they intended to be. It is not the purpose of this article to reduce theories to one-liner aphorisms that are presented as if they completely reflect these theories. The three metaphors should thus not to be interpreted as advocates of reductionism, but as underlying guiding assumptions of theories of collective action.
emotions in motivating efforts to create social change. However, as can be seen in all contributions to this issue, recent theory and research focuses mainly on these psychological variables, both in relation to the individual (e.g., individual cost–benefit calculations), and to the individual in the context of the larger social structure (e.g., through individuals’ social identity).

Within this psychological perspective, there is some consensus that individuals’ subjective sense of group-based injustice, efficacy, and identity are important explanations of collective action (Klandermans, 1997; for a meta-analysis, see Van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Some approaches focus on instrumental explanations of collective action that emphasize individuals’ calculation of costs and benefits (Klandermans, 1984; Stürmer & Simon, 2004), their sense of efficacy to solve group-related problems such as collective disadvantage (Hornsey et al., 2006; Mummendey et al., 1999; Van Zomeren et al., 2004), or the mobilization of resources that help to bring about social change (McCarthy & Zald, 1977). Alternatively, approaches like relative deprivation theory (Crosby, 1982; Runciman, 1966; Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Start, & Williams, 1949; Walker & Smith, 2002) and SIT (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) focused on the role of injustice and identity variables in collective action. For example, Smith and Ortiz (2002) showed meta-analytically that defining relative deprivation as group-based motivates collective action more than defining it as individual-based (see also Dubé-Simard & Guimond, 1986; Kawakami & Dion, 1995; Smith & Spears, 1996). Moreover, research has shown that enacting one’s social identity through collective action empowers relatively powerless individuals (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1996). We propose that these subjective predictors of collective action map nicely onto the individual-based and group-based metaphors of protest, and their application to low and high identifiers.

**Intuitive Economists**

A core assumption about human motivation is that people are individual-based intuitive economists (Edwards, 1962) who make social judgments and decisions by calculating the costs and benefits of a particular action and its anticipated consequences. Individuals choose the type of judgment or action that maximizes their individual gains and minimizes their individual losses (i.e., maximizing subjective utility). This motivation for collective action is reflected in early but influential sociological work on collective action (e.g., Olson, 1968), which heavily influenced later approaches to collective action in terms of its individual rationality assumption (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Simon et al., 1998).

More specifically, early sociological work focused on the “free-rider” problem of collective action (Olson, 1968). Olson framed collective action as a social dilemma, which raised the problem of “free-riding” that arises when rational actors
individually decide whether to engage in collective action to maximize subjective utility. The basis of this problem is that collective benefits are not fungible in the sense that they are like a public good: Once achieved, everybody profits from it. The possible costs, however, are individual costs because one needs to decide to participate without the guarantee that others will join. The ideal solution for each rational actor is therefore to do nothing (i.e., take a “free ride”), and hope that others do the protesting.

Klandermans (1984) developed this line of thought further by specifying three cost–benefit motives for collective action: The collective motive, and the social and reward motives (for a review see Stürmer & Simon, 2004). The first motive captures the value of the instrumental goal of a collective action for the individual, and the individual’s expectation that collective action will achieve this goal. The social motive represents the individual’s value of what significant others think about collective action, and his or her expectation that they will approve or disapprove of collective action. The reward motive is characterized by individual costs and benefits of collective action (such as missing an important meeting or having to spend a lot of time and effort). These motives all focus on planned and intentional behavior, which fits with the metaphor of the calculating intuitive economist (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975).

Olson’s work also influenced other approaches in terms of its premise of individual-based rationality (for a similar individual interest theme within analytic Marxism, see Elster, 1989). For example, resource mobilization theory (McCarthy & Zald, 1977) focused on the macrolevel of collective action phenomena like the power politics between social movement organizations and authorities. The theory assumed that social protest constitutes a set of rational collective actions by groups to advance their collective interests, pressuring those in power to submit to the demands of the aggrieved. However, its exclusive focus on the macro-level often left resource mobilization theorists to view people as intuitive economists. Other approaches referred in this respect to individuals’ subjective sense of group efficacy as a motivation for collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; Mummendey et al., 1999; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). This concept refers to expectations that one’s group is able to achieve social change through collective action. The more resources one can mobilize, the more people should believe their group to be efficacious.

In sum, our analysis suggests that both individual cost–benefit calculations and group efficacy beliefs represent motivations of the intuitive economist in collective action research (see Table 1). Although Klandermans (1984) was criticized for being too individualistic (see Schrager, 1985), the three cost–benefit motives have been shown to predict collective action among various social movements (e.g., Klandermans, 1984; Stürmer & Simon, 2004). Moreover, group efficacy beliefs also predict collective action (Hornsey et al., 2006; Mummendey et al., 1999; Van Zomeren et al., 2004). However, two developments in social psychology challenge
Table 1. A Classification of Motivations of Collective Action

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<tr>
<th>Low Identifiers</th>
<th>→ Intuitive Economists</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maximize subjective utility (Olson, 1968)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Calculation of costs and benefits (Klandermans, 1984; Stürmer &amp; Simon, 2004)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Group efficacy beliefs (Mummendey et al., 1999; Van Zomeren et al., 2004)</td>
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<tr>
<th>High Identifiers</th>
<th>→ Intuitive Politicians</th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Maintain positive identities vis-à-vis social groups to whom one is accountable (Reicher et al., 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Awareness that power struggle is fought out in the public domain (Simon &amp; Klandermans, 2001)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>→ Intuitive Theologians</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Defend “sacred” norms and values from secular encroachment (Skitka et al., 2005; Tetlock, 2002)</td>
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the universality of the traditional *homo economicus* assumptions inherent in the intuitive economist metaphor.

First, the “cognitive revolution” in psychology generally cast doubt on individuals’ capability to calculate costs and benefits to assess where maximal utility lies. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) showed that people use specific heuristics for social judgment. Rather than calculating each and every anticipated individual cost and benefit, people use rules of thumb, make errors of judgment, and often show self-serving biases (see Kunda, 1990). Thus, individuals were not always the precise intuitive economists some had suspected them to be. Second, and more relevant to our argument, individuals’ motivations for collective action do not form and occur in a social vacuum. Because individuals have social identities that connect them with the larger social structure, being a member of a low-status group motivates social competition for status (Tajfel, 1978). As noted, individuals become more motivated to engage in collective action through their stronger psychological identification with their low-status group under sociostructural conditions of illegitimacy and instability of the intergroup status differential, and the impermeability of intergroup boundaries (Bettencourt et al., 2001; Ellemers, 1993; Mummendey et al., 1999; Simon et al., 1998; for a review see Stürmer & Simon, 2004). This analysis fits nicely with the idea that low identifiers reflect intuitive economists (calculating individual interests as *homo economicus*), whereas high identifiers reflect intuitive politicians and intuitive theologians (where other principles come into play and even take precedence, such as displayed by *homo politicus* and *homo moralis*).4

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4We use the *intuitive politician* metaphor with regard to high identifiers, but we acknowledge that low identifiers can be strategic too regarding their personal interests (e.g., Doosje et al., 2002; for a
Intuitive Politicians

Individuals need a social compass that allows them to navigate through their social web of accountabilities to different social groups (e.g., to their fellow group members, but also to the powerful authorities) in order to survive and prosper as group members (Tetlock, 2002). More specifically, the key to the intuitive politician metaphor is individuals’ motivation to achieve social change despite intergroup differences in power. Intuitive politicians’ motivation lies in “the knowledge that one is under the evaluative scrutiny of important constituencies in one’s life who control valuable resources and who have some legitimate right to inquire into the reasons behind one’s opinions or decisions. This knowledge activates the goal of establishing or preserving a desired social identity vis-à-vis these constituencies” (Tetlock, 2002, p. 454, italics added). In other words, intuitive politicians care deeply about accountability concerns because they are aware that social change can be resisted and even thwarted by those in power. Therefore intuitive politicians anticipate the effects of their behavior on others who have some degree of social control or influence in promoting, or preventing, social change (e.g., fellow group members). Indeed, those in power are typically motivated and capable to resist social change (e.g., Reicher, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). The notion of intergroup power differences thus extends the traditional emphasis of SIT on the intergroup status differential between groups (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also Sachdev & Bourhis, 1985).

Two recent developments in the collective action literature speak to this view of people as group-based intuitive politicians. First, the social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE for short; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995; Spears & Lea, 1994; for a review see Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007) extends SIT by suggesting that low-status group members strategically communicate their willingness to engage in collective action to different audiences. In another extension of SIT, Simon and Klandermans (2001) proposed that social identity becomes particularly important to collective action when social identity becomes politicized. People with a politicized identity are more self-conscious about the societal power struggle that is fought out in the public arena, and hence their identity has collective action as its raison d’être. In line with these ideas, the Elaborated Social Identity Model (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Reicher, 1998)
suggests that politicization of an identity helps relatively powerless individuals to have a collective influence.

Firstly, research on the SIDE model (e.g., Reicher & Levine, 1994; Reicher, Levine, & Gordijn, 1998; Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2006; Spears, Lea, Cornelussen, Postmes, & Ter Haar, 2002; Van Zomeren, Spears, & Leach, 2009) suggests that an intergroup or intragroup communication context presents different strategic, communicative possibilities for low-status group members. An intergroup channel of communication imposes accountability to the out-group, whereas an intragroup channel of communication imposes accountability to (and provides access and exposure to) the in-group. This is important because powerful out-groups have the power to sanction or punish the in-group for communicating a desire for social change unless the in-group has the power to challenge them, whereas communicating a desire for social change to fellow group members can mobilize the in-group for collective action by providing social support. Indeed, research has shown that when people are anonymous to out-group members and identifiable to fellow group members (such that they are able to coordinate and express mutual support) they are more likely to express those aspects of their social identity punishable by the out-group. This exemplifies the motivation of the intuitive politician to achieve social change while maintaining a positive identity vis-à-vis fellow group members or those in power.

This analysis implies a substantial shift in the interpretation of the lack of collective action. Whereas intuitive economists would not act because of the seduction of free-riding, a perceived lack of group efficacy, or their assessment of stronger costs than benefits, intuitive politicians may remain inactive when facing those in power because they do not want their goal (i.e., social change) to be thwarted by foolish and dangerous provocations (Gramsci’s “pessimism of the intellect”). Indeed, recent research has shown that individuals therefore only communicate their anger and willingness to protest when facing those in power when they feel sufficiently powerful to challenge them (Van Zomeren et al., 2009). Moreover, in line with the notion that intuitive politicians’ motivation for collective action is group-based, high identifiers were found to be more strategic in these communications than low identifiers (Van Zomeren & Spears, 2009). Thus, intuitive politicians can be seen as “entrepreneurs of identity” (Besson, 1991; Reicher & Hopkins, 2001), who strategically take into account the audiences to which they communicate their desire for achieving social change.

A second theoretical development concerns Simon, Stürmer, and colleagues’ argument that identification with a social movement organization is more important to collective action than identification with the disadvantaged group because the former is a politicized form of identity (for a review, see Stürmer & Simon, 2004). As Simon and Klandermans (2001) proposed, people “evince politicized collective identity to the extent that they engage as self-conscious group members in a power struggle on behalf of their group knowing that it is the more inclusive
societal context in which this struggle has to be fought out” (p. 319, italics added). They argue that people can develop “activist” identities that include a focus on third-party support for their struggle. Politicized identity develops when people perceive shared grievances, make adversarial attributions, and realize the involvement of society at large (i.e., the system). Stronger identification with this more specific and developed social identity indeed predicts collective action better than identification with the less specific social identity (see Stürmer & Simon, 2004, for a review).

The notion of politicized identity is important because it identifies the general public as another important social group (a source of support and power) that intuitive politicians like to impress and use to achieve social change (Herrera & Reicher, 1998; see also Hornsey et al., 2006). This is especially important for low-status or low-power groups because they are most likely to need the support of the general public to pressure those in power to concede to their demands. Indeed, it is through the experience of participation in collective action that people become aware that such support is necessary to achieve social change (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2000; Reicher, 1996). Taken together, theory and research on intuitive politicians suggests that they will “tailor” their identity-relevant responses to collective disadvantage to (1) their own group (who can be mobilized through intragroup communication channels), (2) those in power (who can be challenged through intergroup communication channels), (3) third parties (who can be addressed and mobilized to pressure those in power to concede).

Intuitive Theologians

Individuals can also be motivated to believe that the ground rules of the current social structure are not relative, but absolute. This provides a moral benchmark for a group that, once transgressed, results in a motivation among individuals to protect these “sacred” values (Tetlock, 2002). For example, protesters against the legalization of abortion may engage in collective action as intuitive theologians who respond to “perceived threats to sacred values, values that—by community consensus—are deemed beyond quantification or fungibility” (Tetlock, 2002, p. 454, italics added). In other words, intuitive theologians are motivated to protect “sacred” group values from “secular” encroachment. This fits nicely with research on social identity that suggests that—unlike low identifiers—high identifiers commit even more strongly to their group’s identity when under siege (e.g., Ellemers et al., 1997).

Remarkably little, however, is known about this motivation for collective action. Theory and research have discussed variables like ideology (Van Stekelenburg et al., 2009), and moral connotations of relative deprivation (Folger, 1986). However, the intuitive theologian metaphor refers specifically to moral conviction: Strong attitudes toward an issue that are deemed to be absolute (Skitka et al.,
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(2005). This key element of absoluteness has not been examined in the literature on collective action. However, there is emerging evidence for the moral dimension as central to the intergroup realm (e.g., Leach, Ellemers, & Barreto, 2007), and there are some indications that intuitive theologians can be important to theory and research on collective action.

According to Tetlock et al.'s (2000) sacred value protection model, when sacred values are transgressed, individuals experience motivated arousal that transforms into moral outrage responses (i.e., a desire to vilify the transgressors), and moral cleansing responses (i.e., a desire to reaffirm the transgressed value). In line with this proposal, Tetlock et al. (2000) showed that strongly religious people responded with moral outrage and moral cleansing when people doubted the moral superiority of Jesus. In addition, Van Zomeren and Lodewijkx (2005) showed that observers’ responses to innocent victims of “senseless” violence resulted in similar sacred value protection responses, presumably because their fundamental beliefs in a just world were transgressed. Furthermore, Skitka, Baumann, and Mullen (2004) showed that moral outrage decreased political tolerance after the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center in New York. All these findings suggest that individuals may protect their moral conviction from “secular” encroachment. However, moral conviction has not explicitly been related to individuals’ group-based motivation for collective action.

Nonetheless, intuitive economist and politicians might be puzzled by responses of moral outrage after transgressions of their moral conviction. These responses do make sense, however, when thinking of people as intuitive theologians who defend their subjective moral boundaries. The lack of research on collective action from an intuitive theologian perspective therefore suggests the undiscovered potential of this group-based metaphor of protest. However, simply noting a gap does not necessarily make clear meaningful ways to fill it, so we will develop new hypotheses about intuitive theologians (as well as intuitive economists and politicians) below. We also apply our analysis to the domains of practice and policy, because our analysis suggests that viewing humans as having different motivation for collective action requires different interventions to move them in action.

Developing New Hypotheses and Practical Recommendations

Our analysis of classifying different motivations for collective action onto individual-based and group-based metaphors of social functionalism resulted in two core insights: First, the individual-based motivations reflect low identifiers’ motivations for collective action, whereas the group-based motivations reflect high identifiers’ motivations for collective action. Second, although theory and research has examined intuitive economists and politicians’ motivation for collective action, it has not examined intuitive theologians’ motivation for collective action. Indeed,
if we want to understand, for example, the Chinese student taking a stand to force a tank come to a halt, the psychology of the intuitive economist alone would not suffice. Rather, explanations that base individuals’ motivations in their awareness and accountability to particular audiences, or in their protection of sacred values, provide different and complementary explanations of why people protest. We discuss the implications of this analysis for each metaphor below.

**Intuitive Economists**

Note that our analysis does not suggest that intuitive economists are unimportant to collective action. Even those who identify weakly with a disadvantaged group may end up protesting as long as they have individual-based instrumental reasons for doing so. And even when the individual-based intuitive economist motivates people not to engage in collective action (e.g., take a free-ride), group-based motivations may still lead people to do so. This implies, for one, that although the free-rider problem has long been thought to be at the roots of the problem of nonparticipation in collective action (Olson, 1968), this problem seems to be a problem primarily for low identifiers. Moreover, our analysis implies that because low identifiers have different motivations for collective action than high identifiers, their mobilization for collective action should follow different motivational trajectories.

Our analysis leads more specifically to the following three testable hypotheses. First, low identifiers should engage in more calculation of costs and benefits than high identifiers, and engage in more instrumental reasoning when deciding to engage in collective action (e.g., in terms of relying on their group efficacy beliefs). Second, low identifiers should also be in more need of information about such instrumental factors than high identifiers. Third, low identifiers should be more open to social influence targeting these instrumental factors than high identifiers. Especially the latter hypothesis has important practical and socially consequential implications.

Indeed, our analysis implies that intuitive economists are especially important to acknowledge for social movements because focusing on sympathizers’ instrumental motivations (e.g., cost–benefit calculations, group efficacy beliefs) may particularly mobilize the low identifiers to engage in collective action. Given that typically only a very low percentage of the mobilization potential of a disadvantaged group is mobilized for collective action (Klandermans, 1997; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994), understanding low identifiers’ motivation for collective action is important to both theory and practice of collective action. Therefore, a practical recommendation derived from our analysis is that social movement campaigns should provide low identifiers with information about the benefits of collective action (including the group’s efficacy to achieve its goals) to satisfy the intuitive economists within.
**Intuitive Politicians**

What about high identifiers? Our analysis implies that high identifiers’ motivation for collective action depends on which group-based metaphor is relevant for them. On the one hand, the intuitive politicians among them are motivated to maintain positive social identities in the face of other important groups in their social world to whom they are accountable through intergroup power differences. On the other hand, the intuitive theologians among them are more likely to defend the fundamental values of their social group when these are under siege.

Our analysis contributes to the psychology of the intuitive politician in terms of two testable hypotheses. First, if a sense of politicized identity is necessary for intuitive politicians to become motivated for strategic collective action despite intergroup differences in power, then individuals whose identity is not politicized should not be similarly affected by (or simply care less for) third-party support as individuals with a politicized identity. Indeed, only the latter should realize the strategic opportunities provided by the audience of the general public and try to put them to use (as indicated by, e.g., a willingness to persuade them to join their struggle). In contrast, individuals whose identity is not politicized should not care about the general audience at best and may even be more strongly motivated to take a free-ride at worst. Note that this should be true even when individuals have a strong sense of (unpoliticized) identification with the larger social group.

Second, because the social identity tradition emphasizes the importance of the larger social structure in determining whether low-status group members will engage in collective action despite intergroup power differences, there may be an interaction between sociostructural conditions on the one hand, and audience factors on the other hand (e.g., Scheepers et al., 2006). More specifically, we hypothesize that audience considerations should only be relevant when sociostructural factors indicate hope and scope for social change. This means that intuitive politicians require at least some prospects of social change in order to engage in strategic, power-based, identity-relevant behavior.

Alternatively, intuitive politicians may still aim to achieve social change even in the face of a status quo supported by the existing social structure. An interesting question here is how intuitive politicians can manage to prevent fellow group members from accepting the status quo when there is little hope or scope for social change. We hypothesize that one way to prevent collective acceptance of the status quo is strategically to use intragroup channels of communication (and the in-group audience it includes), in which social identities can become politicized “underground,” while acting as if accepting the status quo when facing those in power. If true, then those with a politicized identity should perceive and value the possibility of “underground resistance” more than those whose identity is not politicized when chances of social change are limited.
The intuitive politician metaphor also has important implications for practice and policy because of its focus on intergroup power differences. First of all, social movements should aim to develop politicized identities among their sympathizers. In contrast to the individual-based intuitive economists, intuitive politicians should be targeted through their group-based motivations. Social influence attempts (e.g., a mobilization campaign) should therefore focus on the “activist” content of individuals’ social identity (and with it group norms that prescribe acting on behalf of the group; see Stürmer & Simon, 2004), on the importance of the power struggle fought out in the public domain, and on the importance of third parties to pressure those in power to concede. Thus, mobilizing intuitive politicians requires a greater focus on intergroup power differences and thus different motivations compared to mobilizing intuitive economists.

Intuitive Theologians

As noted, we believe that the intuitive theologian metaphor offers most scope for theoretical innovation and novel research. We therefore develop three new hypotheses to be explored by future research on collective action.

First, if intuitive theologians are motivated for collective action through defending the moral boundaries of their social group, then the strength of their moral identity (e.g., Aquino & Reed II, 2002) should directly predict their engagement in collective action. Moral identity establishes the boundaries between those who agree and those who disagree on moral values deemed absolute and integral to the self. Interestingly, research has shown that stronger moral identity results in stronger prosocial behavior to out-group members (Reed II & Aquino, 2003). This suggests that intuitive theologians may even take part in collective action on behalf of out-groups (e.g., McGarty, Bliuc, Thomas, & Bongiorno, 2009). However, theory and research on moral conviction (e.g., Skitka et al., 2004; 2005) suggests that intuitive theologians become enraged when individuals’ moral identity is threatened, resulting in a strong defense of their moral boundaries. This should be indicated especially by moral outrage responses toward the out-group (i.e., feelings of anger and a desire to vilify those who represent the moral threat; see Skitka et al., 2004; Tetlock et al., 2000). Research should test these competing hypotheses.

Second, if moral identities are developed on the basis of subjective sacred values, then research should examine which values are most commonly perceived as “moral” (i.e., the normative content of such identities). For example, Baumeister and Leary’s (1995) proposition of a fundamental need to belong suggests that, at the group level, denying belongingness to those who deserve it would enrage intuitive theologians (because they are highly identified with the group and hence use harsher inclusion and exclusion criteria; Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman, 1993). A good example of this line of thought may be collective action against the extradition of asylum seekers (i.e., exclusion from one’s nation). Moreover, moral
conviction may also motivate collective action to support universal human rights (as for instance organized by Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch). Thus, issues of belonging and universal human rights can be likely bases of moral identities (i.e., the normative content of a moral identity) and hence represent a motivation for collective action to protect them.

Third, our analysis suggests that there may be a difference between moral conviction on the individual and the group level. For example, whereas individual moral conviction (which is part of individuals’ personal identity) should apply their beliefs to any other individual, collective moral conviction (which is part of individuals’ social identity) should apply their beliefs more to in-group than out-group members (i.e., moral in-group bias). This may operate in two different directions: (1) giving the benefit of the doubt to morally transgressing in-group but not out-group members and (2) including out-group members into the in-group when out-group members transgress against the moral beliefs of the out-group (i.e., when they betray their own group). Thus, we hypothesize different implications of individual and collective moral conviction. Future research should test these hypotheses to improve our understanding of the psychology of the intuitive theologian.

In practical terms, it is not hard to think of real-life examples of intuitive theologians collectively rising to meet those who are perceived as a moral threat. For example, when thinking about the U.S. misconduct of Iraqi prisoners, feelings of moral outrage among those identifying with the Iraqi, Arab, or more generally the Muslim world may result in collective action to defend their moral boundaries. Interestingly, however, it may be the case that moral conviction is not restricted to low-status group members’ motivation for collective action. Indeed, moral conviction may be a strong motivation for collective action for individuals from low or high status groups, as long as they identify strongly with their moral identity. For practitioners of collective action, raising individuals’ sense of moral identity and moral threat should therefore be a potent motivator of collective action to defend “absolute truths.”

**Conclusion**

This article proposed a classification of a variety of motivations for collective action along the lines of three general metaphors of social functionalism (Tetlock, 2002), and the distinction between high and low identifiers with a low-status group (Ellemers et al., 1999; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This classification is not meant to be exhaustive and aims to inspire scientific discussion. It suggests the general insights that low identifiers are more likely to resemble intuitive economists whereas high identifiers are more likely to resemble intuitive politicians and theologians, and that progress and innovation in theory and research on collective action lies in the group-based metaphors in general, and in the intuitive theologian metaphor
in particular. Our analysis resulted in new hypotheses for all three metaphors, with an emphasis on the largely undiscovered country of intuitive theologians’ motivations for collective action.

With these insights in mind, let us conclude by returning to the student blocking the way of a Chinese tank at Tiananmen Square on the 1989 World Press Photo. What motivated him to stand still in defiance of tons of steel? We believe we can understand his act of protest better if we assume him to be an intuitive politician or theologian than an intuitive economist: Perhaps he knew that cameras were flashing, making his action a protest statement for the world’s audience to witness. Perhaps he was driven by moral outrage over the Chinese intervention that transgressed fundamental, sacred values. Whatever the answer, this article hopes to show that asking questions that go beyond traditional assumptions about human motivation is important for a better understanding and appreciation of the diversity and complexity of individuals’ motivations for collective action.

References


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